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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I examine Friedrich Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power, his account of
friendship and his understanding of human flourishing. Through textual analysis, I offer a new
way of interpreting the will to power, as the achieving of self-realization. The process of
achieving self-realization is undergirded by the satisfaction of seven existential needs that are
rooted in the paradoxical human conflict between instincts and consciousness. The existential
needs are the need for a frame of orientation, the need for devotion, the need for unity, the need
for rootedness, the need for stimulation, the need for effectiveness and the need for self-love.
While there are a variety of ways in which these needs can be satisfied, I propose a norm of
satisfaction: beauty. I appropriate the ancient Greek concept of to kalon and claim that this
notion of “action for the sake of the beautiful” is the primary normative standard that Nietzsche
would advocate for how an individual ought to satisfy his existential needs. I then turn to an
analysis of friendship in order to demonstrate its supportive role in self-realization. I claim that
Nietzsche does in fact have an account of friendship, albeit one that must be pieced together
from various middle works and that he presents genuine friendship as a mean condition existing
between various sets of excessive and deficient vices that are constantly in tension. Friendship is
the virtue that, if authentic, can bear a mutually supportive relation with the will to power. I
argue that the will to power and the virtue of friendship are two primary elements that constitute
human flourishing, but a particular kind of human flourishing that includes both happiness and
unhappiness as siblings.
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Chapter One
Introduction
Through the Nietzschean lens, what does it mean to flourish as a human being? If human
flourishing is possible, then what are the constitutive elements of such an existence? What kind
of happiness can we possibly hope to occupy in modernity, where our “new happiness” is not
merely one of pleasure and comfort, but one that is representative of an excellent human life? In
order for us to properly understand what Friedrich Nietzsche’s conception of human flourishing
is, we must question the traditional understanding of happiness. This inquiry will involve an
examination and a re-thinking of the will to power, which is one of the central themes in
Nietzschean thought and one of the most often misunderstood. Comprehension of what a
Nietzschean picture of human flourishing is will also require us to think seriously about the role
of friendship in our understanding of the “new happiness.”
In chapter two, I construct a Nietzschean picture of human nature, appropriating Erich
Fromm’s characterization of humanity as a fundamental conflict between instincts and
consciousness. I offer a new interpretation of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power as the
achieving of self-realization, a process which is constituted by the satisfaction of the existential
needs arising from the instinct/consciousness inner split. I then provide an assessment of the will
to power in which I argue that such a process of achieving should not be understood as a moral
phenomenon but as a psychological one. I make an inquiry into what the true essence of power
is and how it manifests itself in multifarious ways. I then look into the relationship between
power and wisdom, specifically as this relationship is presented by Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. The
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second chapter concludes with a discussion of beauty, which I argue is the fundamental norm for
the satisfaction of our existential needs.
In chapter three, I make a detailed analysis of each of the existential needs as they present
themselves within the human condition. First, we explore the existential needs for rootedness,
effectiveness and excitation/stimulation. Next, we delve into the existential needs for a frame of
orientation, devotion and unity. I pay special attention to the existential need for unity, since the
kind of inner unity for which Nietzsche advocates is complex and idiosyncratic.

Upon

improving our conception of this Nietzschean unity, we will also improve our understanding of
selfhood. I then attempt to untangle two related processes: the satisfaction of an existential need
and the sublimation of a drive. Finally, I examine the existential need for a relation of self-love,
an existential need which I add to Fromm’s set.
In chapter four, I investigate the ontological status of the will to power and ask, “Does the
doctrine of the will to power express a myth or is it a truth?” In order to answer this question, I
claim that we must first understand what Nietzsche takes to be the nature of philosophy: “Is
philosophy an art or a science?” Because the doctrine of the will to power lies within the realm
of philosophical discourse, gaining insight into the broader sphere of philosophical inquiry will
enhance our insight into this particular doctrine. I then provide three models of achieving selfrealization in order to make more concrete the process of self-realization. These three models
are the saint, the artist and the philosopher; however, the first two models are in a sense merely
steps toward the becoming of a philosopher, which serves as the ultimate model of an individual
who exemplifies a will to power. Drawing from Nietzsche’s discussion of higher selves in his
essay, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” I argue that Arthur Schopenhauer actually serves as an
2

exemplar of the will to power, despite such a notion not being a part of his own philosophical
perspective.
In chapter five, I claim that Nietzsche does in fact have an account of friendship, and I
interpret his account of friendship as a mean condition, appropriating Aristotle’s notion of a
mesotês [mean condition] lying between a plurality of vicious conditions. I discuss and reply to
a few objections that might be raised against such an account of friendship and also that might be
raised against this virtue ethical approach more generally. I then explain how the virtue of
friendship supports the achieving of self-realization (i.e. the will to power) and reciprocally how
exemplifying the will to power supports the activity of friendship. I conclude this chapter with
some distinctions between erotic love, neighbor-love and friendship.
My interpretation of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power provides new insight into
Nietzsche’s understanding of selfhood and also offers a new way to think about the relation
between power and the self. My argument that, properly understood, the will to power is the
achieving of self-realization shows Nietzsche to have anticipated and be a precursor to the
recognition of the importance of selfhood in social psychology, analytical psychology and
psychoanalysis in the twentieth century.

Exploring Nietzsche’s notion of the self, and

particularly the higher self, throughout this project draws closer the link between philosophy, as
an enterprise that promotes becoming an excellent human being, and psychology, as a discipline
that investigates the human psyche. In addition, my claim that Nietzsche does in fact provide an
account of friendship provides a segue to viewing Nietzsche as a virtue ethical thinker. Because
Nietzsche wrote and thought more about friendship than any other virtue, our exploration of this
virtue could enhance our inquiry into the nature of other forms of excellence, both as represented
3

by Nietzsche and by other thinkers. Finally, the climax of this project lies in my claim that
friendship is the virtue that best supports the process of self-realization, and it is this connection
that illustrates just how the self-oriented aspect of the will to power and the other-oriented aspect
of friendship are not only compatible but mutually supportive. It is my hope that we can leave
behind the conception of Nietzsche as the advocate of an Übermensch who is isolated and
without companions and that we can improve our own understanding of how to possibly become
real selves and how to genuinely engage in friendship.

Human Flourishing: Rethinking Happiness and Unhappiness
It is an error to conceive of unhappiness and happiness as metaphysical opposites. We
must first recognize the error of placing our faith in such metaphysical opposites. In this inquiry,
the two “opposites” that must be exposed as such are happiness and unhappiness.1

One

dimension of happiness is the acceptance of two essential features of human existence in the
natural world: suffering and death. One must yield to the reality of the necessity of suffering in
human existence and to its apparent senselessness. To do otherwise and act on the impulse to
place as much distance as possible between one’s existence and suffering opens the way for the
tendency to create another world, absolutely free of suffering, that is more real than this one—
e.g. Christianity’s Kingdom of Heaven. Such an attitude would only be conducive to the kind of
(false) happiness that represents spiritual sickness and life-negation. The second dimension of
happiness is the acceptance of the absence of the objective (or absolute) meaningfulness of
1

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits. Trans. R. J.
Hollingdale. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986, Volume I, Sec. 1. See also
Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil in Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Trans. Walter Kaufmann.
New York: The Modern Library, 2000, Sec. 2.
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existence and the absence of objective values. These two affirmations will likely involve a
significant kind of unhappiness, perhaps even an engendering of an attitude of horror at the
seemingly vast nothingness of existence. However, there is “wisdom in pain,” especially this
aforementioned kind of existential pain. Of this painful sort of life-affirming attitude, Nietzsche
says:
[The bold seafarers’] expression is never prouder, more warlike, and happier than it is
when a storm comes up; indeed, pain itself gives them their greatest moments. This is the
heroic type, the great pain bringers of humanity, those few or rare human beings who
need the very same apology that pain itself needs—and truly, one should not deny it to
them. They contribute immensely to the preservation and enhancement of the species,
even if it were only by opposing comfortableness and by not concealing how this sort of
happiness nauseates them.2
This pain should be understood as an existential kind and as one associated with the “stormy sea
of existence,” for Nietzsche consistently uses the image of “the sea” to represent “existence”
throughout the GS. But there is a third dimension of this new happiness that one must consider:
a recognition of the degree of danger within oneself in not confronting the inner demands placed
on one by his needs and instincts.3 While there is a danger in not facing up to these inner
demands, there is an even more pressing potential danger with how an individual can satisfy the
collection of existential needs that may possibly conflict with each other or which may be hidden
from one’s consciousness.
So far, these dimensions of the new happiness appear to create a picture of happiness that
is quite far from the more traditional conceptions of happiness. The kind of traditional happiness
that Nietzsche attacks consists of a splitting off and destruction (or quieting) of the affects and a
single-minded promotion of the rational faculty’s hegemonic dominance. Any conception of
2

Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books,
1974, Sec. 318.
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happiness that equivocates happiness with reason’s triumph over the appetites, desires and drives
misunderstands the nature of humankind. So, the Socratic idea of a happy soul being three
entities fused into one—a many-headed beast (desires), a lion (the spirited element) and a man
(reason) all contained within the image of a man—but where reason rules the other two parts, is
not going to give due weight to the force that emotions and instincts have as constitutive
elements in the human psyche nor to the integral role that they play in the process of selfrealization.4 Also, Nietzsche would find problematic any conception of happiness that is lifenegating. Hence, the Kantian summum bonum, the exact correspondence of happiness with
morality that can exist only in an eternal kingdom of God, which he claims we ought to strive to
promote, along with its Christian forerunner would also be defunct.

For Nietzsche, the

traditional account of happiness may appear to be tranquil, yet such sought-for tranquility denies
the affective reality of humanity’s inner needs and destroys the possibility of harmonizing
desires with reason, or of harmonizing instinct with consciousness. The traditional conception of
happiness finds expression in several thinkers in the Western tradition, a few of which will
suffice to get an idea of Nietzsche’s target of attack. For Nietzsche, the utilitarian promotion of
the “happiness of the greatest number” implicitly assumes an equality between all human beings
and portrays an idealized leveling of any possible greatness downward to mediocrity.5 As such,
it is the opposite of the promotion of the kind of excellence and greatness associated with
genuine selfhood. As the classic utilitarian, John Stuart Mill’s general happiness principle is
characterized by impartiality and disinterestedness for all, yet it advocates such dispositions
without questioning the psychological possibility of being completely impartial and being

4

Plato. The Republic of Plato. Trans. Francis MacDonald. London: Oxford University Press,
1945, [line numbers] 588-589.
5
TSZ, “On the Higher Man,” Sec. 3, pp. 399-400. See also BGE, Sec. 225.
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completely disinterested. The utilitarian’s conception of happiness also incorrectly features
pleasure (and the absence of pain) as the defining criterion that constitutes happiness; however,
this is a mistake, for according to Nietzsche it is the degree of self-realization, or the
exemplification of a will to power, that is the central criterion for human flourishing. As we will
see, a self’s process of becoming is not essentially rational. The process requires a certain degree
of cognizance of the reality of the human condition. It is possible that not everyone is capable of
realizing a self. And the traditional notion of happiness will have to be sacrificed in order to
attain a higher measure of selfhood.
Despite the long-lived promotion of such traditional notions of happiness, there is a
dimension of hope and possibility for one who experiences the new happiness. Nietzsche
presents the idea that in order to discover and make “one’s own way” through the apparent
meaninglessness of suffering and pain, that one should develop a personal relationship to one’s
problems. What is this uniquely personal problem? I take it to be the problem of one’s own
unique and personal suffering being “incomprehensible and inaccessible to almost everyone.”6
No one can with absolute certainty understand my suffering, nor can I with absolute certainty
understand anyone else’s suffering. The language that one uses to describe his state of suffering
can be a distorting force that prevents him from reaching all the way down to such suffering. In
addition, because each action has a complex and unique history that can only be retrieved by a
shared (and leveling) language, our actions are also are for the most part unknowable to others
6

GS, Sec. 338. It is also the case that our most personal and profoundest joy is just as
unknowable to our neighbors; however, Nietzsche emphasizes the unknowability of one’s
suffering by another because such the most intense kinds of suffering feel more real to us. Think
of how our the suffering of one’s conscience has “more reality” when it experiences shame or
regret as opposed to the “felt reality” of the joy of one’s conscience when it praises itself. There
is an asymmetry between the felt experience of suffering and joy, one of Schopenhauer’s insights
that I take to be correct.
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and for many human beings unknowable even to themselves. Nietzsche correctly stresses this
important sense in which we are unknown to each other. He also underscores the idea that an
individual must let his own suffering lie upon him in order to find his way:
…if you experience suffering and displeasure as evil, hateful, worthy of annihilation, and
as a defect of existence, then it is clear that besides your religion of pity you also harbor
another religion in your heart that is perhaps the mother of the religion of pity: the
religion of comfortableness. How little you know of human happiness, you comfortable
and benevolent people, for happiness and unhappiness are sisters and even twins that
either grow up together or, as in your case, remain small together.7
In this same passage, Nietzsche continually speaks of “one’s own way”, “my own way”, “living
for yourself”—all as different expressions of one and the same goal. The preceding thought
about the necessity of affirming one’s own suffering as part of this new happiness presents the
new happiness as the condition for the possibility of selfhood. One loses one’s way toward the
realization of one’s self either by feeling a “weakening pity” toward others whereby one sees the
vulnerability and fragility of the other in oneself: realizing that the suffering of another could
possibly be my suffering; or by feeling this “weakening pity” toward oneself in which one
forgets that distress is “a sister to” happiness: unhappiness and happiness are siblings in that the
presence of the former makes its active overcoming a possibility. So the hallmarks of the new
happiness that Nietzsche advocates are danger, distress, and the capacity for suffering but also
risk, adventure and the possibility of creating a real self out of a destroyed apparent self. One
upshot of viewing happiness in this Nietzschean way is that the new happiness (and its
accompanying sibling unhappiness) is a disposition one must already occupy that makes possible
the exemplification of a will to power and the realization of a self. It has been thought that such

7

GS, Sec. 338. For a continued treatment of this “sisterhood” of happiness and unhappiness but
one that expands upon and further problematizes the religion of pity into two different kinds of
pity, pity “for the creature in man” and pity “for the creator in man,” see BGE 225.
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Nietzschean enterprise is a solitary commitment, yet Nietzsche articulates a social dimension to
the process of self-realization: the virtue of friendship. On my account, the will to power and the
virtue of friendship are mutually supportive of each other in human flourishing. A related upshot
from adopting this view is that human flourishing cannot be interpreted as (or equivalent to) the
traditional conception(s) of happiness.

The activity of flourishing, hence, is more closely

associated with the Nietzschean notion of “new happiness,” which involves realized selfhood
rather than the traditional notion of happiness. Interpreting the relation between Nietzsche’s new
happiness, the virtue of friendship and the will to power in this manner makes more intelligible
his problematizing of what he refers to as the error of cause and effect and of his reversal of the
moralistic and religious formula, “Do this and that, refrain from this and that—then you will be
happy!”:
In my mouth, this formula is changed into its opposite—first example of my “revaluation
of all values”: a well-turned-out-human-being, a “happy one,” must perform certain
actions and shrinks instinctively from other actions; he carries the order, which he
represents physiologically, into his relations with other human beings and things. In a
formula: his virtue is the effect of his happiness.8
Nietzsche postulates that humankind is not in a state of progress but is possibly in a state
of decline due to our unquestioned faith in truth, the negation of this world for some other “true”
world and the potential nihilistic consequences that may emerge from such post-Enlightenment
historical events. According to him, it is possible for a higher individual to internalize the
existential grief felt in recognizing that humankind is not progressing but potentially in a slow
state of deterioration, and it is in that internalized grief within a single individual that one can see
and welcome a new kind of happiness to embody. So even though Nietzsche claims that he does
8

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Twilight of the Idols: Or, How One Philosophizes with a Hammer in The
Portable Nietzsche. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Penguin Books, 1954, “The Four Great
Errors,” Sec. 2.
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not advocate a particular morality, he does appear to advocate a particular kind of egoism that
makes the realization of a self possible. The revaluation of the up-till-now devalued suffering,
pain and distress just is the active condition of a “happy one.” Some balance between selfcontempt (of one’s former failure to affirm life and self) and self-admiration (of one’s potential
vis creativa drawn up from his vis contemplitiva) must be struck in order to work towards
satisfying one’s existential needs.9 Such a precondition is the experience of “the sadness of the
most profound happiness.”10 The adoption of this stance prepares the way for one to consciously
tend to one’s existential needs. It is the satisfaction of one’s existential needs, rooted in the
internally agonistic nature between consciousness and needs—and between need and need—that
constitutes the achieving of self-realization. And it is through this achievement that one can
exemplify a will to power. I argue that friendship is the virtue that can best facilitate the
exemplification of the will to power, where both the embodiment of the will to power and
participation in genuine friendship are mutually supportive in attaining what Nietzsche considers
to be “a new happiness.”

9

This thought thematically connects sections 213, 214 and 301 of the GS.
GS, Sec. 183.
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Chapter Two
Bringing Forth a Self into the World: From Existential Needs to the Will to Power
We begin with the question: What is the will to power? A number of accounts have been
undertaken to render this crucial Nietzschean doctrine intelligible. As soon as one begins to
inquire into what the will to power is, its elusive and ambiguous nature begins to reveal itself.
But where does one even begin to inquire into this doctrine? How has the will to power been
defined? Philosophers have characterized the will to power in various ways—as a drive, as a
self-conscious myth, as a means to some further end, as the development of an activity pattern
and as an activity of overcoming resistance. Each of these views does not seem to accurately get
at the heart of the will to power’s essence.

I define the will to power as an existential

phenomenon: one that structures the satisfaction of our existential needs and that structures how
we come to value activities, things and people in the world. The will to power should be
considered existential because it is grounded in the social conditions of human existence. There
are a number of ways to categorize the conditions in which we exist: aesthetic, political, social,
meaning-laden, psychological, biological, physical, etc. Conceiving of the will to power in only
one of these fashions would be limiting because human existence is a comprehensive project in
which our becoming occurs simultaneously in terms of all the above categories. So while much
of my discussion of the will to power is psychological, thinking of it as a merely psychological
phenomenon would be incorrect. The will to power should be defined as the following: a
potential achieving of self-realization that is integral to the human condition but that is infinitely
differentiated for each human being. Two provisions to the will to power are that one can
succeed or fail in achieving self-realization (hence it being potential) and that the process of
11

achieving is fundamentally insatiable, in that the striving for self-realization is an ongoing
process and not an end-state (hence it being an achieving and not an achievement). In claiming
the will to power to be “infinitely” differentiated, I mean that it manifests itself or fails to
manifest itself (with varying levels and degrees between a more complete manifestation and a
less complete manifestation) in multifarious ways that are unique and particular to each human
being. Conceiving the will to power as infinitely differentiated does not mean that for each
person there are an infinite number of ways in which it can manifest itself—where a person
could act out of the will to power in any way he chooses. As human beings we are conditioned
by the limits that are imposed upon us by our contradictory nature: an instinctual life at odds
with consciousness. That contradiction generates existential needs that partially determine how
we engage with the world, yet the conscious dimension of our selves-in-progress makes possible
the capacity to choose how we will satisfy such needs and allows what we do to be evaluated
through the normative attitudes of oneself and of others. So, while there is an endless set of
ways in which particularity manifests itself, any one individual’s particularity is conditioned by
the structure of universally human needs.
I will employ Erich Fromm’s description of the human condition—whereby we possess a
complex and related set of existential human needs—in order to expound how the will to power,
as the human potential, is the “energy” that compels us to satisfy such needs. In focusing on
those needs dealing with human relationships, I augment Fromm’s list with a new existential
need—the existential need for self-love. The satisfaction of this need bears upon how other
social needs may or may not be successfully dealt with. In chapter three, I reference Karen
Horney’s account of the inner conflict between the despised self and the idealized self in order to
explicate this dimension of the will to power. An analysis of what Nietzsche says regarding the
12

will to power supports my conception of the will to power as the potential achieving of selfrealization that is integral to the human condition but that is infinitely differentiated with each
human being. So, all human beings possess the will to power, but it expresses itself in different
forms. Within each of those forms of expression, the will to power can present itself with
varying levels of strength and weakness, depending upon the psychology and history of an
individual and depending upon the social conditions in which she finds herself.
Human beings are both part of the natural world and are creatures who strive to become
more than mere natural beings. We struggle to stay alive and remain sane, but with varying
levels of success and failure. We also have a drive to feel at home in the world in which we
exist. So we ask ourselves: what is our nature as human beings? To answer this, I appropriate
Fromm’s idea that we can only define humankind’s nature “in terms of fundamental
contradictions that characterize human existence and have their root in the biological dichotomy
between missing instincts and self-awareness.”11

Today we exist with an ever-decreasing

determination of behavior by instincts and with an ever-increasing capacity for self-awareness,
reflectivity and imagination. Because of the growth of our brains (especially of the neocortex)
and these capacities, we are aware of our frailty, our helplessness, our separateness, our
powerlessness and our lostness. We are aware of our contradictory nature, and it can sometimes
generate a feeling of horror at its unintelligibility. This problem of consciousness in Fromm’s
thought strikingly echoes a Nietzschean line of thinking less than a century earlier in which
consciousness can be a danger to humanity if it is not balanced with action guided by our
instincts. In the GS, Nietzsche pinpoints consciousness’ late arrival on the human stage:
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Consciousness is the last and latest development of the organic and hence also what is
most unfinished and unstrong. Consciousness gives rise to countless errors that lead an
animal or man to perish sooner than necessary, “exceeding destiny,” as Homer puts it. If
the conserving association of the instincts were not so very much more powerful, and if it
did not serve on the whole as a regulator, humanity would have to perish of its
misjudgments and its fantasies with open eyes, of its lack of thoroughness and its
credulity—in short, of its consciousness; rather without the former, humanity would long
have disappeared.12
According to Nietzsche, our instincts have a kind of potency in guiding what we do, and that
strength forms more of “our core” than our consciousness in virtue of the fact that it has been
dominant for a longer period in our history. Nevertheless, there is a new tension that exists
between our instinctual life and our conscious life, and it is the very experience of that tension
through our consciousness that gives credence to its force. We feel ourselves pulled by an
instinct, but through the hesitance felt by our reflecting on the instinctual pull, a multitude of new
feelings of anxiety, guilt, shame and embarrassment can take the reins and be inhibiting forces
preventing action. Another way of describing this tension between instincts and consciousness
lies in the transition from how we experience instinctual drives to our consciousness of those
drives. A distortion occurs in this transition because we are limited by language how to convey
the idiosyncratic experiences of our instincts. Since we exist as social and political beings, a
need for communication presents itself—a need to communicate that which can be immeasurably
difficult to communicate in an accurate and meaningful way. Take the experience of fear that an
individual may have. One can say that he is “afraid of” someone or something, which results
from his cognitive and affective experience of some phenomenon that threatens his mental
stability, his bodily integrity or his life. Nevertheless, the linguistic expression, “I am afraid of
X,” is a distant approximation to what the experience of that fear feels like from the inside. Even

12
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providing a very detailed description of the subjective experience of some particular fear does
not come close to actually representing the experience itself. A similar problem presents itself
with several other emotional attitudes, especially the supposedly more extreme ones that are
designated by the words “love” or “hate.” This disparity between the instincts (and needs) and
our consciousness of such inner content causes our consciousness to continually attempt to
render such instincts meaningful. Thus, it is not incoherent for one to ask questions such as,
“Why do you love the person that you love?” or “Why do you feel animosity toward someone
that you hate?” The fact that answering such questions through reason and language is so
labyrinthine testifies to the inherent tension between instincts and consciousness. I take this
tension to be part of the contradiction that Fromm believes to define human nature, a notion that
is already present in Nietzsche:
…consciousness has developed only under the pressure of the need for communication;
that from the start it was needed and useful only between human beings… [ man] needed
to “know” how he felt, he needed to “know” what he thought… Man, like every living
being, thinks continually without knowing it: the thinking that rises to consciousness is
only the smallest part of all this—the most superficial and worst part—for only this
conscious thinking takes the form of words, which is to say signs of communication, and
this fact uncovers the origin of consciousness. …Fundamentally, all our actions are
altogether incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely individual; there is no doubt of
that. But as soon as we translate them into consciousness they no longer seem to be.13
We are walking contradictions in that so much of our waking life is this struggle to make sense
of and communicate the first-personal experiences to others. Much of this “figuring out” one’s
instinctual life is constituted by the manifold estimations that we make regarding our instincts
and the valuations that are already in place and shaped by those instincts.

This complex

relationship constituting the inner world of the soul—the battlefield between instincts and
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between one’s consciousness and one’s instincts—where meaning must be given to instinctual
drives is the foundation of our existential needs.14
The zenith of this overlap between Fromm and Nietzsche on humanity as a contradiction
comes to the fore in Nietzsche’s examination of conscience in the second essay of GM. There
the contradiction between instincts and consciousness has been transformed into a contradiction
between instincts and conscience in such a way that conscience is a more sharply evaluative
combatant against the instincts. Conscience, at least in its “bad” form, prevents one from acting
on instincts properly and thus from acting on the will to power as it can exist in its most excellent
form. “Bad conscience” originates out of the internalization of the instinct to cruelty in man.15
As we became civilized beings, the weaker were forced to live in conditions of “peace” and
“security” by those beings with stronger natures. According to Nietzsche, the inability to express
one’s instinct to cruelty forced that instinct to turn inward, and the delight in selflessness, selfsacrifice and self-denial secretly remained tied to the power felt by the cruelty done to oneself.
One legitimates such behavior by disguising it with the feeling of guilt and justifying it in terms
of punishment that one deserves. The particular form of guilt associated with a “bad conscience”
that is detrimental to the achieving of self-realization is the guilt experienced concerning the
aspects of one’s character and one’s personal history over which one has no control. Clearly not
all forms of guilt work against the realization of a self, for one should feel a sense of guilt if one
has placed oneself in a deed that is expressive of psychological sickness or of a life-negating
attitude. As we will see, operating under a “bad conscience” prevents one from satisfying the
existential need of developing a relation of self-love. The “bad conscience” therefore represents
14
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a reactive response to an instinct that is stifled, and such reactivity does not allow for a more
affirming attitude towards one’s instincts. Nietzsche elucidates the bad conscience as an illness
arising from discord between one’s evaluative consciousness and one’s instincts:
But thus began the gravest and uncanniest illness, from which humanity has not yet
recovered, man’s suffering of man, of himself—the result of a forcible sundering from his
animal past, as it were a leap and plunge into new surroundings and conditions of
existence, a declaration of war against the old instincts upon which his strength, joy, and
terribleness had rested hitherto….on the other hand, the existence on earth of an animal
soul turned against itself, taking sides against itself, was something so new, profound,
unheard of, enigmatic, contradictory, and pregnant with a future that the aspect of the
earth was essentially altered.16
Observe that Nietzsche leaves open the possibility of humankind working to transfigure the
fundamental contradiction that defines it. I argue that this transfiguration takes place when an
individual achieves self-realization through the satisfaction of his existential needs. While we
may not be able to nullify our defining contradiction, we may be able to harmonize the internal
agonistic structure between instincts and consciousness. “The future” that an individual is
potentially “pregnant with” is a realized self: a genuine human being who learns to live
excellently with both his instincts and his conscience. Despite the first impression one might
adopt upon reading the Genealogy’s second essay, then, conscience is not an entirely bad
phenomenon. The “bad conscience” should be contrasted with the intellectual conscience. As
Nietzsche says in the GS, the intellectual conscience is the reflective ability to question one’s
conscience, which has a pre-history in one’s instincts, likes, dislikes, experiences and lack of
experiences.17 It is the conscience behind one’s “conscience,” itself capable of providing a
reasoned account of one’s pros and cons, one’s valuations and one’s moral judgments. The
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intellectual conscience is an active faculty that involves self-examination, self-discovery and
self-creation—a turn inward that makes possible a reflective and evaluative attitude toward
oneself. This type of conscience is supportive of the project of “becoming who you are” while
the “bad conscience” frustrates the achieving of self-realization.
Based on this existential view of humankind, Fromm elucidates a set of existential needs
that are common to all human beings, and he refers to them as “existential” because they are
rooted in the very conditions of human existence—incorporating our multiple levels of existence
from the biological to the social. The following is a modified version of Fromm’s list of human
existential needs containing the psychic needs that are outlined by Fromm and the need that I
have added to it (the addition is italicized):

1. Need for a frame of orientation
2. Need for devotion
3. Need for rootedness
4. Need for unity

Achieving of Self-Realization

5. Need for effectiveness
6. Need for excitation and stimulation18
7. Need for a relation of self-love
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This comprehensive set of human existential needs sets the stage for us to become actors in the
social conditions in which we find ourselves. As we will see, there is a potentially infinite set of
drives that are extensions of one or more of the more primal existential needs. For example, in
his On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche identifies an “instinct to cruelty” and a “will to
truth,” and it might be argued that these should also be included in the set of existential needs.
However, the instinct to cruelty is an extension of the need for effectiveness in that cruelty is one
particular kind of effectiveness amongst many kinds and also an extension of the need for
excitation in that cruelty is one particular form of stimulation.19 Similarly, the will to truth is an
extension of the need for a frame of orientation and the need for devotion in that truth is one
object of devotion amongst others insofar as one can be myth-oriented as opposed to knowledgeoriented.20 I mention these two drives, as opposed to the existential needs, because they would
be the first to be misinterpreted as existential needs in the Nietzschean corpus. Later in chapters
three and four, I will unpack this set of needs in some detail and decipher whether Nietzsche
himself would endorse such a list. Partitioning out the needs into groups will prove helpful in
understanding how they relate to each other and how they structure the larger project of
potentially achieving self-realization—and thus constituting the will to power.
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Assessing the Will to Power
We can respond to the constellation of existential needs in multifarious ways. A good
starting point to begin thinking about how we ought to satisfy our existential needs are the two
distinct ways that Fromm describes in which one can cognitively and affectively respond to
one’s existential needs. Fromm believes that two general patterns of response show themselves,
and he refers to them as syndromes: (1) the life-furthering syndrome, a productive orientation
consisting of love, solidarity, justice and reason and (2) the life-thwarting syndrome, a
destructive orientation consisting of sadomasochism, greed and narcissism.
We ought to be suspicious about the neatness of these two syndromes, however. The
character-rooted passions may not be so easily compartmentalized into one syndrome containing
nothing but supposedly positive values and emotions and an opposing syndrome containing
nothing but supposedly negative values and emotions. Fromm claims that love, solidarity,
justice and reason are interrelated and that they are all manifestations of the same productive
orientation that he calls the life-furthering syndrome.

Additionally, he claims that

sadomasochism, destructiveness, greed, narcissism and incestuousness belong to the opposing
life-thwarting syndrome.21 It is questionable whether in fact there is such a unity between love,
solidarity, justice and reason, or whether there is such a unity between sadomasochism,
destructiveness, greed, narcissism and incestuousness. A single human being’s psychological
interior could be fragmented in such a way that would not allow a neat unity of virtues or
conversely a neat unity of vices. The same worry holds for a single human life stretched out
over time. Could there be spheres of a person’s life where dramatically different aspects of a
single person manifest themselves, yet all still belong to the same person? It is possible for a
21
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person to be masochistic in his morbidly dependent personal relations but to sincerely work to
promote social justice in his public life. It is also possible for a person to be greedy in his
dealings in the business world, considering his competitors to be nothing more than just that—
business competitors—and yet to be a loving father to his children to whom he can devote
himself fully.

A good fictional (and conceptually possible) example of a character who

exemplifies both the life-furthering and life-thwarting syndromes in different dimensions of his
life is Dexter, from the Showtime drama of the same name. As a serial-killer who is obsessed
with and compelled to kill and dismember murderers, Dexter expresses the life-thwarting
syndrome: he despises the fact that he cannot change the tragic and horrific death of his mother
(the origin of his rage towards his experience of the senselessness of suffering), and he becomes
a slave to his vengefulness, which is never sublimated but only intensified with each kill. On the
other hand, as a husband and father, Dexter expresses the life-furthering syndrome in his
commitment to being a moral exemplar for those whose lives he desires to enhance in a lifeaffirming manner. Even though the example is somewhat extreme, it’s extremity is instructive in
exposing the plurality of roles that one can fill and the discord that can exist within an individual.
As our inquiry into the nature of the will to power moves forward, it is worth including
BGE 23 in our analysis because it refigures the doctrine of the will to power as a psychological
doctrine, in that it exists within the particular lived circumstances of human existence. It is
neither laden with metaphysical nor moral presuppositions. The “development of the doctrine of
the will to power” is performed under the rubric of psychology, “the queen of the sciences.”
Nietzsche stresses that we should not look away from a truth because it is hard to swallow. The
main theme of this section is that good (physio-) psychology should not allow the moral
prejudices to distort our picture of human needs and emotions. We are conditioned to think of
21

our drives as “good” or “bad”, but we must look past such moral prejudices to see that our drives
(and needs) are not good or bad in themselves. The entities that can be “good” or “bad” at most
are the complex affective and cognitive responses to our existential needs, and these needs
condition the possible responses that do or do not result. Nietzsche again attacks the faith in
opposites in this passage:
A proper physio-psychology has to contend with unconscious resistance in the heart of
the investigator, it has “the heart” against it: even a doctrine of the reciprocal dependence
of the “good” and the “wicked” drives, causes (as refined immorality) distress and
aversion in a still hale and hearty conscience—still more so, a doctrine of the derivation
of all good impulses from wicked ones.22
Nietzsche gives a robust description of his account of the will to power in BGE 259, one
that supports viewing the will to power as the potential achieving of self-realization, which is a
psychological and existential process underlying organic human life. Warning his reader to be
receptive to “the bottom of the matter” even though our “heart” may experience a sentimental
weakness in pondering what must be considered, Nietzsche says:
…life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and
weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one’s own forms, incorporation and at least,
at its mildest, exploitation—but why should one use those words in which a slanderous
intent has been imprinted for ages?23
Here the will to power is depicted in terms of growth and development even if such growth and
development is sometimes (but not always) at the expense of others. Notice also that the terms
in which he conveys the will to power are terms that already have a certain morally negative
connotation and “slanderous intent” associated with them. Something’s being difficult to accept
about the nature of a thing is not an argument against it though, especially when that alleged
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argument is based on preformed moral prejudices. Nietzsche further explains that for any
individual:
…it will have to be an incarnate will to power, it will strive to grow, spread, seize,
become predominant—not from any morality or immorality but because it is living and
because life simply is will to power.24
Here we again notice that the will to power is not moral in nature, but more importantly that it is
not immoral in nature. The process of striving to continually achieve a self that is more
harmonized and realized is part and parcel of the 'who-we-are' of the human condition. It is
interesting that Nietzsche uses and reuses the word “exploitation” to describe one of the possible
consequences of the essence of the will to power. To exploit something or someone is to use
them for one’s own growth and improvement, yet according to Nietzsche exploitation is not an
immoral phenomenon:
“Exploitation” does not belong to a corrupt or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs
to the essence of what lives, as a basic organic function; it is a consequence of the will to
power, which is after all the will of life.
Another possible consequence of the essence of life is benevolence, or improving the condition
of another out of love for her own sake. Such a consequence would also assist in the process of
self-realization.

Manifestations of Power
The section entitled “On the doctrine of the feeling of power” in The Gay Science is the
first place in Nietzsche’s body of work where he explicitly frames the feeling of power as a
doctrine. Here he refers only to “power” and to “the feeling of power” and not to the more
24
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specific “will to power,” but the exercise of one’s power is characterized as if it is an attempt to
satisfy certain human existential needs. As Nietzsche indicates, the preservation of our feeling of
power (and of power itself) has a certain prefiguring priority over any moral phenomena or
moral interpretations in that benefiting others or harming others are simply ways of exercising
one’s power upon others.25 One feature to notice is that the desire for power is more basic than
the moral phenomena of benevolence or malevolence. The concept operates on the plane of
human existence and of the existential conditions determining what we need to potentially
progress as human beings and not on a moral register. A second feature is that Nietzsche’s
discussion of power is essentially involved with an individual’s relation to others and how we
experience such relations to others. There is a close relationship between how we view ourselves
and how we view our relation to others. A third feature of the doctrine as presented here is the
idea that hurting others is a sign that we are still lacking power; hurting others reveals a sense of
frustration in the face of this poverty.26 Harming others is rooted in a lack of power in the
individual who acts destructively or thwarts the lives of others. This may initially appear to be
counterintuitive, yet if this is not the case, then Joseph Stalin, Adolf Hitler and Kim Jong Il
would exemplify the highest forms of the will to power, having near completely realized selves.
To further problematize the situation: if ability to dominate and control others is in fact the best
way of achieving self-realization, then some of the most villainous characters from literature and
film would also have to be Nietzsche’s exemplars of having the highest will to power.
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How are we justified in viewing the domination and control of others—as the opposite of
or as a failure to realize one’s will to power? There are two phenomena that illuminate this
claim: 1) an individual’s attitude toward revenge and mercy and 2) an individual’s attitude
toward fate. In terms of the first phenomenon, it is important to recognize that an act of revenge
is motivated by the inability to erase the harms/wrongs done to an individual in his past. He
feels powerless to change his status as a victim or as one made to feel inferior, the fact that he
suffered a trauma or harm as part of his history. Furthermore, because of this past impotence and
helplessness, he refuses to accept that part of his fate that he cannot possibly undo. These
internal schisms—between a person and his history and between that person and his unrelenting
attempts to “equalize” his own past sufferings with the future suffering of others—seem to be the
crux of the spiritual weakness underlying such an individual’s ability to undo that which is
necessary, i.e. his own past.

Nietzsche draws an analogy between the individual and the

community to contrast the revenge against fate that is made external when one harms others, and
the transfiguration of that attitude into one of love and/or forgiveness (The idea warrants being
quoted at length.):
As its power increases, a community ceases to take the individual’s transgressions so
seriously, because they can no longer be considered as dangerous and destructive to the
whole as they were formerly…As the power and self-confidence of a community
increase, the penal law always becomes more moderate; every weakening or imperiling
of [the power and self-confidence of a community] brings with it a restoration of the
harsher forms of [the penal law]…It is not unthinkable that a society might attain such a
consciousness of power that it could allow itself the noblest luxury possible to it—letting
those who harm it go unpunished. “What are my parasites to me?” it might say. “May
they live and prosper: I am strong enough for that!”…This self-overcoming of justice:
one knows the beautiful name it has given itself—mercy; it goes without saying that
mercy remains the privilege of the most powerful man, or better, his—beyond the law.27
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Here, the idea is that as a community develops and re-interprets its relationship to the past
“crimes” done against it, the community can come to “discharge” the deeds of the criminal,
relieving the resentful attitude it holds towards the past wrongs. Like the community, the
individual’s ability to endure its sufferings without seeking compensation for them becomes the
“measure of his wealth.” So, contrary to the view that domination and control of others is a sign
of power, for Nietzsche it is in fact a sign of weakness that is grounded in odium fati. The
individual who increases his power and approaches the creation of a self operates on a new
“principle”: he sublimates his odium fati into his amor fati.28 The growing wealth of the
community parallels the growing wealth of the powerful individual. Justice, understood as the
discharging of every crime by punishment, overcomes itself and transforms into a higher, more
enriched form of justice—justice as mercy [Gnade]: the active liberation of oneself from the
imprisoning idea that all debts must be paid back or else every debtor must be punished!29
When discussing how the sadist seeks power over others as the more barbaric form of
domination and control, Fromm expresses a line of thinking that is not very different from the
presentation of the will to power in the Genealogy. Of the sadistic character-type, Fromm states:
“He is sadistic because he feels impotent, unalive, and powerless. He tries to compensate for this
28
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lack by having power over others, by transforming the worm he feels himself to be into a god.
But even the sadist who has power suffers from his human impotence.”30 Both Fromm and
Nietzsche recognize the contradictory nature of the individual who acts on a will to power in a
life-thwarting manner, yet which gives rise to apparent power as opposed to a will to power.

The Self-Command of the Wise
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra provides a substantive look into the nature of the will to power as
a potential achieving of self-realization in the section of TSZ entitled “On Self-Overcoming.”
The section is addressed to “you who are wisest,” and Zarathustra says to the wisest that it is
their whole will that is the will to power. This might imply several things: that those who are
unwise do not possess the will to power as their whole will; that the unwise do not recognize that
the will to power is the will of life; or that those who are wise know that the will to power is the
very heart of life but that they do not act out of and from the will to power. Zarathustra’s three
points regarding commanding and obeying may illuminate which implications we should accept.
Those who are unwise are “the people”—the herd; the ignorant; those who have chosen to follow
their conscience without identifying themselves with their intellectual conscience. What does it
mean that the unwise do not possess the will to power as their whole will? I take it to mean that
they are capable of obeying but not capable of commanding. If one has the capacity to command
oneself, then one has the capacity to command oneself to do something or to perform some
action. I am assuming that commanding and acting are closely intertwined such that it would not
make sense to think of someone who would have the ability to command (herself or others) but
30
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not be able to act and place herself within the action. Thus, the unwise are too impotent for
genuine action. The second implication also seems to be the case: not only are the unwise
incapable of a full realization of their will to power but they also are not cognizant that the very
heart of life is the will to power. The third implication seems to be the most curious because in it
we draw a contrast between wisdom and action. Does the increase of wisdom inhibit genuine
action? Does genuine action preclude the possession of wisdom? Neither of these seems to be
true.

A certain amount of practical wisdom is needed in order to act well and to do so

successfully: knowing when to act, with whom to act, how to act, and for what causes to act.
Having the ability to command oneself, and thus to place oneself in one’s deed, is what is
required for one to achieve self-realization in and through a deed. When one takes one’s piece of
wisdom, “that the heart of life is the will to power,” and places that wisdom and oneself in one’s
action, then one has “overcome” one’s self, by bringing a self into reality and bringing that self
out of one ’s mere wisdom. Think of the way that an artist brings her idea out of her mind and
realizes it on a canvas. Thus, progress is made in achieving a more fully realized and more fully
overcome self. Interpreting self-overcoming as self-realization seems to be the most intelligible
and coherent way of explicating the notion.31
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There is one peculiar passage in “On Self-Overcoming” that further characterizes the
nature of the will to power, yet this alleged definition of the will to power can be easily
misinterpreted. Life itself appears to provide its definitive stance on the will to power:
Rather would I perish than forswear this; and verily, where there is perishing and a falling
of leaves, behold, there life sacrifices itself—for power. That I must be struggle and a
becoming and an end and an opposition to ends—alas, whoever guesses what is my will
should also guess on what crooked paths it must proceed.32
Bernard Reginster uses this as a definitive passage for his account of the will to power. He
argues, “Since the will to power is not simply a will to resistance [Widerstand] either, or the
desire for a condition in which some striving is perpetually frustrated by resistance or obstacles
to its fulfillment (there would be no ‘expansion, incorporation, growth’ unless the striving were
eventually successful), we must conclude that the will to power is a will to the very activity of
overcoming resistance.”33

Nevertheless, the will to power is not merely the activity of

overcoming resistance as he claims it is. Even though the will to power possesses the quality of
insatiability, there is yet a directedness to its movement. Reginster’s use of “resistance” is
somewhat on track, but it is too vague to fully characterize Nietzsche’s doctrine. What kind of
resistance should an individual overcome? There can be and often is resistance against the
satisfaction of our existential needs, yet the needs do coalesce and aim at a kind of goal—that of
self-realization. If the will to power were equivalent to the activity of overcoming resistance,
then one could be overcoming various forms of resistance but those instances of resistance could
be completely unconnected.

In such a case there would be no unification of the diverse
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occasions of overcoming resistance, leaving out the importance of unity and failing to
acknowledge the actual essence of the will to power, which is the realization of a self.

Beauty: The Fundamental Norm
The discussion above allows us to develop a more complex understanding of the norm
operative in assessing manifestations of the will to power than Fromm’s simplistic understanding
of ‘life-affirming’ and ‘life-denying’ assessments.

How should an individual satisfy his

existential needs? Is there a norm of satisfaction that guides one toward the goal a realizing a
self? The concept that plays this role in Nietzsche’s thought is beauty. It is beauty that captures
all of the dimensions of flourishing that we touched on in the preceding discussions.
The norm of beauty addresses the complex and unsystematic dynamic between the
existential needs and our responses to them. First of all, the norm of beauty does not correlate
with what is traditionally thought of as good. We may have to rid ourselves of standard
conceptions of “good” and “evil” and replace them with the more appropriate “beautiful” and
“shameful”, two norms that might be considered opposites, but that both lie within the human
world of experience. Nietzsche presents this idea early on in the fifth book of Daybreak:
As we go about in nature, with joy and cunning, bent on discovering and as it were
catching in the act the beauty proper to everything; as we try to see how that piece of
coastline, with its rocks, inlets, olive trees and pines, attains to its perfection and mastery
whether in the sunshine, or when the sky is stormy, or when twilight has almost gone: so
we ought to go about among men, viewing and discovering them, showing them their
good and evil, so that they shall behold their own proper beauty which unfolds itself in
one case in the sunlight, in another amid storms, and in a third only when night is falling
and the sky is full of rain. Is it then forbidden to enjoy the evil man as a wild landscape
possessing its own bold lineaments and effects of light, if the same man appears to our
eyes as a sketch and caricature and, as a blot in nature, causes us pain, when he poses as
30

good and law-abiding?—Yes, it is forbidden: hitherto we have been permitted to seek
beauty only in the morally good—a fact which sufficiently accounts for our having found
so little of it and having had to seek about for imaginary beauties without backbone!—As
surely as the wicked enjoy a hundred kinds of happiness of which the virtuous have no
inkling, so too they possess a hundred kinds of beauty: and many of them have not yet
been discovered.34
We discover an individual’s beauty “in the sunlight” or “amid storms” or “only when the night is
falling.” There is a vast range of different human beings that have the ability to exemplify
beauty, and we ought not to seek such beauty only in the morally good. Since we should be
looking for “beauties with backbone,” it may very well be the case that the kind of beauty that
should guide our satisfaction of existential needs will be associated with courage and
fearlessness of some sort. Even though we ought to look to individuals other than “the morally
good” for this new standard of action, we also should not think that we are to only find this
standard instantiated in “the evil.” We should conceive of Nietzsche’s standard in the following
terms: the existential needs should be satisfied not merely for their own sake but for the sake of
the beautiful, and they ought not to be satisfied in a shameful way.
In order to better understand what it means to act for the sake of the beautiful, we should
try to get a handle on what kind of shameful existence people can occupy in modernity.
Nietzsche uses the metaphor of nakedness to indicate how we tend to view ourselves as
existential creatures stripped of our moral clothing. We dress ourselves up with the notions of
“duty, virtue, sense of community, honorableness, self-denial”—and yet the reason why we
fashion ourselves in such a way is not to hide “human malice and villainy.” The reason why we
wear moral costumes is our sickness. Nietzsche says that “it is precisely as tame animals that we
are a shameful sight and in need of the moral disguise, that the ‘inner man’ in Europe is not by a
34
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long shot bad enough to show himself without shame (or to be beautiful).”35 Thus, our shame
has its basis in a kind of psychological sickness—a sickness of “profound mediocrity, timidity
and boredom with itself.” One who is too weak to have a real effect on anything or who is too
much a coward to begin the activity of self-realization experiences himself as impotent and
naked, which causes him to adorn himself with the moral decorations of self-sacrifice and
neighborly-love, for this is all that he is capable of. This kind of other-oriented attitude that
stems from a shameful weakness is precisely the kind of so-called “compassion” that Nietzsche
rightfully derides. Observe also that Nietzsche intimates that part of the reason for being “a
shameful sight” is that “[the ‘inner man’] is almost an abortion, scarce half made up, weak,
awkward.”36

The image of one being an abortion signifies the following: incompleteness,

destruction before wholeness, lack of full development, premature resignation. Similarly, the
picture of being “half made up” conveys fragmentation and being unfinished work-in-progress.
It is therefore reasonable to identify the primary source of shame as failing to realize a whole
self—evident, for example, in the person who acts on cruelty rather than mercy.
With careful eyes and digging tools, we can unearth further evidence of the connection
between beauty and selfhood in the section entitled “On Those Who Are Sublime” in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra. Who are those who are sublime? The sublime represent a type of people who are
“ascetics of the spirit” and who have the capacity to make judgments—for we internally possess
weights and scales and are inherently “weighers”—and to act on their judgments, yet who have
withdrawn from transforming themselves into graceful beings. Perhaps only those who have
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strong wills and the potential to be even stronger wills can embody the kind of gracefulness that
Nietzsche closely associates with the great-souled person. The beautiful serves as a telos for one
for whom it is possible to achieve self-realization, a figure whom I believe takes on various
labels for Nietzsche: the strong will; the great-souled person; the hero; the sublime one. The
core passage in this section is the following:
To stand with relaxed muscles and unharnessed will: that is most difficult for all of you
who are sublime. When power becomes gracious and descends into the visible—such
descent I call beauty. And there is nobody from whom I want beauty as much as from
you who are powerful: let your kindness be your final self-conquest. Of all evil I deem
you capable: therefore I want the good from you. Verily, I have often laughed at the
weaklings who thought themselves good because they had no claws.37
Such an account of what characterizes ‘beauty’ clearly echoes our earlier discussion of power in
terms of the transition from cruelty to justice to mercy. Thus ‘beauty’ refers to a particular
manner in which power manifests itself. Possessing the ability to “stand with relaxed muscles”
but yet to stand with an “unharnessed will” is an apt description of one who has self-mastery and
the discipline to harness one’s will in a purposive way. Power only becomes beautiful when it
transforms into graciousness and “descends” into concrete actuality (i.e. becomes “visible”).
Kindness performed from the motive of over-flowing power serves as the pinnacle of beautiful
action, or action done for the sake of the beautiful. It’s interesting that perhaps only those who
are capable of great evil are capable of sublimating such coarse acts into actions which are fine
and beautiful. The final sentence about “the weaklings” exhibits the same sense of shame that is
present in the earlier discussion of GS 352, in that such weak wills are likely to be the ones who
must mask their impotence with “moral” disguises.
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Taking what we have gleaned from Zarathustra and The Gay Science, we discover a dual
sense in which beauty serves as the normative standard for the Nietzschean project of satisfying
one’s existential needs in order to achieve self-realization: an action’s virtue lies in its being
done for the sake of the beautiful and a self becomes more fully realized as it makes itself a
beautiful human being. Both senses are present in Nietzsche’s thought and both senses of beauty
bear a strong resemblance to the ancient Greek idea of to kalon that we find in Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics. As Aristotle says, we should start to understand the relation between
beauty and excellence by first looking at particulars and then work our way toward the general
conception of excellent actions as done for the sake of the beautiful.38 In Book III of the NE,
Aristotle says that there are many things of which we are afraid—e.g., loss of reputation,
poverty, disease, loss of friends, death, etc.—but that death is the most frightening thing to most
people. However, he suggests that the virtuous person is more afraid of shame and disgrace than
dying a beautiful death, and that such a person has developed the kind of ethical perception to
decipher what is genuinely to be feared and what not:
…[the courageous person] will endure [frightening things] in the way one ought and
keeping them in proportion, for the sake of the beautiful, since this is the end that belongs
to virtue….So one who endures or fears what one ought, for the reason one ought, as one
ought, when one ought, and is confident in similar ways, is courageous, since the
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courageous person undergoes things and acts in accordance with what is worthy and in a
way that is proportionate.39
A person who exemplifies courage has the ability to recognize those things that are worth
defending or are worth achieving, and he has the ability to endure the frightening things that
threaten that which has true worth. Throughout his remarks on courage, Aristotle continuously
contrasts a courageous activity as a beautiful thing with a cowardly activity as a shameful thing.
Beauty thus serves as the determining feature of what is excellent, and shame serves as the
determining feature of what is base. The norm of beauty and its counterweight shame are not
diametrically opposed poles. Courage is an active condition that, when it done from the right
motivation, will be performed for the sake of the beautiful, and one will situate oneself
appropriately toward the emotions of fear and confidence. Similarly, acting under the norm of
beauty will then constitute the Nietzschean becoming of a person’s higher self.40
We might wonder what the source is of norms of beauty and shame. Richard Schacht
claims that for Nietzsche the “Ur-source” of normativity is “the indisputably real historically
engendered, culturally configured and socially encoded macro- and micro-forms of human life or
broader and narrower Lebenssphären, (‘spheres of life’)…in which our human reality expresses
and develops itself.”41 While Schacht speaks about normativity in general arising out of our
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forms of life, I believe the same can be said about the more specific norms of satisfaction of
beauty and shame. Their existence and reality qua norms goes no further than human existence
and human reality. Conceiving of normativity in this way creates a space in which Nietzschean
norms can hold some degree of relativity between socio-culturally differentiated forms of life yet
possess a kind of universal “what-it-is” that is shared by those varied instantiations.42
According to Aristotle, the norms of beauty and shame play a role in determining when a
person exemplifies the active conditions of temperance, generosity, magnificence, greatness of
soul, the nameless mean condition concerning honor, truthfulness [alētheia] about oneself, and
friendship. Concerning temperance, the virtuous person’s desires must be in harmony with his
reason, “for the aim to which both look is beautiful.”43 With regard to generosity, Aristotle
associates beauty with the activity of giving and says that “it is more characteristic of virtue to
act well than to be acted upon well, and to do beautiful things rather than not do shameful ones,
and it is not unclear that acting well and doing beautiful things go with giving, while being acted
upon well or not doing what is shameful goes with getting.”44 This account of generosity
resembles my account of the overflowing power of genuine self-realization, in which one desires
to give out of an abundance of stored-up spiritual health.

Additionally, this account of

generosity also resembles Nietzsche’s account of the gift-giving virtue. Zarathustra says that the
highest virtue is uncommon and useless and that it is gleaming and gentle in its splendor: “a giftgiving virtue is the highest virtue.” However, the work of art is more the generous person
himself rather than what is given. Thus, the gift-giver is selfish, but his selfishness “flows back
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out of [his] well as the gifts of [his] love.”45 Similarly with magnificence, Aristotle says that the
work that is valued most is one that is great and beautiful and that the excellence of a work is in
its grandeur. The kinds of things that a magnificent person concerns himself with are on things
shared in common, and “his gifts have some likeness to offerings devoted to the gods.”46 So the
work of art which the magnificent/generous person creates for others will celebrate or honor that
to which a community devotes itself: festivals, music, temples—or even a warship, which
indicates that even justice may be something toward which an individual can devote himself.47
Thus we must recognize that beautiful actions require the presence of others in most
situations, and they do not merely require the presence of just any others but of others with
whom the person of virtue shares his life in a graceful way. The excellence lies in the giving and
not the receiving, and the relation of artist to work of art is used by Aristotle to illustrate this: the
parent as artist of her child and the poet as artist of his poem.48 However, some of these virtues
are self-oriented, such as megalopsuchia and sôphrosunê. Both Aristotle and Nietzsche realize
that the virtuous person ought to strike a healthy balance between one’s attitude toward oneself
and one’s attitude toward others, yet according to Nietzsche, giving style to one’s character
seems to have a certain priority over one’s relations with others. If done in an authentically
virtuous manner, one will create oneself according to one’s own artistic plan. This artistic plan
involves a certain level of constraint and balance—knowing when to engage in playfulness but
with a graceful spirit. This mixture of gracefulness and playfulness ought to foreground a kind
of self-legislation, a form of legislating that both Aristotle and Nietzsche advocate. In one of his
45
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concluding thoughts on how to associate with others, Aristotle states that “someone with a
gracious and generous spirit will hold himself to such limits, being like a law to himself.”49 And
similarly, Nietzsche partially explicates the thought of “giving style to one’s character” in saying
that it will be the strong and domineering natures that will “enjoy their finest gaiety in such
constraint and perfection under a law of their own.”50
One may object to such a comparison of Nietzsche with Aristotle and claim, for example,
that the Aristotelian account of the rational nature of the virtues is incompatible with the
Nietzschean irrationalism. Alisdair MacIntyre claims that the power of Nietzsche’s position
depends upon the truth of one central thesis: “that all rational vindications of morality manifestly
fail and that therefore belief in the tenets of morality needs to be explained in terms of a set of
rationalizations which conceal the fundamentally non-rational phenomena of the will.”51 This
claim is mistaken. Nietzsche does not completely abandon the value of reason as a constitutive
element in living well. Think of his notion of intellectual conscience discussed in the GS, or his
praise of science and truthfulness in HAH.52 MacIntyre argues that Aristotle’s ethics and politics
would have to rank with all those “degenerate disguises” of the will to power, yet it is not clear
that this is actually the case.53 Firstly, according to Aristotle, the person who becomes virtuous
(and thus possibly flourishes) undergoes an internal harmonization between the desiring part of
the soul and the rational part, where “the aim to which both look is the beautiful.”54 This
harmonization is not completely unlike the Nietzschean harmonization of opposing drives.
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Furthermore, choice is described by Aristotle as “either intellect fused with desire [dianoetic
orexis] or desire fused with thinking [orektik nous], and such a source is a human being.”55
Aristotle recognizes the opposition between desire and reason, and he sees the synthesis (or
fusion) of such opposing parts of the soul as something to be accomplished by the virtuous
person who strives to flourish. What character type exists as such a unitary source of action
whereby mind and desire are synthesized?—the lover of wisdom, the genuine philosopher.56
And finally, both Aristotle and Nietzsche have a similar understanding that the end of a genuine
ethical life is not merely contemplating the good: “Or, as has been said, is the end in matters of
action not contemplating and knowing each of them but rather doing them? Then it is not
sufficient to know about virtue, but one must try to have it and use it, unless there is some other
way that we become good.”57

It is not entirely clear whether Aristotle holds the purely

contemplative life or a synthesized existence of contemplation and action to be the best kind of
human life. However, the former option of the contemplative life, which is only significantly
discussed in chapters six through eight of Book X, is somewhat of an anomaly in the larger
context of Aristotle’s ethic of virtue: in which the end is energeia [being-at-work]. The latter
option of contemplation-fused-with-action gains support from the conclusive remarks at the end
of Aristotle’s discussion of friendship in Book IX, where human flourishing seems to be
impossible without the presence of others. The last three steps of that argument reach what
seems to be a climactic conclusion about the conditions to be a eudaimon:
So if being is choiceworthy in itself to a blessed person, since it is good and pleasant by
nature, and that of one’s friend is very nearly the same, then a friend would also be
55
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something choiceworthy. But that which is choiceworthy for him ought to be present to
him, or he will be deficient in that respect. Therefore, for someone who is going to be
happy, there will be a need for friends of serious worth.58
This strong connection between friendship and eudaimonia will be further examined later in this
project when the relationship between realized selfhood, i.e. the will to power, and friendship is
explored.
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Chapter Three
In this chapter we will analyze each of the seven existential needs whose satisfaction
under the norm of beauty serves as the foundation for achieving self-realization, which is itself
the exemplification of the will to power. The first grouping of needs consists of the need for
rootedness, the need for effectiveness and the need for stimulation. The second grouping of
needs consists of the need for a frame of orientation, the need for devotion and the need for
unity. My investigation of what kind of a need for unity arises from the human conflict between
instincts and consciousness will be more thorough because it holds a considerably elevated status
amongst the other needs. The special kind of unity sought for—genuinely realized selfhood—
will be further explicated through an examination of how the process of sublimation handles the
vast array of drives, which are extensions of the existential needs. The chapter will conclude
with an inquiry into the need for a relation of self-love and how self-love differs from selfcontempt and self-dissatisfaction.
The Existential Needs for Rootedness, Effectiveness and Excitation/Stimulation
Three of the existential needs—rootedness, effectiveness and stimulation—illustrate how
existence cannot be tolerated without an individual having a real effect on others in the world
and without being “stimulated” by others in that world. This group deals with the individual’s
relatedness to the natural and the human worlds; these existential needs concern the inevitable
separation from nature that occurs in infancy, and the problem of recouping the intimacy of the
mother-child symbiosis. Fromm claims that the source of the existential need for rootedness is
the departure of the infant from his mother’s womb, “the situation in which he was still part of
nature,” but unable to return to the security and protection of his mother’s womb, each individual
41

becomes aware of his separateness and needs to establish new ties with others.59 So this problem
of separateness from nature and from others substantiates the need for rootedness. In terms of
drives, the separated individual has an intense drive for a new emotional condition of security
and protection. What would Nietzsche’s attitude be toward the need for rootedness? Would he
be an advocate of the existence of our desire for strong affective ties? The manner in which we
are speaking of rootedness mostly appears to be a drive to be cognitively and affectively planted
in some social structure that provides some sense of security and protection. It appears to be the
feeling of separateness and isolation that we want to be secured against and protected from. This
need makes sense, yet this kind of rootedness, whether it is being rooted in a career, a family, a
city, a religious group or a political organization, does promote the tendency to achieve the kind
of happiness that Nietzsche negatively criticizes: the happiness of comfortableness, passivity and
resignation. Nietzsche would not endorse the satisfaction of the need of rootedness if it were
responded to under the assumption that happiness and unhappiness—unhappiness as a complete
absence of conflict and suffering—are opposites and that being rooted suffices for human
flourishing. In a bold condemnation of such a conception of happiness, Nietzsche states:
If you, who adhere to this religion [of pity], have the same attitude toward yourselves that
you have toward fellow men; if you refuse to let your own suffering lie upon you even
for an hour and if you constantly try to prevent and forestall all possible distress way
ahead of time; if you experience suffering and displeasure as evil, hateful, worthy of
annihilation, and as a defect of existence, then it is clear that besides your religion of pity
you also harbor another religion in your heart that is perhaps the mother of the religion of
pity: the religion of comfortableness. How little you know of human happiness, you
comfortable and benevolent people, for happiness and unhappiness are sisters and even
twins that either grow up together or, as in your case, remain small together.60
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It may be the case that a certain kind of “uprootedness” is necessary for the new happiness
Nietzsche advocates.61 When one dislodges oneself from the security and protection of what is
familiar—the existing customs and conventions of one’s local culture—one thereby opens
oneself up to the possibility of intellectual conflict through exposure to new perspectives. This
often untraveled mode of living would further make possible the questioning of old values, their
potential destruction and the occasion to create new values. Nietzsche illumines this new mode
of living in the following passage where he describes the preparatory courageous human beings
that are capable of the new happiness:
For believe me: the secret for harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness and the
greatest enjoyment is—to live dangerously! Build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius!
Send your ships into uncharted seas! Live at war with your peers and yourselves!62
Thus, we should be somewhat wary of the extent to which and the manner in which the
existential need for rootedness plays a constitutive role in the more comprehensive need of
achieving self-realization. We ought to not entirely reject the need for rootedness, since one
condition for the possibility of a constructively agonistic existence is the possession of peers (and
by possession I mean “active engagement with”). We should not just be at war with ourselves
but spiritually at war with others as well. There is usually a sense of community within which a
free spirit embarks to find new “truths” on the sea of existence:
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At long last the horizon appears free to [we philosophers and “free spirits”] again, even if
it should not be bright; at long last our ships may venture out again, venture out to face
any danger; all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, our sea,
lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an “open sea.”—63
In addition to the community-oriented tone of this passage, there is an emphasis on what the
consequences might be from the death of God for “ourselves.” Perhaps the destruction of the
monolithic old truths of Christianity makes room for a richer and more diverse “sea” into which
a free spirit travels. Such diversity of perspectives would then have the opportunity to be
harmonized in the unity that is required for self-realization.
The existential need for effectiveness can be closely associated with the human fear of
being powerless. To exist in the world and to be unable to have any meaningful impact on other
individuals or on any community in any way is to exist as if one were approaching a kind of
nothingness. Fromm expresses this concern when he says that “the sense of being condemned to
ineffectiveness—i.e., to complete vital impotence—is one of the most painful and almost
intolerable experiences, and man will do almost anything to overcome it, from drug and work
addiction to cruelty and murder.”64 How has this need developed such an enormous intensity?
Fromm is operating with a more refined sense of “effecting.” He refers to the Latin of “to
effect” which is ex-facere, meaning to bring to pass, to accomplish, to realize, to carry out, and to
fulfill. He stresses the weight of this need by considering it a kind of proof that one exists: I
effect. Therefore, I am.65 As a caution, we should not take this as formulaic or as prescribing the
essence of humankind in its entirety. I do not see Fromm making the same kind of move that
Descartes made when he defined humankind to be essentially thinking, non-corporeal things: I
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think. Therefore, I am.66 Fromm is merely acknowledging one dimension of a cluster of
interconnected existential needs. From an early age, we are forced to succumb to the necessities
of nature, merely affected by others and tossed about in a sea of existence which we cannot
control. As infants we are virtually inefficacious. Fromm makes an interesting claim: Because
of such biological and social limitations, “it seems that man is profoundly attracted to move to
the personal, social, and natural borders of his existence, as if driven to look beyond the narrow
frame in which he is forced to exist.”67 Nietzsche would stand behind the existence of such a
need, but he would not attest to the two overly streamlined patterns of response to this existential
calling: life-furthering and life-thwarting. As we discussed in chapter two, such categories are
overly simplistic. Specifically in the relationships to others, it is not simply a dichotomous
matter of either effecting love or effecting fear and suffering; nor in the relationship to things is it
clear-cut choice of either affecting constructively or affecting destructively. Unfortunately for
Fromm, his faith in opposites shows itself here and its presence creates an inappropriate
polarization of possible responses to the need. Consider the experience of love. Though we tend
to assume that it is purely altruistic and ‘life-affirming’ in the way Fromm discusses, love may
just be the most ingenious expression of egoism, in which both love and greed are extensions of
the same basic instinct: the drive for the feeling of conquest through possession. Most forms of
erotic and romantic love contain some measure of “avarice” in them, which is caused by the
lover’s desire to be “supreme” and “supremely desirable.” Being the loved one’s “all and
everything” creates a feeling of pleasure in oneself: a feeding of the ego. According to a
Nietzschean line of thought, in addition to the other side of this self-oriented aspect of love, there
66
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is also the lover’s desire to exclude the whole world from his object of desire: “if one considers
that the lover aims at the impoverishment and deprivation of all competitors and would like to
become the dragon guarding his golden hoard as the most inconsiderate and selfish of all
“conquerors” and exploiters,” we recognize that there is an element of destruction (the
destruction of competitors) within the constructing of oneself as a lover that cannot be denied.68
We could even go so far as to say that the lover wishes to affect fear and suffering in those who
might steal away his precious beloved. So, while Nietzsche would agree that there are different
ways to satisfy the need for effectiveness (particularly in affecting others), we must move
beyond the polarized responses characterizing Fromm’s account of what we are to do with our
need for effectiveness.
Another worry is that Nietzsche would likely not sanction this need as one for mere
effectiveness but perhaps as one for a continuous enhancement of effectiveness. Fromm may
have this in mind in his explication of these existential needs, but he does not make it clear that
our need to affect is a desire to affect more strongly, more excellently. Under this consideration,
Fromm ought to change his principle to this: I effect my effecting. Therefore, I become.
How does the existential need for stimulation serve as a constitutive element in the larger
framework of self-realization? Fromm draws from observations of daily life that show that the
human organism (as well as the animal organism) is in need of a certain minimum of excitation
and stimulation. We are eager to respond to and seek excitation. He rightly points out that the
68
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list of excitation-generating stimuli is endless and that the difference between people (and
cultures) lies only in the form taken by the main stimuli for excitation.69 This distinction
between the forms of stimuli is where things get particularly stirring. Fromm distinguishes
between a simple stimulus and an activating stimulus. The simple stimulus produces a drive: the
person is driven by it. Here is an apt description:
If a man is threatened with danger to his life, his response is simple and immediate,
almost reflexlike, because it is rooted in his neurophysiological organization. The same
holds true for the other physiological needs like hunger and, to a certain extent, sex. The
responding person “reacts,” but he does not act—by which I mean to say he does not
actively integrate any response beyond the minimum activity necessary to run away,
attack, or become sexually excited. One might also say that in this kind of response the
brain and the whole physiological apparatus act for man….Stimuli of the first, simple
kind, if repeated beyond a certain threshold, are no longer registered and lose their
stimulation effect. Continued stimulation requires that the stimulus should either increase
in intensity or change in content: a certain element of novelty is required.70
As depicted simple stimuli engender a more reactive response, one in which there is not really an
agent doing anything. A biological/neurophysiological response merely happens. There is no
thought, no reflection and no time to alter one’s attitude toward the simple stimuli. Most of
contemporary existence functions on the level of simple stimuli: on the Internet, in the media, in
office cubicles and unfortunately sometimes even within educational institutions.

A large

portion of the economy operates on the level of simple stimuli. The mechanisms of advertising
and marketing within our economy utilize simple stimuli in order to sell a product, make a profit
and continually work to produce those desires for such products within us. Because it operates
merely on the level of simple stimuli, commercials must reinvent themselves, advertisements
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must be re-fashioned and each product has to generate the appearance of novelty.71 Otherwise,
we become bored with the stimuli and consumerism breaks down. Simple stimuli affect only
one side of the existential split between instincts and consciousness: one merely instinctually
responds to simple stimuli. There is no conscious reflectivity or conscious thought present when
one unquestioningly accepts some traditional moral theme of a sitcom or when one lusts after the
newest model of I-phone (2G? 3G? 4G?) from a bombardment of advertisements. To satisfy
one’s need for stimulation and excitation through only simple stimuli is to allow only a mere
semblance of satisfaction.
On the other hand, the activating stimulus shows itself to possess a significantly different
structure:
Such an activating stimulus could be a novel, a poem, an idea, a landscape, music, or a
loved person. None of these stimuli produce a simple response; they invite you, as it
were, to respond by actively and sympathetically relating yourself to them; by becoming
actively interested, seeing and discovering ever-new aspects in your “object” (which
ceases to be a mere “object”), by becoming more awake and more aware. You do not
remain the passive object upon which the stimulus acts, to whose melody your body has
to dance, as it were; instead you express your own faculties by being related to the world;
you become active and productive.72
Activating stimuli are those which provoke critical thinking and aesthetic appreciation, while
expressing and inquiring into the complex themes associated with human life. A key feature of
such stimuli is timelessness: no matter how many times you come back to it, there is always
something new to discover.

Some personal examples are the ancient Greek tragedies of

Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides; the Platonic dialogues; the essays of Montaigne; the
writings of Nietzsche; the novels of Alduous Huxley; or, the contemporary rock music of Pink
71
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Floyd or Tool. These are the activating stimuli that I find compelling, yet everyone should seek
out those kinds of activating stimuli that are in closer proximity to her life and relative to her
experience of the world.
What would Nietzsche’s position be concerning this existential need for stimulation? I
think that Nietzsche would attest to the existence of this need.73 Further, I think that he was
already cognizant of the growing prevalence of “simple stimuli” in modern living, and that that
partially formed his opinions about how we are becoming “the last men.” So, he would approve
of Fromm’s distinction between the two general kinds of stimuli. Nietzsche would go further
(and Fromm would likely be on board with this extension) and argue that we can produce simple
and activating responses, just as there are simple and activating stimuli. These two forms of
response can be possibilities even within the same human phenomenon. A good example is that
of revenge and the attendant ambiguity of that concept.

Simple revenge (or “restitutional

revenge”) is sought out of self-preservation: one only thinks of oneself in delivering the counterblow, not of the other and the harm done by the blow. Another side of the motivation of the first
species of revenge is fear—i.e. the fear of remaining in a seemingly inferior and powerless
position. On the other hand, activating revenge requires the passage of time and allows one to
pre-meditatively reflect on how to direct the counter-blow:
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One needs time if one is to transfer one’s thoughts from oneself to one’s opponent and to
ask oneself how he can be hit at most grievously. This happens in the second species of
revenge: its presupposition is a reflection over the other’s vulnerability and capacity for
suffering: one wants to hurt. To secure himself against further harm is here so far from
the mind of the revenger that he almost always brings further harm upon himself and very
often cold-bloodedly anticipates it.74
The motives by which revenge is sought stand in opposition to each other in the two species
described here. The simple form of revenge is rooted in fear and in self-preservation, with an
orientation directed more toward the self. The activating form of revenge is rooted in an absence
of fear and in the drive to demonstrate a lack of fear (or to acquire the feeling of superiority). As
a concluding thought, the difference in types of stimuli and the difference in the types of
responses to those stimuli highlight the complexity of the need for stimulation. The more that
one is exposed to simple stimuli and the more that one simply responds to stimuli in his
environment, the less one will place himself inside his/her “deeds.” However, the more that one
is exposed to activating stimuli and the more one actively responds, the more he will put himself
inside his actions: thereby contributing to the achieving of self-realization. But what exactly
does it mean to put oneself inside one’s deeds? This process consists of some degree of
contemplation about one’s potential future actions and the necessary solidification of that
contemplation within one’s deeds. This process can be further understood in terms of the nature
of virtue and vice, for the interplay between one’s desire/emotions and the (rational and
affective) response to them are an expression of the existing character and give rise to how that
character can be shaped over time. In Aristotelian terms, the right motives, the right reasons and
the right desires must be internalized by contemplation but then externalized into action, but
action in which there is no longer any hesitation but only pure willfulness.
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difference between the “pure willfulness” of the simple response differ from the pure willfulness
of the active response? Regarding the “pure willfulness” of simple responses would be present
in the unrestrained person who acts purely out of his desires or out of his spiritedness, regardless
of whether his desires happened to be good or bad and regardless of what his spiritedness is
directed toward. Such a figure’s “pure willfulness” is contrasted with the self-restrained person,
who has bad desires but who does not act according to them. Such an inner tension prevents any
sort of pure willfulness. However, the pure willfulness of the active response would be present
in both the virtuous and the vicious persons, for both achieve a kind of harmony between their
desires and their intellect. Both choose to do what they do, and the difference between them then
becomes action for the sake of the beautiful (for the virtuous person) and dissipated action (for
the vicious person).
Zarathustra claims that there is no reward for virtue and that virtue is not even its own
reward, yet he does intimate that the “reward” for virtue, if there is any reward at all, is the
realization of a self through genuine agency. Speaking to that individual who is capable of
virtue, Zarathustra says, “You love your virtue as a mother her child; but when has a mother ever
wished to be paid for her love? Your virtue is what is dearest to you,” and later in the same
section states even more fervently, “Oh, my friends, that your self be in your deed as the mother
is in her child—let that be your word concerning virtue!”75 Both images represent an artistic
process of creation and discovery, except that what the mother of the virtuous deed discovers is
the new self that is realized and embodied through such action. There is a rough parallel
between the process whereby the calm reflection of contemplation (i.e., deliberation about what
to do and about what is valuable concerning each doing) transforms into the intense passion of
75
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genuine action and the movement of beauty as it is associated with virtue. Speaking to those
who are only apparently “virtuous,” Zarathustra begins his teaching on virtue as the personified
voice of beauty—but a beauty that undergoes a transformation:
Slack and sleeping senses must be addressed with thunder and heavenly fireworks. But
the voice of beauty speaks gently: it creeps only into the most awakened souls. Gently
trembled and laughed my shield today; that is the holy laughter and tremor of beauty.
About you, the virtuous, my beauty laughed today. And thus its voice came to me: “They
still want to be paid.”
At first, the voice of beauty carefully and gently enters that soul who is capable of contemplating
the nuanced differences between excellence and baseness. Upon considering what the telos of
one’s virtue should be, whether it should be some divine reward, honor, praise or its own end,
beauty playfully begins to undergo the transformation from the contemplative activity into the
somewhat ferocious realization of beauty into virtue and self. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra mocks
“the virtuous” who deem themselves to be so with the expectation that their virtue must be paid
for.

Two ways of manifesting such apparent virtue would then be operating under the

expectation that virtue sufficiently guarantees happiness and/or operating under the assumption
that virtue grants one supernatural reward in an afterlife. The hope for compensation undermines
the true nature of the virtuous human being, whose actions are performed for the sake of the
beautiful. Zarathustra continues to describe the process by which beauty manifests itself:
Alas, that is my sorrow: they have lied reward and punishment into the foundation of
things, and now also into the foundation of your souls, you who are virtuous. But like the
boar’s snout, my words shall tear open the foundation of your souls: a plowshare will I be
to you. All the secrets of your foundation shall come to light; and when you lie uprooted
and broken in the sun, then will your lies also be separated from your truths.76
In this latter part of this movement of beauty, Zarathustra’s words, which are the voice of beauty,
become fierce in the tearing open of souls as both the images of the boar’s snout and the
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plowshare suggest. The souls that are torn open are the souls within slave morality and the
innards that are eviscerated are their conceptions of reward and punishment that they hold to be
part of the foundation of slave morality. In the above passage, it is beauty itself that is opposed
to this aspect of slave morality, which praises virtues because of their utility—e.g., to
compensate for one’s impotence and thus to compensate for an inability for active selfconsciousness—and which serve as pieces of the slaves’ “imaginary revenge.” Nevertheless,
beauty’s uprooting of the slave’s truths and lies (as activity of contemplation) makes possible the
identification of the right desires and right motives with one’s virtuous action. It remains a
possibility that one embedded in slave morality can transcend his notions of “good” and “evil,”
but such a transcendence would require an embodiment of beauty in one’s actions, a moving
beyond good and evil. Zarathustra’s image of a dying star possesses a two-fold meaning: as the
“work” of true virtue, which again symbolizes a necessary death of oneself (as a slave who is
“virtuous” because such virtue is useful) that gives birth to a light that continues to shine even
after the work has been performed; and as a work of art, as a child is the mother’s work of art or
as the play is the playwright’s creation.
In order to improve our understanding of the relation between virtue, deed and self such
that we understand the nature of the existential need for complex stimuli, we ought to consider
what the weaker (or false-images) of virtue are. There are at least four ways in which virtue
takes on an imposter-like form: when there is only a simple response with no reflection; when
there is a mere absence of vice; when there is a negation of the natural world; and when there is
no active condition present. Concerning the viciousness of mere simple responses, Zarathustra
says that “there are those for whom virtue is the spasm under the scourge.” Such individuals
merely react instinctively to some insult or injury performed unto them, yet their “virtue”
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remains nothing more than a spasm and not an active condition. Regarding the absence of vice,
Zarathustra states that “there are others who call it virtue when their vices grow lazy,” but the
mere incapacity to be vicious due to apathy is not sufficient for genuine virtue. With respect to
world-negation, Zarathustra says that there are others who are drawn downward by their devils,
lust for their god and holler, “What I am not, that, that to me are God and virtue!” Such
individuals return to the faith in metaphysical opposites, placing vice in the realm of this world
and virtue in the realm of some supernatural world (Heaven). Finally, Zarathustra underscores
the idea that genuine virtue is an active condition. He says that “there are others who are like
cheap clocks that must be wound: they tick and they want the tick-tock to be called virtue.”
Such individuals only act “virtuously” because they adhere to the dogma of some doctrine and
are like mechanical animals that fail to deliberate with themselves about what course of action is
truly excellent.
Here, as elsewhere in this project, I agree with Nietzsche that human action is the means
by which intentions and desires are realized. The same way that a virtue cannot merely be a
disposition or a state of being (and as such would not be an active condition), when it comes to
selfhood, the potential doer does not really know what it is that he wants or intends until an
intention or a motive actually becomes embodied in a doer. When discussing the nature of the
self, Zarathustra makes an interesting link between the self and the body:
Instruments and toys are sense and spirit: behind them still lies the self. The self also
seeks with the eyes of the senses; it also listens with the ears of the spirit. Always the self
listens and seeks: it compares, overpowers, conquers, destroys. It controls, and it is in
control of the ego too. Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, there stands a
mighty ruler, an unknown sage—whose name is self. In your body he dwells; he is your
body.77
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This passage further illuminates what it means for someone to place himself in his deeds. An
individual’s intentions, desires and motives can only be concretized into a self through action.
“Thoughts” and “feelings” must be embodied. So, when Nietzsche’s Zarathustra says that the
self “dwells” inside your body and then that he just is your body, he is expressing the idea that
the embodiment of one’s intentions and desires in action is a condition of selfhood.

The Existential Needs for a Frame of Orientation and Devotion
Three of the above-mentioned needs—frame of orientation, devotion and unity—
foreground the urgency to make the world intelligible and to create purpose within a human life.
People tend to align themselves with metaphysical, religious and political doctrines (just to
mention a few) in order to generate a story within which they feel they appropriately belong and
through which a life can be meaningful. Having a purpose or having a set of purposes provides
an individual with a goal or set of goals. To use Fromm’s expression, human beings need “a
map of their natural and social world,” and even if the map is wrong, it fulfills its psychological
function of explaining as many phenomena as possible in order to serve the purpose of living.78
Fromm claims that the sometimes irrational nature of doctrines and ideologies can be explained
by this need for a frame of orientation. This does seem to be the case in that the doctrine or
ideology with which people align themselves does not have to get at the truth or be the right one.
Rather, what is sought is the belief in the truth of the doctrine or the belief in the righteousness of
the ideology. Fromm notes that the more an ideology pretends to give answers to all questions,
the more attractive it is; though its attraction lies in its ability to provide answers that are
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intelligible to the individual or culture, not to answers that necessarily get the world right.79
Nietzsche anticipates the need for a frame of orientation early in the GS: “Gradually, man has
become a fantastic animal that has to fulfill one more condition of existence than any other
animal: man has to believe, to know, from time to time why he exists; his race cannot flourish
without a periodic trust in life—without faith in reason in life.”80 Three clear examples of
doctrines or ideologies in modernity that serve this life-promoting function are Christianity,
liberal democracy and science. One or all of these make the world intelligible for millions of
people: they satisfy the need for a frame of orientation.

Christianity has invented the

interpretation of the world in terms of “sinfulness” and the possibility of “redemption by God” to
ease the pain of humanity’s impotence and helplessness. This interpretation is a consolation that
provides a map for the world:
Christianity in particular may be called a great treasure house of ingenious means of
consolation: it offers such a collection of refreshments, palliatives, and narcotics; it risks
so much that is most dangerous and audacious; it has displayed such refinement and
subtlety, such southern subtlety, in guessing what stimulant affects will overcome, at
least for a time, the deep depression, the leaden exhaustion, the black melancholy of the
physiologically inhibited. For we may generalize: the main concern of all great religions
has been to fight a certain weariness and heaviness grown to epidemic proportions.81
Christianity thus provides an answer to the question: Why does man exist? However, its answer
is the possible redemption by God for the sinfulness of man. Although the Christian perspective
adopted by its priests may be ingenious, it causes psychological sickness and a life-negating
attitude. This is why Nietzsche considers Christianity to be a bad mode of interpretation, not
primarily because it is constituted by false beliefs.
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The second example of a doctrine that provides a frame of orientation is that of the state.
The two kinds of political state that Nietzsche criticizes most often are democracy and socialism.
He points out that even though following such political ideologies as absolute doctrines may
prevent individual autonomy and the realization of selfhood, they do provide the appearance of a
strong framework of meaning:
Every philosophy which believes that the problem of existence is touched on, not to say
solved, by a political event is a joke- and pseudo-philosophy. Many states have been
founded since the world began; that is an old story. How should a political innovation
suffice to turn men once and for all into contented inhabitants of the earth?...[That people
think that answers to existential questions might come from politics shows that] we are
experiencing the consequences of the doctrine, lately preached from all the rooftops, that
the state is the highest goal of mankind and that man has no higher duty than to serve the
state: in which doctrine I recognize a relapse not into paganism but into stupidity.82
A state ideology, whether it be democracy or socialism or some other form of government, can
provide some kind of frame of orientation, yet one who conceives of such an ideology as absolute
and as the ultimate goal of humankind ignores the potentially disastrous consequences of
promoting the values of “equal rights for all” and “sympathy for all that suffers.” They make
less possible the existence of a self that exceeds the masses in courage, wisdom, creativity and
autonomy. Such a self would always have to fight the tide of “levelization” that both democracy
and socialism bring with them. According to Nietzsche, it is a mistake to think that meaning or
purpose can be found in a political event or innovation. He views selfhood as an individual
project.
A third example of a wide-spread and exponentially growing frame of orientation for
people is science. In science there is an absolute value placed on “objective” truth, and the
scientist supposedly explains nature through empirical observation of natural processes and the
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effects of natural “laws.” Many people are inclined toward the scientific explanation of reality
because it presents itself as offering just that: reality. However, the absolute value of truth (and
that it shows us reality independent from our subjectivity) is the very presupposition that is taken
for granted in science. Nietzsche explains how we still show a kind of reverence towards “the
truth” as if it were a god itself:
Thus the question “Why science?” leads back to the moral problem: Why have morality
at all when life, nature, and history are “not moral”? No doubt, those who are truthful in
that audacious and ultimate sense that is presupposed by the faith in science thus affirm
another world than the world of life, nature, and history; and insofar as they affirm this
“other world”—look, must they not by the same token negate its counterpart, this world,
our world? But you will have gathered what I am driving at, namely, that it is still a
metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science rests—that even we seekers after
knowledge today, we godless anti-metaphysicians still take our fire, too, from the flame
lit by a faith that is thousands of years old, that Christian faith which was also the faith of
Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine.83
Although Fromm combines the two together, I separate the need for devotion from the
need for a frame of orientation because the need for devotion appears to be more focused,
although not necessarily singular. What does it mean to devote oneself to something? In the
sense that we are concerned with, devotion seems to be the activity of discovering and/or
creating something to live for. Fromm suggests that an individual can devote herself to “an idol”
or to “an ideal” and that regardless of whether she devotes herself to a single goal or several
goals she needs to possess purpose in her doings. The object of devotion can be either the
furtherance of life or its destruction. It can be one or a cluster of virtues: courage, greatness of
soul and justice; or it can be one of many allegedly lesser goods: wealth, fame and fortune. This
line of thinking implies that it is not possible for one to exist without striving to satisfy the need
for devotion. One might argue that it is possible for one to exist, maybe for only a short period
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of time, without being devoted to some goal or purpose and that such a possibility would refute
the existence of this existential need. Supporting Fromm, I would reply that even if a person
ceases in her activity of devotion and goes without the guidance of an idol or ideal that she could
only exist in such a way for a very brief period. The “emptiness” of meaning characterizing this
interim would be an even stronger impetus for this individual to begin a new project of satisfying
her need for devotion. Just as soon as one idol “dies,” the existential imperative to either find or
create a new “god” takes over. Such a thought calls to mind the way a person’s devotion can
oscillate from a dead object of devotion to one that has sprung to life—e.g. a drunk’s devotion to
booze as a method of coping with life transformed into her devotion to Alcoholics Anonymous;
an atheist’s devotion to reason transformed into his devotion to being a Born-Again Christian; a
Republican’s disappointed devotion to the established GOP’s conservativism transformed into
his devotion to even smaller government as a Tea Party member. Whatever the situation may be
where one’s need for devotion is apparently killed or frustrated, that need re-emerges in a fairly
immediate way.

Living without purpose, without meaning, potentially results in practical

nihilism which can lead one to hopelessly succumb to mental and physical nothingness.
I believe that Nietzsche would endorse both the need for a frame of orientation and the
need for devotion. The main theme of the third essay of the GM is how humankind responds to
the problem of the senselessness of suffering. Suffering pervades each human life, and each
person ultimately ends in that which we find most unintelligible: death. We might say that it is
our awareness of our own mortality and the knowledge that one day we will not exist that causes
the most tremendous suffering. This dimension of the human condition remains unintelligible to
most. The fact that we do suffer and that such suffering appears meaningless to us intensifies the
unintelligibility of the world. The evidence that humankind seeks more than just life—that we
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seek meaning for our lives—is provided by the various ascetic ideals to which we devote
ourselves. Nietzsche frames the idea in the following way:
Apart from the ascetic ideal, man, the human animal, had no meaning so far. His
existence on earth contained no goal; “why man at all?”—was a question without an
answer; the will for man and earth was lacking; behind every great human destiny there
sounded as a refrain a yet greater “in vain!” This is precisely what the ascetic ideal
means: that something was lacking, that man was surrounded by a fearful void—he did
not know how to justify, to account for, to affirm himself; he suffered from the problem
of his meaning. He also suffered otherwise, he was in the main a sickly animal: but his
problem was not suffering itself, but that there was no answer to the crying question,
“why do I suffer?”84
Regardless of whether the character type that one occupies is that of the priest, the scientist, the
historian or whatever, the need for devotion presents itself and compels the individual to devote
himself to that which gives meaning to what is meaningless. In Nietzschean style, we address
“the problem of our meaning” in and through the existential need for devotion and the existential
need for a frame of orientation.

The Existential Need for Unity
The existential need for unity has an important status among the existential needs, since
they can all be understood, in a way, as the need for unity. After all, these needs arise out of the
experience of a break or divide between consciousness and instinct.

But here we mean

something more specific: as a striving to be a part of, or in some kind of union with (or
connected to) the story that one builds for oneself through the satisfaction of the prior two
existential needs…the successful achieving of which produces the experience of feeling at home
in the world. Fromm speaks of the need for unity as arising from a kind of existential split
84
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between the human world and the natural world, a split having generated a fracture even within
humankind itself. (It is not clear how helpful it would be to look at the manner in which the
existential need for unity historically manifests itself on a kind of world-historical scale. The
primary sense of the need for unity—that between our instincts and our consciousness—arises in
the face of significant historical events such as: the invention of agriculture during the Neolithic
Revolution; the invention of religions during the first millennia B.C.E.; the dawn of philosophy
in and around 6th century B.C.E; the European Renaissance; the Protestant Reformation; the
Industrial Revolution; the construction of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons in the early 20th
century; and the advent of the Age of Technology in which we now exist.) As far as the
appearances tell us, we find ourselves existing in the here and now having torn ourselves apart
into mere pieces of a broken whole, but according to Nietzsche the existential split between our
instincts and our consciousness was not so gradual. In accounting for the evolutionary change of
humankind from “semi-animals well adapted to the wilderness, to war, to prowling, to
adventure” to men “enclosed within the walls of society and peace,” Nietzsche describes the
change as abrupt: “…suddenly all their instincts were disvalued and ‘suspended’,” and “[the
forcible sundering from his animal past was] a leap and plunge into new surroundings and
conditions of existence.”85 Perhaps because man’s new suffering of himself was such a radically
different mode of existence from his purely instinctual mode of existence did Nietzsche feel the
need to speak of this change in hyperbolic terms. However gradual or swift the change was, we
will put aside the question of just how consciousness historically emerged, and we will instead
focus on the nature of the existential split between instincts and consciousness and our need for
unity between these two dimensions of our existence.

85

GM, Second Essay, Sec. 16.
61

Fromm claims that there are three dimensions to the existential split: 1) the split within an
individual human being; 2) the split between humankind and the natural world; and 3) the split
between one human being and others. Fromm offers some possible solutions to such splits, one
solution having to do with the supposed common features of religions and the other solution
requiring that we reverse our attitude from experiencing ourselves as things to recognizing
ourselves as persons. From the above list of historical milestones of humanity, Fromm chooses
to focus on the creation of religions. Drawing from origins of various religions and making a
unifying move, Fromm’s first solution appears to be untenable and somewhat overly idealistic.
He conceptualizes an amalgamation of world religions and makes the following claims:
The great religions springing from the soil of these cultures taught that man can achieve
unity not by a tragic effort to undo the fact of the split, but by fully developing human
reason and love. Great as are the differences between Taoism, Buddhism, prophetic
Judaism, and the Christianity of the Gospels, these religions had one common goal: to
arrive at the experience of oneness, not by regressing into animal existence but by
becoming fully human—oneness within man, oneness between man and nature, and
oneness between man and other men.86
It is not clear whether we ought to take the advice of the so-called “great humanists” that are the
founders of these religions. It is not the case that the common mission of these religions is to
develop human reason and love. That is an oversimplification. But even if it were, reason and
love are not just valuable simpliciter—as Nietzsche has shown, a more complex understanding of
what is genuinely ‘life-affirming’ is necessary than the overly positive vision that Fromm
endorses. This is evident, for example, in the fact that the nature of the love taught by at least
some of the religions that he mentions, especially Christianity, do not fully acknowledge the
need for self-love. Further, this idea that the one common goal of religions is oneness within a
human being, between humankind and nature, and between all members of humankind is
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misguided. I will begin with the last form of oneness. Oneness between all members of
humankind is not psychologically possible, nor should it be desirable. Conflict is part of the
essence of the human condition. We define ourselves by our struggles, our pain and our
suffering, all of which originate in our head-butting attitudes about who should be in power,
about who deserves what amounts of money, about who gets to use what resources and about
who has the bigger “ego.” Think of any great piece of literature, and you will see that cruelty by
the antagonist is what makes him interesting and that the desire for justice/revenge is what makes
the protagonist praiseworthy. On an individual or a global scale, oneness between man and other
men is a fantasy. The second form of oneness between humankind and nature is also not
(humanly) possible. As a species we have changed things. Not only have we changed things,
but we have changed them forever! There is no going back to a hunter-gatherer society. We
cannot return to some pre-technological or pre-industrial mode of living. The schism between
human beings and the natural world is only going to become more pronounced in the future. So
I am not sure what hope there is to be had for this kind of unity. The first kind of oneness within
the individual is something that is possible to accomplish, but it is not clear that doing so guided
by religious teachings is the best way. Another problem with Fromm’s first possible solution is
its omission of polytheism. Why does he not include Hinduism or the worship of the Greek and
Roman gods and goddesses on his list of “great” religions? Perhaps his praise of the ideal of
oneness shows a prejudice resulting from Fromm’s entrenchment in a monotheistic world. It is
possible that a more pluralistic but not necessarily fragmented interpretation of the world might
be healthier than our demand for oneness allows, where by pluralistic I mean a pluralism of
values, ideals and perspectives that do not share a one size fits all motif.87
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If we reject Fromm’s emphasis on ‘oneness’, then how should we understand Nietzsche’s
attitude toward the existential need for unity? The answer to this question depends on what kind
of unity we are considering. I will put aside the unity between humankind and nature for the
moment, as it will surface in chapter four’s analysis of what it means, for Nietzsche, for an
individual to transcend nature. The issue of unity between individual members of humankind
will be considered in chapter five, where we discuss the nature of friendship. Here, I will focus
on the possibility of unity within a single individual, since this is the kind of unity with which
Nietzsche is primarily concerned.

One aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophical project is re-

integrating humankind into nature: showing through metaphor and argumentation that human
beings are part of the natural world despite our tendency to think of ourselves otherwise, and as
such we must conform to natural processes and natural laws just as everything else does. The
part of the human being—the instincts, or “the will”—that is linked to the natural world in which
we participate draws Nietzsche’s focus. His critique of the absolute freedom of the will is one
prominent example of this attempt to illustrate that “the will” is a piece of nature, not something
that metaphysically or religiously transcends the human condition. Nietzsche possesses a strong
tendency toward naturalism for two related reasons. He wishes to expose the errors of the
supernatural and metaphysical views of humanity that are life-negating and that have helped to
dissociate humankind from itself. The supernaturalist (or metaphysician) has often proclaimed
that that which is good, right, beautiful and virtuous are of the “real” world, of the world of
of norms, which makes it possible for an individual to create and own his ideal. This garners a
certain sovereignty and freedom, first attributed to one’s god in relation to other gods, that one
adopts as his own sovereignty and freedom to create his own values. On the other hand,
monotheism spawned the belief that there is only one normal type and ideal for the human
species and that type is modeled after “the one true God.” This advantage of polytheism is likely
to be part of the explanation for why Nietzsche has such a peculiar reverence for Hinduism. The
other reason for his interest in the Hindu gods is possibly its rank ordering of society, which is
antithetical to the equality of the liberal democracy of Western culture.
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Platonic Forms, of the noumenal realm or of the Kingdom of Heaven. Thus half of our values,
and half of our constitution as esteemers, is banished from this world. The other reason for
needing to retain a naturalist position is that Nietzsche promotes the perfection of human beings,
and this process of perfecting seems to require the promotion and affirmation of life—and life
qua a part of the natural world is the only life that we have reason to think exists. So looking
into how we work as natural beings will require facing up to the reality and complexity of our
humanness.

Unifying the Self
Nietzsche is interested in illustrating the complexity of the will, especially the way it is an
“oligarchy” of drives that tend to “be at war” with each other. His rejection of the I and his
theme of self as multiplicity is prevalent throughout his corpus. In BGE Nietzsche rejects soul
atomism: “the belief which regards the soul as something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a
monad, as an atomon: this belief ought to be expelled from science!”88 A few sections later in
BGE, he expands upon this rejection of ‘the I’ with the idea that the will is a manifold thing
where the synthetic concept “I” takes sides with the commanding element of the will:
…our body is but a social structure composed of many souls—to his feelings of delight
as commander. L’effet c’est moi: what happens here is what happens in every wellconstructed and happy commonwealth; namely, the governing class identifies itself with
the successes of the commonwealth. In all willing it is absolutely a question of
commanding and obeying, on the basis, as already said, of a social structure composed of
many “souls.”89
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Nietzsche’s Zarathustra also rejects the unity of the I in saying, “‘I,’ you say, and are proud of
the word. But greater is that in which you do not wish to have faith—your body and its great
reason: that does not say ‘I,’ but [performs] ‘I’.90 ‘The I’ lies not in mere language, but in action.
Because of the lack of a singular subjectivity and because of the agonistic nature of multiplicity
of drives, we could conceive of the will as continually in a state of discord or fragmentation—in
other words, possessing a lack of unity.91

Achieving some sort of wholeness amidst

manifoldness is one of Nietzsche’s ideals, a hierarchical ordering of drives that is perhaps led by
some commanding drive. The key to the kind of inner unity that Nietzsche praises consists of a
continual improvement of the actual “waging of war” against oneself such that each of the
warrior drives becomes more adept and skilled in response to his opponent.92 The air of paradox
seems to draw near with this idea. How can something simultaneously be whole and manifold?
How can something simultaneously be unified yet discordant? To shed light on this puzzle,
Nietzsche appropriates the Heraclitean notion of unity amidst opposites.

Heraclitus states,

“People do not understand how that which is at variance with itself agrees with itself. There is a
harmony in the bending back, as in the cases of the bow and the lyre,” and “Opposition brings
concord. Out of discord comes the fairest harmony.”93 Heraclitus metaphorically shows that
without tension in a bow, which is created by the string, that the arrow could not find direction
and hit its target. Similarly with music, without tension in the strings of the lyre, notes in a
harmonized arrangement could not be produced.
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92
See BGE, Sec. 200.
93
Heraclitus. Heraclitus: The Complete Fragments: Translation and Commentary and the Greek
Text. Trans. William Harris. Middlebury College, 1994, DK line numbers 51 and 8.
91

66

harmony and tension—or more precisely, tension is a condition for harmony. Nietzsche uses
these metaphors and applies them to the human being, turning what is often interpreted as
metaphysical opposites into psychological opposites. Without a certain kind of tension between
the multiplicity of drives (or inner perspectives) in an individual, the resulting harmony could not
possibly be attained. When Nietzsche endorses the value of having enemies, there is a double
meaning being conveyed. He does value external others as enemies, but he also values the
“internal enemy”:
Here too we have spiritualized hostility; here too we have come to appreciate its value.
The price of fruitfulness is to be rich in internal opposition; one remains young only as
long as the soul does not stretch itself and desire peace. Nothing has become more alien
to [we immoralists and Antichristians] than that desideratum of former times, “peace of
soul,” the Christian desideratum; there is nothing we envy less than the moralistic cow
and the fat happiness of the good conscience. One has renounced the great life when one
renounces war.94
For he who realizes a self, the “hostility” of external opposition becomes internalized, and the
“war” of the opposing enemies becomes “spiritualized”: a spiritual war.95 Keep in mind that
while there may be a countless number of drives within any given individual, drives simpliciter
must not be confused with the existential needs, which are basic and are rooted in human
existence as a walking contradiction between instincts and consciousness.96 To further unravel
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the apparently paradoxical nature of this notion of unity, one needs to think of the unified whole
not as a static ‘oneness’ but as an active dialogue—an inner spiritual war but one where the
warriors possibly ascend to new heights. In the GS Nietzsche describes this as a process of
incorporation [Einverleibung] (or assimilation) of truth:
A thinker is now that being in whom the impulse for truth and those life-preserving errors
clash for their first fight, after the impulse for truth has proved to be also a life-preserving
power. Compared to the significance of this fight, everything else is a matter of
indifference: the ultimate question about the conditions of life has been posed here, and
we confront the first attempt to answer this question by experiment. To what extent can
truth endure incorporation? That is the question; that is the experiment.97
Here is an example of praise for that thinker who is an arena where the drive to truth and the
drive to live (grounded in preserving certain life-preserving errors) clash, but do so in such a way
as to assimilate as much truth as possible or to consider as many perspectives as possible in order
to arrive at a wholeness.98 Notice that both truth and error can each be life-preserving powers.
The value of each depends on whether and to what extent each preserves and in turn enhances
life.

As we amass more affects, drives and perspectives, the more complete does our

“objectivity” become.99 Nietzsche uses Goethe as a prime example of a figure who approaches
the ideal of unity:

and to garner a response from an individual. See her Nietzsche and Jung: The Whole Self in the
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[Goethe] bore [the Renaissance’s] strongest instincts within himself: the sensibility, the
idolatry of nature, the anti-historic, the idealistic, the unreal and revolutionary… He
sought help from history, natural science, antiquity, and also Spinoza, but, above all,
from practical activity; he surrounded himself with limited horizons; he did not retire
from life but put himself into the midst of it; he was not fainthearted but took as much as
possible upon himself, over himself, into himself. What he wanted was totality; he
fought the mutual extraneousness of reason, senses, feeling, and will…; he disciplined
himself to wholeness, he created himself.100
So according to Nietzsche, we are illusory I’s—sets of affects, drives, “wills”, perspectives, and
feelings that continually tend to resist and overcome each other—that nevertheless still have the
always-present capacity to become harmonized albeit with a certain tension into an integrated
whole.
There are problems with this picture though. How does one achieve self-conscious
unified selfhood when it seems that a self already needs to be present in order to achieve this?
And even if we are valuing poorly, how can a mere sack of drives (or just one of those drives)
perform the activity of valuation that would appear to require a self in place to do such? There
seems to be a huge tension between Nietzsche’s elimination of any substantial I and his
dependence upon a substantial I as the ground of valuation. Sebastian Gardner explicates the
“fundamental, pervasive, and ineliminable” role of ‘the I’ in the following two ways:
(1) First, the subject who values must understand himself—his self—as the ground of the value
that he affirms.
(2) Second, there is reciprocal relation in Nietzsche between valuing, self-creation, and selfdetermination: to determine such and such to be of value is to determine oneself, and to affirm
oneself by way of affirming what one values, and vice versa.101
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Gardner points out that the sovereign individual of the second essay of GM and Zarathustra both
speak and act as if there is already a unified self in place because this is what is needed to
identify with and have a sense of ownership over what one values.

Gardner contends,

“Elimination of this I in favour of thinkings ascribed to complexes of will to power or any other
units within the psychological composite would produce a profound self-alienation and
undermine the normative dimension of valuation, i.e., the possibility of its being thought that the
valuation in any sense ‘gets things right’.”102 Gardner suggests that one possible solution to this
problem (one that we might wonder why Nietzsche did not take) is for the Nietzschean to
demarcate the boundary between legitimate transcendental claims for the necessity of the Irepresentation and illegitimate claims regarding the constitution-in-itself of a corresponding
object of this representation. Just as certain individuals (free spirits; Übermenschen; realized
selves) may artistically posit the existence of particular values as useful fictions, the
transcendental I should be viewed as another “honest illusion,” one whose actual non-existence
is forgotten in the normal course of everyday human life.103 This proposal would make sense out
of how it is possible for one to be the ground of one’s valuations. Being a transcendental self
would then just be how one must experience the world and how one must experience the activity
of valuing. In his Critique of Pure Reason (in the “Transcendental Deduction”), Kant elaborates
the nature of the transcendental I:
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We are conscious a priori of the complete identity of the self in respect of all
representations which can ever belong to our knowledge, as being a necessary condition
of the possibility of all representations. For in me they can represent something only in
so far as they belong with all others to one consciousness, and therefore must be at least
capable of being so connected. This principle holds a priori, and may be called the
transcendental principle of the unity of all that is manifold in our representations, and
consequently also in intuition.104
And somewhat later in the “Paralogisms of Pure Reason,” where Kant argues that we cannot
know or prove that the soul possesses substantiality, simplicity, personality or ideality, he states:
Self-consciousness in general is therefore the representation of that which is the condition
of all unity, and itself is unconditioned. We can thus say of the thinking ‘I’ (the soul)
which regards itself as substance, as simple, as numerically identical at all times, and as
the correlate of all existence, from which all other existence must be inferred, that it does
not know itself through the categories, but knows the categories, and through them all
objects, in the absolute unity of apperception, and so through itself. Now it is, indeed,
very evident that I cannot know as an object that which I must presuppose in order to
know any object, and that the determining self (the thought) is distinguished from the self
that is determined (the thinking subject) in the same way as knowledge is distinguished
from its object.105
Despite the appeal of this suggestion, simply positing a transcendental self is insufficient
for the exemplification of the will to power. The will to power is the achieving of selfrealization.

The self that is realized to a more full degree—one that nearly approaches

wholeness—is not the same as a mere transcendental self. As a necessary condition for the
possibility of human experience (and of valuation), a transcendental self could still be wildly
fragmented in terms of conflict between needs and drives, yet all the while think of itself as “a
self.” So the Kantian solution to this problem of how the existential need for unity could be
satisfied does not give us a complete answer. The individual who comes to exemplify the will to
power will not merely have to operate under the assumption that she is a unified self-conscious
self. She will have achieved the privilege of being a unified self-conscious self.
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But the process of achieving self-realization is still a process, and until one becomes a
unified self-conscious self, how is it possible for “him” qua one of his strongest drives to
genuinely value what he takes to be valuable? In other words, is it intelligible to say that ‘my
drive for companionship’ values and loves my friend? Until I am a fully realized self, do I say
that my ‘drive to sex’ is what is lusting after some potential lover? This does sound strange
indeed. No, even in the earlier phases of self-realization, the experience that I have from the
inside is that I value and love my friend and that I value and lust after my potential lover.
Remember that the criticism against Nietzsche is that valuing as a unit within a psychological
complex would produce a “profound self-alienation” and “undermine the normative dimension
of valuation,” and those early valuations might be necessary steps in the development of a more
fully realized self. In the case of the genuine philosopher undergoing the process of becoming
who he is, such an individual must not “let himself go” or “let oneself drop,” but he must “find”
his greatness in “his range and multiplicity, in his wholeness in manifoldness” and how much
responsibility he can bear to unify himself.106
In our analysis of the will to power, we should not fall into the tendency of being overly
systematic or of stripping out all normativity. John Richardson falls prey to these tendencies in
his work on Nietzsche’s “System.” Richardson proposes a systematic account of the will to
power where “a drive wills power by trying to develop its activity pattern” and “each such
activity pattern wills its own ‘self-overcoming’ [Selbstüberwindung]: it wills to rise toward a
new and higher level of effort—perhaps indeed a level at which its internal ends are also
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overcome and replaced by descendants—one that will then have to be overcome in turn.”107
Richardson tends to speak of drives as opposed to persons, and he along with Nietzsche
considers persons as collections of drives. For Richardson, the will to power neither seeks the
objects of desires nor desires themselves. What the will to power seeks is the improvement of
the activity pattern of each desire—to enhance through sublimation [Sublimierung] or
spiritualization. There is a continual process of one mastering drive integrating other “weaker”
drives into the service of the mastering drive’s end, thereby “enhancing” how that drive actively
pursues its end, thus increasing its power. Richardson’s power ontology is a worthy attempt to
systematize the doctrine of the will to power and integrate it with Nietzsche’s values and his
perspectivism, but this ontology falters in several respects. According to Richardson, each drive
seeks to improve (and enhance) its own pattern of activity, which requires each drive to already
have an end in place, to pursue that end, to pursue the opposition to that end and to pursue
overcoming the opposition to that end—all of this stemming from the will to power, which is the
essence of all drives. There are some problems with this schema. Firstly, Richardson’s account
appears to claim that the will to power is an already-existing phenomenon that is at work,
developing activity patterns and enhancing those integrative processes, for all drives, and I take
it, for all human beings. If this were the case, then any and every drive would originate from the
will to power, yet needs and drives which are satisfied in a base or vicious manner, and not
satisfied under the norm of beauty, cannot be constitutive of a realized self and thus also not
constitutive of a will to power. Secondly, Richardson seems to place too much personified
autonomy on a single drive.

Even if it be fictional, or a necessary condition for human

experience (in Kantian language), some kind of transcendental self must be posited for the
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possibility of realizing a self which exemplifies a will to power. We do hold that there is a
movement from existing as a mere disorganized collection of drives toward some sort of a
unified self, yet just who is doing the unifying (one particular drive or some already-existing self)
does not have a clear answer for us. Richardson does foreground the difficulty in determining
just what the relation is between a drive and the individual in which it inheres. There is an
ambiguity in his claim that a drive itself seeks or wishes to increase its own pattern of activity.
There is a sense in which each drive has the “aim” of enhancement, but this is only a partial
account of what is “the goal” of a collection of drives. The enhancement of each drive’s activity
pattern aims at the achieving of self-realization. Realizing a unified self is the ultimate target
toward which any set of drives takes aim. What does it mean for a drive to want to enhance its
pattern of activity? A drive cannot intend or want anything because it is just a part of a larger
whole, the larger whole being that collection of drives that is striving for some kind of further
unification. An individual can identify himself with his most dominating drive, as a nation might
identify itself with its strongest class of citizens, yet the drive cannot do or desire anything
outside of its relation to the whole collection of drives. Further, the sustained emphasis on what
the drives are striving for makes it difficult to makes sense of how the relationships between
individuals develop. Does a set of my drives bear some attitude? Can drives (or a drive) do this?
No, it is an individual who loves another or an individual who is attempting to understand the
psyche of another. Nevertheless, it is possible that such an individual qua oligarchy of drives
and affects may not yet be a realized self. Thirdly, positing that the will to power is the essence
of all drives (the basic stuff of the world) and holding that the ultimate goal of that essence is the
ongoing development of each drive’s “activity pattern” do not allow us to discover when we
have actually succeeded in performing a genuine action. It is the case that the will to power is
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insatiable, and as such “development” never really has a stopping point; however, at what point
can an individual recognize that he has reached a successful level of development (or that he has
successfully performed an action)? I contend that it is when a more fully realized self has been
brought forward into existence, one that is more whole than a cluster of completely nonintegrated drives.
This issue leads into my third worry: there is nearly no social or intersubjective aspect to
Richardson’s power ontology. Richardson defines human beings as drives early in his account
when he states that the “ ‘will to power’ is most basically applied not to people but to ‘drives’ or
‘forces’, simpler units which Nietzsche sometimes even calls ‘points’ and ‘power quanta’.”108
This seems rather simplistic to consider us to be only or basically drives. While drives may be
part of how we are psychologically and conceptually structured, we are more than just that: we
are human beings and are striving to become whole selves. There is a more holistic kind of
unity, even if incomplete or incompletely unified that is already somewhat present in a human
life. Finally, Richardson makes Nietzsche a value monist where his supposed principle would be
the following: “act so as to maximize power in general” and because of this crude reductionism
the relationship between the will to power and our other values is strained. If the above were our
sole principle to act on, then one could not value a friend for his own sake because he would
have to value him for the sake of increasing one’s own power. Richardson does address the
question of “whose power” each ethical agent should be maximizing, but his answer of “power
egoism” is not quite accurate.109 He views agents very atomistically and ignores our social
nature, especially the fact that we look to select an other (or a group of others) for their honor
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and admiration, and more especially to notice when they show disgust or indignation toward
some act that we have done. Richardson gets to an impasse between Nietzsche’s idea that each
agent ought to maximize her own power and Nietzsche’s apparently counter-idea that each agent
ought to maximize the power of the overman.110

One possible resolution of this impasse

involves not thinking of the overmen as some distantly future individuals for whom we are
supposed to devote our lives here and now. Conceiving of our lives purely instrumentally makes
little sense. Who exactly am I living my life for? When is this future overman supposed to
arrive on the scene? Aren’t I supposed to be improving my relationship with myself? Nowhere
do we find explicit textual support for the idea that the overman as this separate figure in some
distant future that Nietzsche thinks we ought to promote. That is often an assumption that is
upheld prior to an analysis of the figure of the overman. The imagery that Zarathustra uses to
characterize the overman is rendered more intelligible if we conceive of the overman as a
realized self, one that any free spirit can bring into existence. For example, Zarathustra portrays
the overman as a lightning bolt coming forth from a thundercloud, but if we place this image
alongside Nietzsche’s conception of a genuine philosopher “who is perhaps himself a storm
pregnant with new lightnings” and who is “a being that often runs away from itself, often is
afraid of itself—but too inquisitive not to ‘come to’ again—always back to himself,” then the
image can be understood as the process of achieving self-realization.111 A second image that
Zarathustra uses to portray the overman is the sea. He says that man is a polluted stream and that
one must be a sea in order to be able to receive such a polluted stream without becoming
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unclean.112 Zarathustra states that the overman is this sea, which represents a complex entity that
may potentially be at-odds with itself but which has the ability to take in “polluted streams” (unsublimated instincts), being conscious of these flowing streams, and transform them into rich and
variegated “sea” (a fully realized self or overman). Such a reading especially makes sense if we
think of how Nietzsche uses the image of the sea qua existence in the GS, but as an existence that
comprises both danger and hopefulness.

The overman is even pictured as “a supreme

achievement” in Nietzsche’s reflections in Ecce Homo.113 If we think of the overman as a
potential higher self that may be discovered/created within each free spirit—and it is possible
and likely that not everyone is capable of realizing his higher self or being a free spirit—then we
can have a rough schema about self-realization—one that is partially egoistic, but also one that
holds the self to potentially include certain others, and thus is partially other-oriented.
Recall that in order to better understand the existential need for unity (of the self), we
should extrapolate the notion of the will to power as it is expressed in Nietzsche’s primary
works. Moving on to how Nietzsche expounds the will to power in Beyond Good and Evil, we
discover new insight into the doctrine mainly in the first part of the work, “On the Prejudices of
Philosophers,” and in the ninth part, “What is Noble.” In BGE 13 Nietzsche connects the final
thought concerning the will to power from the section “On Self-Overcoming” in TSZ with the
introduction to the doctrine in BGE. The main distinction is that self-preservation is not the
cardinal instinct of an organic being but is only one of the indirect and most frequent results of
the will to power. The almost exact same idea is also expressed in GS 349. Here again it is
important to recognize that Nietzsche is making a claim about the human condition, yet his
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remarks about the will to power will be best understood if correlated with his remarks about the
complexity of the human psyche and how concepts about the inner world of an individual need
to be reinterpreted. One example is the soul-hypothesis: the concept of the soul as something
indestructible, eternal, indivisible, monadic and atomic does not necessarily have to be thrown
out, but merely reconceived as “mortal soul,” and “soul as subjective multiplicity,” and “soul as
social structure of the drives and affects.”114

Nietzsche appropriately acknowledges the

complexity of the inner world of human willing which involves various (and various kinds of)
sensations, thinking, a ruling thought, and an affect—the will is a manifold thing, and the word
“will” cannot capture all that happens in human willing.115 The thought that willing is really
always composed of a social structure of many “souls” should be an accompanying provision to
the will to power. This meets the objection that the notion of the will to power is overly
simplistic. Nietzsche has to use language to discuss the will to power as the central motive-force
behind human existence; yet he is mainly concerned with human beings insofar as they are
meaning-users and value-creators. So he is not going to spend time with the vast array of
physical, biological and chemical processes that occur at the micro-level of human willing.
There is complexity even at the level of meaning, thought and affect—and it is this dynamic
configuration of “moving parts” that substantiate human willing.
In order to resolve this difficulty, we ought to think of the process of achieving selfrealization as a transcendental self sublimating drives into a realized self. As we will discuss in
the following section, the process of sublimation makes room for the existence of becoming a
self and for the potential achieving of self-realization by that becoming self—sublimation
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provides a middle position between a completely naturalistic picture of “selves” as sacks of
conflicting drives and a Christian metaphysical picture of “selves” as eternal and indestructible
souls.

The Satisfaction of the Existential Needs and the Sublimation of a Thousand Drives
How might a mere collection of animosity-laden drives possibly begin a process of
cohesion? Is there a specific name for such a process? Nietzsche is the first to recognize and to
begin to explicate the nature of this complex internal psychological activity: its name is
sublimation (also often referred to as spiritualization). As we have seen, unity in the traditional
sense of perfect harmony between parts may have to be rethought. Is some kind of unity
possible within an individual even if there is enmity between the drives? When there is a
conflict between two drives, the more powerful drive will not completely squash the other into
oblivion. It would do better to sublimate the weaker drive into the service of the reigning drive.
The phenomenon of sublimation arises out of the internal agonistic nature of the drives that
constitute a human being.
Even though we must use the Nietzschean notion of sublimation to account for this
possibility, we must make a departure from his restriction that sublimation can only occur
beneath consciousness. It seems that someone can become aware of an instance of sublimation
(even one that occurred over a period of time) that has occurred in his past. Becoming aware of
the sublimation of one particular drive into new channels may make future potential instances of
sublimation more successful.

Even though most instances of sublimation occur on an

unconscious level and without our “choice” in the matter, it is possible for such a process to enter
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into consciousness. How does this happen? A first and primary step is self-examination of one’s
drives, desires, affects, etc. As discussed earlier, the intellectual conscience can be a tool in
evaluating a particular “vehement” drive and possibly sublimating that drive through conscious
thought and action.

There does not have to be complete mutual exclusivity between the

unconscious and the conscious.
When Nietzsche refers to an individual being made up of “many mortal souls,” such is a
metaphor for drives. In order to demonstrate how sublimation is required for the beauty and selfmastery characterizing genuine self-realization, we must look at some examples of how the
process of sublimation works. It has been argued that neurotic repression occurs in what I am
calling the failure to achieve self-realization, whereas sublimation occurs in what I refer to as the
successful achieving of self-realization.116 In other words, those who do not exemplify a will to
power repress drives that are not so much socially unacceptable, but drives that are unacceptable
to the free spirit’s vision of itself. On the other hand, sublimation occurs in those who succeed at
self-realization and thence do exemplify a will to power—i.e. the drives are not repressed but
given appropriate expression. Because, prima facie, sublimation appears to be a mysterious
process, we will now focus on how sublimation might underwrite the achieving of selfrealization.
Nietzsche outlines essentially six different methods of how one might possibly combat
the vehemence of a drive. Since we are speaking the languages of drives [der Triebe], it is
important to enhance our understanding of what kinds of drives we have in mind and to do so
from thinking about the drives that we find in experience. Ranging in intensity from weakness to
116
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ferociousness, some of the more-or-less common drives are the following: the drive to sexual
enjoyment, the drive to murder for revenge, the drive to steal money, the drive to commit
suicide, the drive to restfulness, the fear of disgrace, the drive to love, the fear of humiliation, the
fear of ineffectiveness, the fear of shame, the drive to possess, the fear of failure, the fear of
purposelessness, the drive to cruelty and the drive for praise.117 For all intents and purposes, this
non-exhaustive list is comprised of some of the basic drives of the human psyche. Some of the
drives refer to “fears” because they are best conceived of in terms of a strong aversion to or a
forceful pulling away from something that causes one’s humanity to disintegrate or that causes
one’s self to shrivel down to nothing.
The first method of sublimation that Nietzsche considers is to avoid opportunities for
gratification of the drive with the intention of weakening the drive and making it wither away.
The second method is to implant regularity into the drive which encloses its ebb and flood within
firm time-boundaries again with the intention of exterminating the drive. However, these two
methods are ultimately forms of repression, which are likely to result in neurotic behavior and a
stunted development of a self. Nietzsche includes them to contrast the more unhealthy methods
of combat with the healthier ones. The third method is to deliberately give oneself over to the
wild and unrestrained gratification of a drive in order to generate disgust with it. This method is
similar to the first two in that it is likely to result in a failure to extinguish the intensity of the
drive, like “the rider who rode his horse to death and broke his own neck in the process.”118 The
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fourth method of combating a drive is to associate its gratification in general so firmly with some
very painful thought that the gratification of that drive comes to be experienced as painful. This
method is slightly more sophisticated because it does not seek to destroy the vehement drive.
Instead, it associates the vehement drive with imagined or potentially real bad consequences that
would arise from its continued existence. Its sophistication lies in its “intellectual artifice.”
Nevertheless, this method is still akin to the first three because it is an unconscious attempt to
eliminate the vehement drive. All of these methods assume that it is possible to completely
extirpate one of the more vehement drives. While it may be possible to entirely extirpate a drive,
it nevertheless would seem to require a great deal of spiritual effort. Even though it is possible to
fully rid oneself of a drive, it may not be possible to destroy the existential needs, which have a
certain foundational primacy underneath an individual’s diverse set of drives. The force of each
of these drives is rooted in the “chemistry” of our existential needs: we are compounds made up
of instincts, imagination, reason, consciousness—all or any of which may be masked drives
themselves. In other words, there is a certain quantum of energy behind one’s reason, behind
one’s intellect, behind one’s imagination and behind each of the “faculties” of our inner
experience. Because of this forcefulness of each of these faculties, we can say that they are the
skeletal framework fleshed out by developed and developing drives. Let us jump to the sixth
method which is to generally weaken and exhaust the entire bodily and physical organism,
thereby weakening the vehement drive. This method is less than ideal because of its more
comprehensively life-negating quality. To sacrifice one’s body simply in order to combat a

horse is a lover of moderation [sōphrosunē] and shame [aidōs]; and the black horse is a lover of
pride [hubris] and boasting [alazoneia]. It is interesting to notice that it is the two horses that
ultimately control the movement of the charioteer, not the other way around. All that the
charioteer can do is to “rein in” the “vehemence” of his horses. The charioteer cannot destroy
his horses, or he would surely “break his own neck.”
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single violent drive would be to sacrifice the possibility of self-realization. The body plays too
integral a role in the process of self-realization to give it up.119
Nietzsche’s fifth method of combating a vehement drive is the one involving actual
sublimation and works in the following manner:
…one brings about a dislocation of one’s quanta of strength by imposing on oneself a
particularly difficult and strenuous labor, or by deliberately subjecting oneself to a new
stimulus and pleasure and thus directing one’s thoughts and plays of physical forces into
other channels. It comes to the same thing if one for the time being favours another
drive, gives it ample opportunity for gratification and thus makes it squander that energy
otherwise available to the drive which through its vehemence has grown burdensome.120
The vehement drive, disapproved and unaccepted by the individual and society, transforms itself
into a new drive that can be approved and accepted. The channels into which the overly violent
drive flows may retain some semblance of the pre-sublimated drive: cruelty sublimated into
punishment; sexuality sublimated into art; possession sublimated into love; “evil” actions
sublimated into “good” actions.121 The distinction between the existential needs and the drives,
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which are all extensions of the more basic needs, should be recognized here. The sublimation of
some inner entity implies an attempt to annihilate that entity upon its sublimation where the
entity in which it transforms itself replaces the former one. An individual’s drives are what are
sublimated, for the drives are entities that can be, and sometimes ought to be, extinguished. On
the other hand, the existential needs are the raw materials of what we are—walking
contradictions between our instincts and our consciousness—and they cannot be extinguished,
for to do so would be to cease to be human. Despite this distinction that complexifies our picture
of the psyche, the process of sublimation does appear to play a crucial role in the realization of a
self. The more refined the processes of sublimation are—the closer will an individual be to
achieving self-realization: this is the primary sense of what it means to exemplify the will to
power. Bear in mind that the fundamental norm of need-satisfaction is that it is performed for
the sake of the beautiful and that acting for the sake of the beautiful involves some kind of selfmastery, especially the conscious self-mastery over one’s instincts and needs. Both the elements
of beauty and self-mastery appear to be inextricably linked to sublimation. When an individual
manifests the most elevated form of the will to power, such a refined activity of sublimated
drives finds itself as a process beautification.

The Existential Need for a Relation of Self-Love
The notion of the self as multiplicity (or at least as duality in which the self “sees” and
“relates” to itself) and this continual return to the self’s complex inner world has influenced me
to add a further existential need to Fromm’s list: the need for a loving relationship to one’s self.
The need to form a loving relationship to one’s self ought to be added because the previous
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needs do not sufficiently address the “many mortal souls” that exist within a single individual
and how those souls quarrel and potentially can coexist without internal discord. The kinds of
inner discord that we are most concerned with result from feelings of impotence, self-contempt
and resentment that have the potential to be externalized toward others. Christine Swanton says
that self-love is a solid bonding with oneself expressing strength, vitality and energy, one that is
devoid of the resentment of the threatened, vulnerable, hostile and envious.122 Such harmful
feelings turn inward when the human needs remain present yet when these existential needs
cannot be satisfied (and hence when the self undergoes dissolution). It seems that the various
forms of self-hate and self-contempt that frequently arise in the face of this discord prohibit a
real self from being fully realized. Whether it be of the whole or of a part of oneself, self-hatred
causes further fragmentation in which there is inner distance between the parts of a self but no
communication between such parts. Similarly, certain forms of self-contempt that do not allow
healthy growth and development stifle the possibility of realized selfhood.

Along with

Nietzsche’s idea that thoughts are the shadows of our feelings—always darker, emptier, simpler,
I assume that the affects possess a primacy over cognitions.123 This being the case, the affect
oriented toward oneself that best exemplifies beauty is that of love. All of the existential
needs—including that of self-love—coalesce into a kind of harmony between instincts and
consciousness which makes possible the achieving of self-realization, and it is this undertaking
that I take the will to power to be.
First, how does one go about developing self-love? It might be useful to provide some
examples of how one can fail to love oneself. Imagine a vindictive person—let’s call him Mr.
122

Swanton, Christine. Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View. New York: Oxford University Press,
2003, pp. 133-136.
123
GS, Sec. 179.
85

V—who must humiliate and triumph over everyone with whom he comes into contact. Mr. V
glorifies that aspect of himself in which he does have a high degree of power, perhaps in logical
acuity and conceptual analysis. His superiority in intellectual games and abstract theoretical
analysis spills over into how he sees his whole self, causing him to feel superior in toto to others.
However, in focusing his efforts on showing his felt superiority over others through humiliating
and shaming them in their intellectual deficiencies, he simultaneously represses his inability to
care for others and develop strong emotional attachments to them. Mr. V may feel contemptuous
towards his inability to enter into romantic relationships and thus tends to be especially rude to
intelligent women, who threaten his glorified self. The relationship that Mr. V has with himself
is one of self-contempt and self-hatred: he hates himself for not being more physically attractive,
for lacking the ability to be intimate and for being the primary source of his own loneliness and
solitude. I draw the example of Mr. V from what Karen Horney calls the arrogant-vindictive
type, which is merely one of three sub-types (the narcissistic, the perfectionistic and the arrogantvindictive type) in which the despised self is repressed and the individual identifies himself
completely with his idealized self.124
A second example of a failure to develop a loving relationship to oneself is that of a
person who undergoes a shrinking process where everything is sacrificed in order to achieve love
from others.

Imagine a person that we can call Mrs. E who views all manifestations of

selfishness and aggression as taboos. Mrs. E experiences herself as mostly helpless and as not
having many talents or even the resources to develop the few talents that she possesses. Because
of her inability to be effective or to have any sway over those who are ambitious, she idealizes
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the image of herself into “a composite of ‘lovable’ qualities, such as unselfishness, goodness,
generosity, humility, saintliness, nobility, [and] sympathy.”125 The character traits of a subdued
self become virtues to be praised for Mrs. E. Such an individual bears a strong resemblance to
the individual experiencing ressentiment in Nietzsche’s Genealogy, where an imaginary revenge
takes place against those who are strong and powerful.126 The key to why the self-effacing
neurotic solution prohibits the development of building a relation of self-love is that the self
approximates to a point that approaches self-annihilation. Because Mrs. E sacrifices everything
to be loved by others, one of things that she has sacrificed is herself. This is counter to some of
Nietzsche’s suggestions that faith in oneself can only be acquired through a dialogue between the
skeptic and the doer both inside an individual, and it is by way of good, beautiful and great
actions that the doer can overcome the skeptic, thereby achieving and maintaining a love for
oneself.127
A third example of how one might fail to develop a relation of self-love is by resigning
from active living. Let’s call our third neurotic Mr. R. This individual has settled for a peace
which is merely the absence of conflicts, and the direct expression of this neurotic solution is his
being an onlooker at himself and his life. Mr. R does not strive to achieve anything and has an
aversion to effort, influence, pressure, coercion, ties of any kind or change—he has resigned
from the conflicts between the pride of the idealized self and the inner “should’s” of the despised
self. Mr. R experiences himself as having achieved a freedom from his inner conflicts and a
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freedom from human attachments. His idealized image is a composite of self-sufficiency,
independence, self-contained serenity, freedom from desires and passions, stoicism, and
fairness.128 The space where Mr. R hides, or “has freedom from,” the world is on his couch
watching hours and hours of television and living vicariously through the doings of fictional
characters, only to wake up one day and realize that he has spent his entire life, not in the whoop
and whirl of life, but as a resigned couch potato.129 Because Mr. R never does anything, he
cannot be praised for doing anything and there is then no self there to love.
Thus it appears that the three modes of neuroses—the appeal to mastery, the appeal to
(neighborly) love and the appeal to freedom—make a relation of self-love impossible. The
absence of the satisfaction of this existential need prohibits the possibility of achieving selfrealization. To get a better picture of why the satisfaction of the existential need for self-love is a
requirement for the overall possibility of achieving self-realization, we ought to think of what the
opposite sort of relation to oneself might produce. What is going on inside one who undergoes
self-hate, and what are the consequences of this relation?

Horney outlines six modes of

operation (or expressions) of self-hate: relentless demands on the self, merciless self-accusation,
self-contempt, self-frustrations, self-tormenting and self-destruction.130

The common

phenomenon in all of these modes of operation is “the should” and the pride system tyrannizing
the real self. Neurotics are driven to reach beyond themselves and do so by setting absolute
values to be the measuring rod by which they measure themselves. The neurotic must be as
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charitable as possible, the best lover possible, the most successful businessman, the most selfless
as she can possibly be…all of which become oppressive demands because they are unreasonable
or even impossible to meet. The neurotic’s pride is then damaged by the inability to “measure
up” to the created absolute dictates. He then feels contempt, hatred, and/or frustration toward
himself. He despises his powerlessness. The potential results are a stunting of the growth and
development of the real self and potentially even self-destruction. What is the end game for one
who sets goals/values that are impossible to meet? There is no end game. There is only the
continual and progressive tormenting of the self by the self, even if this occurs on an
unconscious level.
This kind of self-contempt is not the same attitude as that of self-dissatisfaction. On the
one hand, to feel contempt towards oneself is necessarily pejorative and such an attitude is
caused by some deficiency or excess in one’s life. That to which one directs a contemptuous
attitude is perceived as worthless and hopelessly vile, or at least so much so that such would not
be worthy of an attempt at redemption. But does self-contempt always result in a failure to make
headway in the process of self-realization? One might argue that there is sometimes a need for
self-contempt, or ask the question: How do we distinguish between the self-contempt that
contributes to producing a realized-self, or ‘who I am,’ and the self-contempt that does not? Or
with my distinction: How do we distinguish between self-contempt and self-dissatisfaction?
Nietzsche may help provide an answer. In the GM, he describes the attitude that someone with a
bad conscience possesses toward himself: someone who fails to satisfy his need for effectiveness
and internalizes this need due to one of many forms of external restraint imposed by society and
civilization:
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This secret self-ravishment, this artists’ cruelty, this delight in imposing a form upon
oneself as a hard, recalcitrant, suffering material and in burning a will, a critique, a
contradiction, a contempt, a No into it, this uncanny, dreadfully joyous labor of a soul
voluntarily at odds with itself that makes itself suffer out of joy in making suffer—
eventually this entire active “bad conscience”—you will have guessed it—as the womb
of all ideal and imaginative phenomena, also brought to light an abundance of strange
new beauty and affirmation, and perhaps beauty itself.—After all, what would be
“beautiful” if the contradiction had not first become conscious of itself, if the ugly had
not first said to itself: “I am ugly”?131
The norm of beauty here plays a role. If an individual with an attitude of self-contempt results in
the lowering of humankind or some portion of it, then he chooses a disfiguring mode of needsatisfaction. However, if an individual possesses self-contempt (or self-dissatisfaction) and
recognizes the contradictory nature of the bad conscience, then such a self-conscious soul might
give birth to beauty. In other words, self-contempt can be viewed as an incurable cancer or as a
pregnancy, just as there are two primary ways of viewing the bad conscience.132 The former fails
to move beyond the internalization of its instinct for freedom, while the latter imagines a
possibility of realizing the instinct for freedom. Keep in mind that Nietzsche equivocates the
“instinct for freedom” with the will to power, and hence, by “instinct for freedom” I mean the
achieving of self-realization. Where self-contempt is a purely negative stance towards oneself,
self-dissatisfaction is simultaneously a negative and a positive stance towards oneself. Robert
Pippen describes this state of self-dissatisfaction in the following terms:
All action involves a negation of a sort, an alteration of what would have remained the
same without one’s intervention, but Nietzsche appears particularly interested in a kind of
inward-looking self-negation, a transformation of what had been a subject’s restraints, or
commitments, basic desires or passions, all in a way that makes possible a new kind of
outward-looking relation to the world. In those paradigmatic cases (where, especially,
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the direction and course of one’s whole life are at stake), he often focuses our attention
on what he calls a “tension of the spirit” that allows a genuine “self-overcoming.”133
So, Pippen’s claim that self-dissatisfaction allows self-overcoming and genuine agency coincides
with my claim that self-dissatisfaction allows the achieving of self-realization.
Another mode by which self-hate might exist is when an individual acts under the
assumption that he has not set any values to guide his existence. Even though it appears that
such a person is “beyond value,” he is still valuing the feeling of power derived from harming
others. For example, the profiteering hedge fund manager (or the Modern Blond Beast) whose
primary goal is to greedily make as much money as possible through whatever means of
manipulation and deception, does what he pleases regardless of who it harms. He acts only to
satisfy his greed (and any number of figures could replace him: the corrupt politician, the
insurance salesman, the banker, the CEO of B.P. Oil, etc.). This figure’s conscience may never
come to recognize his vices; however, such a figure may possibly come to experience self-hate if
he were to realize his identification with his idealized self, i.e. the epitome of capitalist wealth
taken to the extreme without restraint. In a general sense, feelings of guilt, shame, remorse and
regret are the sparks that ignite the warring factions within a self. It is more than just a
decentralization of drives. It is a desire to extinguish that which cannot be destroyed (the self)
and a desire to extinguish the self without justification, at least in the cases in which absolute
values have become tyrannical. In the case where it is simply the wrong values that are being
tyrannical (greed or apathy), it is possible that the desire to punish the self may become coercive
instead of being directed towards self-improvement or moral education. As far as our social
existence goes, the problem with self-hate is its strong tendency to be externalized toward our
133
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interpersonal relationships. Horney echoes a thought that is already present in Nietzsche: “We
have cause to fear him who hates himself, for we shall be the victims of his wrath and his
revenge. Let us therefore see if we cannot seduce him into loving himself!”134 This hatred of
others further minimizes the possibility of others being genuine companions of any sort, a
deficiency of rootedness which thereby diminishes the possibility of self-realization. We will
return to this issue of the relatedness between a self and others in the discussion of friendship in
chapter five.
Another kind of self-hate is that which is promulgated by Christianity’s dogmatic view
that humankind is sinful and that we are forever in need of redemption from our sinful nature. If
we are sinful by nature and if hatred is one of the common passions felt by sinners, then we are
also hateful by nature. But how could one ever develop a relation of self-love under such a
picture? Nietzsche suggests forgiveness as a means of transforming this self-relation from one of
guilt and shame into one of love:
If, as Pascal and Christianity maintain, our ego is always hateful, how could we ever
allow and accept that another should love it—whether god or man! It would be contrary
to all decency to let oneself be loved while being all the time well aware that one
deserves only hatred—not to speak of other defensive sensations. —‘But this precisely is
the realm of clemency.’ —Is your love of your neighbor an act of clemency, then? Your
pity an act of clemency? Well, if you are capable of this, go a step further: love
yourselves as an act of clemency—then you will no longer have any need of your god,
and the whole drama of Fall and Redemption will be played out to the end in you
yourselves!135
This passage seems to be the beginning of a new movement of argument present in Daybreak,
one inquiring into the possibility of self-love and the possibility of loving others. Under the
Judeo-Christian moral guise, we appear to need forgiveness for how we exist from God and
134
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neighbor, yet if are waiting for divine forgiveness or forgiveness from other selves (neither of
which can possibly know us), then we will be waiting for an eternity. If these are the conditions
for self-love, then self-love becomes impossible to attain.

However, if one re-focuses on

developing a relation of self-love with oneself—as an attitude of amor fati perhaps136—then it is
possible to recognize the nonexistence of one’s “sinful nature” imposed from God and neighbor.
Not that every feeling of guilt or shame is inappropriate, but the mere acknowledgement that
many of such self-negating feelings are self-imposed is a small step toward inner integration.
Does Nietzsche have a positive account of self-love? Yes, there is an account of self-love
in Nietzsche’s works, but it must be pieced together from various sources. In the section entitled
“The Spirit of Gravity,” Nietzsche’s Zarathustra characterizes self-love as something not simply
possessed by all human beings but as something that one has to learn.

Thus begins the

ambiguous status of whether self-love (and love in general) is something that can be taught and
learned at all. Zarathustra proclaims the following good news:
But whoever would become light and a bird must love himself: thus I teach. Not, to be
sure, with the love of the wilting and wasting: for among those even self-love stinks. One
must learn to love oneself—thus I teach—with a wholesome and healthy love, so that one
can bear to be with oneself and need not roam. Such roaming baptizes itself “love of the
neighbor”: with this phrase the best lies and hypocrisies have been perpetrated so far, and
especially by such as were a grave burden for all the world. And verily, this is no
command for today and tomorrow, to learn to love oneself. Rather, it is of all arts the
subtlest, the most cunning, the ultimate, and the most patient. For whatever is his own is
well concealed from the owner; and of all treasures, it is our own that we dig up last: thus
the spirit of gravity orders it.137
Two curious thoughts present themselves in this passage. The first is that self-love is not
something to which everyone should aspire. If one possesses a poor character that is “wilting
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and wasting,” then one should not love oneself, for there is not anything there that is lovable.
However, if one possesses a more free-spirited character whose love is “wholesome and
healthy,” then such a person ought to work to develop the relation of self-love.138 The second
curious thought is that Zarathustra teaches those who can fly “to learn to love oneself” and yet he
also says that this command, “to learn to love oneself,” is not a command for today and
tomorrow.

Rather than completely negate itself, this further suggestion that Zarathustra’s

teaching is not a command for the present and for the future may indicate that self-love is not
something that can be learned. It is either present but concealed within an individual, or it is not
present and will never be so. Instead of being learned, perhaps self-love is something that is
realized through one’s actions both toward oneself and toward others.

Such a process of

realization would be one that requires “subtlety”, “cunning”, and “patience,” for the instinctconsciousness split can be a source of self-deception. Insofar as one’s instincts (and existential
needs) are frustrated or are not satisfied for the sake of the beautiful, there is the possibility that
those coarsened instincts will be unconsciously disguised often by moral masks that glorify
passivity, humility and compassion. Disgusted by his own weakness, an individual will turn a
blind eye toward himself, as a mere set of frustrated instincts, and the individual qua frustrated
instincts will hide from himself as consciousness. Such is the dimension that is “concealed from
his owner”—one does not conceal what is beautiful; one conceals what is ugly, deformed and
frustrated. The “treasure” that we may potentially “dig up” at last is not a treasure that one
simply and purely discovers, like a treasure on a deserted island. The digging up of the treasure
of selfhood is more a realization, which is a blend of discovery and creation. Digging up a self
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takes work! This is the sense in which a subtle inner-look, a cunning seeker and a patient creator
are all required for the activity of self-realization.
The ambiguity between whether love is learnable or not learnable continues in Book Four
of the GS. Here Nietzsche compares learning to hear a figure and melody in music to learning to
love. He seems to go back to the idea that it is possible for love to be learned, especially love for
oneself. He says:
In the end we are always rewarded for our good will, our patience, our fair-mindedness,
and gentleness with what is strange; gradually, it sheds its veil and turns out to be a new
and indescribable beauty. That is its thanks for our hospitality. Even those who love
themselves will have learned it in this way; for there is no other way. Love, too, has to be
learned.139
There is a sense in which everything outside of oneself is strange and perceived as other.
Nietzsche highlights this strangeness of otherness that at first causes trepidation but that a
person’s beauty may become familiar despite its former unknown quality. It is interesting that
Nietzsche ends this passage with the thought that self-love must be learned in this way: the
overcoming of beauty’s strangeness. The object of love must possess beauty, which continues
the argument begun on self-love in TSZ. However, there is a kind of blurring between the
possession of beauty and the fashioning of beauty. Should one adopt a truthful attitude or an
artistic attitude toward the fatalistic dimension of one’s existence? Well, one ought to be capable
of doing both, depending which facets of one’s existence are being attended to. David Owen
claims that Nietzsche’s idea of self-love is the valuing of the disposition of amor fati.140 By
“valuing,” he seems to mean that self-love is the “adoption” of the disposition of amor fati.
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Owen is on the right track here, for there is an element of artistic illusion toward those aspects of
one’s existence that could possibly prevent one from living well and there is also an element of
truthfulness that is required to “face up” to the aspects of one’s existence that cannot be altered.
One caution to Owen’s conception of self-love is that seeing parts of one’s fate as beautiful may
potentially slip into a form of self-deception. One who makes himself a “poet of his life” will
likely have the ability to discriminate between those fatalistic qualities which cannot be changed
and those fatalistic qualities that can possibly be improved upon.
The theme of self-love is expressed in the section of the GS entitled “One thing is
needful,” yet one will easily misunderstand the main idea if one does not ruminate properly. The
passage opens with the line, “To ‘give style’ to one’s character—a great and rare art!” This
begins the explanation of how strong and weak natures differ in the aesthetic attitudes they bear
toward themselves. The subjective constraint of style will be loved by strong natures who can
bear what fate has given them, but the constraint of style will be hated by weak natures who
cannot stand the sight of what fate has thrown at them. What is it that is often so misunderstood
though? The one thing that is needful is not the giving of style to one’s character. Something
else must be gained before that. Near the very end of this same section, Nietzsche expresses the
salience of the existential need of self-love:
For one thing is needful: that a human being should attain satisfaction with himself,
whether it be by means of this or that poetry and art; only then is a human being at all
tolerable to behold. Whoever is dissatisfied with himself is continually ready for
revenge, and we others will be his victims, if only by having to endure his ugly sight. For
the sight of what is ugly makes one bad and gloomy.141
One cannot be anyone else other that who he is. One is spit into the world as a being that has not
and cannot possibly have freely given the world permission to thrust one into existence. We are
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responsible for fostering the kind of affective attitude that we have towards our own existence
though. Nietzsche considers self-satisfaction to be the mode of self-orientation that is performed
for the sake of the beautiful, while “dissatisfaction” with oneself is a mode of self-orientation
which can manifest itself in vengeful actions toward oneself or be externalized into shameful
actions committed against others. Nietzsche claims that the relation one ought to have with
oneself is that of satisfaction [Zufriedenheit]—a relation that he also speaks of in terms of selflove. Where the weak characters “hate” [hassen] the constraint of style, it can reasonably be said
that the strong characters love the constraint of style. Adopting a loving attitude toward “the
style” that is presented to oneself by one’s own inner dialogical nature seems to be nearly
identical to self-love: a love of one’s fate to be who one is.
Nietzsche’s theme of self-love continues into BGE where self-love presents itself as a
mark of distinction of the noble soul. He solidifies the thought that not everyone is capable of
nobility of soul. Those who seek it are separate from those who simply possess it. The closeness
between faith, reverence and love for oneself is also further explained:
It is not the works [of a noble soul], it is the faith that is decisive here, that determines the
order of rank—to take up again an ancient religious formula in a new and more profound
sense: some fundamental certainty that a noble soul has about itself, something that
cannot be sought, nor found, nor perhaps lost. The noble soul has reverence for itself.142
Through an exploration of what constitutes the seven existential needs and the salient
ways in which we as human beings can satisfy these needs, we have gained a new understanding
of how an individual can undergo and achieve self-realization. When a self is realized under the
norm of beauty, as discussed in chapter two, one does in fact exemplify the will to power. In the
next chapter, we will look more closely at the ontological status of the will to power. I have
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described it as a human achievement that is conditioned both by one’s already existing relation to
happiness/unhappiness and by one’s social and political setting. We will consider the possibility
that the will to power is a self-conscious myth that merely expresses Nietzsche’s values. Upon
replying to this worry, we will look at types of human beings who serve as models that
exemplify the will to power, in order to apprehend a more concrete picture of who a fully
realized self would be.

98

Chapter Four
The Status of the Will to Power: Myth or Truth?...The Status of Philosophy: Art or
Science?
What is the ontological status of the will to power? What mode of existence does it
occupy? Properly understood, the will to power is a specific kind of human achievement—i.e.
the realization of a self. Because it is an achieving of self-realization, it is a mistake to conceive
of the will to power as a metaphysical phenomenon. It cannot be reduced to a metaphysical first
principle, nor can it simply be reduced to a moral first principle. The reductionist account of the
will to power holds that all “quanta of force” are manifestations of a single primary drive—they
are reducible to the drive for power.143 The reductionist view is sometimes framed to include not
just human drives (the weaker reductionist view) but all drives in the universe (the stronger
reductionist view) and is read as some kind of metaphysical view of the world. This common
misunderstanding is put together from passages usually taken willy-nilly from Nietzsche’s
unpublished Nachlass such as the following:
And do you know what “the world” is to me? Shall I show it to you in my mirror? This
world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of
force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expend itself but only transforms
itself; as a whole, of unalterable size, a household without expenses or losses, but
likewise without increase or income;…this, my Dionysian world of the eternally selfcreating, eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of the two-fold voluptuous delight,
my “beyond good and evil,” without goal, unless the joy of the circle is itself a goal;
without will, unless a ring feels goodwill towards itself—do you want a name for this
world? A solution for all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest,
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most intrepid, most midnightly men?—This world is the will to power—and nothing
besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power—and nothing besides!144
We should not look to unpublished notes to decipher the meaning of the doctrine of the will to
power, especially when Nietzsche clearly expresses his distaste for metaphysical pictures of
reality. As an opponent of metaphysicians and anti-naturalists, we might think of Nietzsche as
an anti-anti-naturalist.

He was concerned with re-integrating man back into nature.

He

recognized and attempted an upheaval of the errors of ancient Greek metaphysicians such as
Parmenides and Plato, the long tradition of Christian metaphysics, and the transcendental (and
seemingly metaphysical) notion of the will that held center stage in German philosophy in the
century and a half before him. The grandiose and other-worldly metaphysical systems that were
conceived by Parmenides, Plato, Aquinas, Leibniz, Schopenhauer or Hegel were too far reaching
into that which was “unknowable” and more importantly into that which was “unimportant”
(beyond what is human, all too human). In the chapter entitled “Of First and Last Things,” he
says:
For one could assert nothing at all of the metaphysical world except that it was a beingother, an inaccessible, incomprehensible being-other; it would be a thing with negative
qualities.—Even if the existence of such a world were never so well demonstrated, it is
certain that knowledge of it would be the most useless of all knowledge: more useless
even than the chemical composition of water must be to the sailor in danger of
shipwreck.145
The weaker reductionist view that all human drives are expressions of the will to power implies
that no drive could be opposed to any other drive because there is really only one drive ever at
work, the drive for power, even if it wears different masks. If all human drives were reduced to
one drive, then it seems that the doctrine would not capture the internally conflicting nature of
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the drives present in human psychology. Such a view would be an oversimplification. An even
more pressing problem for the weaker reductionist view is that it presupposes that the will to
power is already operative in everything that we do—whether we are expressing a drive for sex,
a drive for a sense of belonging in a community, a drive to have as much wealth as possible, a
drive to social prestige, a drive to dominate or possess another person, or whatever.

If

formulated in this manner, everyone would have access to the will to power because everyone
would already always be operating under its sway. Such a proposal makes it difficult to explain
the magnitude of apathy, sloth and boredom that exist for us as human beings. Such vicious
conditions seem to have only become more pervasive in modernity with the exponential rise of
industry and technology. How is the absence of a desire to do anything a manifestation of the
will to power? Or how is not having the desire to desire anything a manifestation of the will to
power? The reduction of the will to power to a fundamental meta-drive underlying all human
drives that is already in existence further distances the possibility of the will to power that we
are interested in (and that Nietzsche was interested in) from its birth, in and out of our existential
needs, and its connection to genuine autonomy and unified selfhood. In addition, the doctrine of
the will to power should be understood as applying only to human beings. Although we operate
under the assumption that we are moral beings, we need to be careful in what way we can
possibly be normatively evaluated. Our existential needs are not moral phenomena, but there
will be a sense in which we can morally praise or blame the will to power.146 It is a human
potential that, depending on the degree of success or failure of the achieving of self-realization,
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determines what kind of character one will develop and how that character will exemplify
strength or weakness, virtue or vice, and excellence or baseness.
Moving beyond the absolute metaphysical and moral conceptions of the will to power,
we must further ruminate on the curious status of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power. The
one passage in BGE that serves as a potential threat to my account of the will to power is section
36, the only place where Nietzsche actually provides an argument for the existence of the will to
power. In a sense the entire aphorism composes “the argument” for what the nature of the will to
power might possibly be, but the core of Nietzsche’s line of reasoning lies in the last paragraph
of BGE 36:
Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the
development and ramification of one basic form of the will—namely, of the will to
power, as my proposition has it; suppose all organic functions could be traced back to this
will to power and one could also find in it the solution to the problem of procreation and
nourishment—it is one problem—then one would have gained the right to determine all
efficient force univocally as—will to power. The world viewed from inside, the world
defined and determined according to its “intelligible character”—it would be “will to
power” and nothing else.—
As Maudemarie Clark has argued in her writings on the will to power, the problem is that the
argument is given in the subjunctive tense and not in the declarative.147 So she claims that
Nietzsche merely makes the supposition that all organic functions are rooted in the will to power.
If that supposition were true, then we would have gained the right to determine all efficient force
univocally as the will to power. Then, Nietzsche’s conclusion is that the world would then be
will to power and nothing else (and not that is actually is.) Does the argument here tell against
interpreting the will to power as a doctrine that is Nietzsche’s actual position? Is Nietzsche
being ironic? Is he suggesting that the doctrine is a mere expression of something that he values
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and not saying something about the actual nature of human life? Clark claims that he is. We
must specifically show why Clark’s account of the will is incorrect if we are to view the will to
power as humanity’s potential achieving of self-realization and not a mere expression of
Nietzsche’s values.
Clark claims that Nietzsche in fact espouses two doctrines of the will to power: an
ontological doctrine and a psychological doctrine. According to Clark, the ontological doctrine
of the will to power is that the concept is a self-conscious myth giving us a picture or image of
reality which is not intended to provide knowledge, but is supposed to play a role in the
interpretation of experience and the furtherance of life.148 On the other hand, the psychological
doctrine of the will to power is that it is “the most life-affirming drive in the sense that the
satisfaction of this drive, a sense of power, of the ability to enforce one’s will, is necessary for
the affirmation of life, whereas a sense of powerlessness induces depression and a tendency to
passive nihilism.”149 Clark claims that the ontological doctrine of the will to power is a product
of Nietzsche’s viewing philosophy as an art and not as a science, and she draws this thought
from his early notebooks. Clark believes that because Nietzsche conceives of philosophy as an
art, it cannot be something that is true or false but is the conceptual representation of a myth—a
self-conscious myth that creates the world in the image of what Nietzsche happens to value.150
This conception of the ontological doctrine is misguided. The supposed two doctrines,
ontological and psychological, are one and the same. There is no doctrine of the will to power
whose ontological status is that of a self-conscious myth. There is only one doctrine of the will
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to power that can be defined as the achieving of self-realization, which is psychological in nature
and which engages in a dialogical relationship with our existential needs.
Why reject Clark’s proposal that the will to power’s ontological status is a self-conscious
myth? First, the textual evidence for the ideas that Nietzsche considers philosophy to be an art
and that he intends the will to power to be a myth come from early notebooks which were not
published. This renders the material somewhat dubious as to what degree it represents the core
of Nietzsche’s thought on the nature of philosophy. The material in his early notebooks is a
collection of notes, not polished reflections on the human condition, the nature of philosophy and
the will to power. Even though it may not be the best source to solidify Nietzsche’s thought;
however, it may still be consulted to support the primary material found in the published texts. If
we do venture to use the ideas expressed in the early notebooks, we discover that philosophy
exists somewhere in the space between art and science—and even that philosophy, while
distinct, still has something in common with both. Drawing from the same notebooks that Clark
uses, we find textual support for the idea that philosophy exists at a distance from the mythmaking of art yet shares something both with it and with the enterprise of science:
The philosopher must recognize what is necessary, and the artist must create it. The
philosopher must empathize with universal suffering most strongly, just as each of the
ancient Greek philosophers expresses a need: it is there, in that gap, that he places his
system. He builds his world into that gap.151
There are somewhat different activities that the philosopher and the artist perform.

The

philosopher is moved by his drive for knowledge and by his drive for truth, and the artist is
driven by his drive to create, to use illusory representations to depict the world and make
beautiful what is not, to make digestible what is indigestible. As a lover of wisdom, on the other
151

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Writings from the Early Notebooks. Trans. Ladislaus Löb. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2009, Notebook 19, Sec. [23].
104

hand, the philosopher must have the courage to face up to the necessity of universal human
suffering in order to honestly inquire into this problem of existence.152 Not just the necessity of
it, but the salience and undeniable force that suffering has on us, especially emotional suffering.
The philosopher is a figure who is supposed to seek out and potentially reveal what kind of
attitude we ought to have toward the reality of our suffering and our mortality. Although the
philosopher operates partially under an aesthetic sensibility, he does possess a limitation on his
aesthetic activity, one by which the artist is not so constrained. Neither Salvadore Dali’s surreal
images of his The Metamorphosis of Narcissus nor his Burning Giraffe are limited by reality, nor
are M. C. Escher’s mathematically impossible images of his Relativity or of his Waterfall
constrained by what is logical or even what is possible. This however is not the case for the
philosopher, as understood by Nietzsche. “What is necessary” not only limits the philosophical
activity, but it also serves as a condition that makes possible the ultimate goals of living well and
realizing a self. Gaining insight into what is necessary requires a higher level of consciousness
toward oneself and the world. In the particular case of self-realization, a precondition is that one
must consciously recognize that there are a set of existential needs at one’s core. It is only with
such recognition that it is then possible to satisfy those needs in a manner that will realize a true
self. At another point in Notebook 19, Nietzsche says:
How does the philosophical genius relate to art? There is little we can learn from his
direct behavior. We must ask: what in his philosophy is art? Work of art? What remains
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if his system is destroyed as science? But it must be precisely what remains that restrains
the drive for knowledge, i.e. the artistic quality. Why is such a restraint necessary? For,
scientifically considered, it is an illusion, an untruth, that deceives and only temporarily
satisfies the drive for knowledge. The value of philosophy with regard to this restraint
lies not in the sphere of knowledge, but in the sphere of life: the will to existence uses
philosophy for the purpose of a higher form of existence.153
Here we should notice that part of the philosophical activity of the philosophical genius is artistic
and that part of his activity is scientific. The part that is artistic merely “restrains” the scientific
part: that drive which wants to create is only tempered by that drive which wants the truth—or
vice versa, we might say that that drive which wants the truth is tempered by that drive which
wants to create. The drive to create does not extinguish the drive for truth, nor does the drive to
truth exterminate the drive to create. Quoting again from two final passages in Notebook 19, we
find a further deepening of the notion of philosophy as both science and art:
There is no philosophy apart, separate from science: in both, thinking occurs in the same
way. The reason why unprovable philosophizing still has a value, indeed usually a
greater value than a scientific proposition, lies in the aesthetic value of such
philosophizing, i.e. in its beauty and sublimity. Even if it cannot prove itself as a
scientific edifice, it is still present as a work of art. But is it not the same in scientific
matters?—In other words: it is not the pure drive for knowledge that decides, but the
aesthetic drive: the poorly supported philosophy of Heraclitus has greater artistic value
than all the propositions of Aristotle.154
For instance, Heraclitus wonderfully describes the randomness of the events of the world when
he states, “Time is a child moving counters in a game; the royal power is a child’s.”155 On the
other hand, even though we should admire Aristotle for his insight and philosophical rigor, we
do not generally find such alluring imagery; rather, we find rational arguments. Further along in
the same notebook:
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Philosophical thinking belongs to the same species as scientific thinking, but it relates to
great things and concerns. But the concept of greatness is variable, part aesthetic, part
moral. It restrains the drive for knowledge. That is its cultural significance.156
The structure of thinking in philosophy resembles the structure of thinking in science, and it is
neither the pure drive for knowledge nor the pure drive to beatify that constitutes the practice of
philosophy. The aesthetic drive may take a certain primacy in decision-making based on what is
valuable and what is not, but it is the consideration of the authority of the values themselves that
makes the path to ‘hard-to-swallow” truths laden with artistic imagery. It is the uncertainty and
ambiguity of “what is great” that “restrains,” yet does not extinguish, the drive for philosophical
knowledge. A more appropriate word for philosophical knowledge might be “wisdom,” which is
often conceived of as being a necessary virtue for living well and for the corresponding
possibility of realizing a self in a life well-lived. An individual who attains such wisdom would
be someone who realizes the interdependence of truth-seeking rationality and beauty-seeking
intuition. Nietzsche suggests that an existence that embodies only one or the other would be
incomplete:
There are eras in which rational man and intuitive man stand side by side, the one fearful
of intuition, the other scornful of abstraction. The latter is just as irrational as the former
is inartistic. Both desire to dominate life: the former by knowing how to meet the
greatest needs with foresight, prudence and regularity, the latter by being an ‘over-joyous
hero’ who does not see those needs and who regards life as real only when it is disguised
as make-believe and beauty.157
Notice that both the irrationality of the intuitive man and the absence of artistic ability of the
rational man are deficiencies of a figure that ought to seek to possess the capacities of each. In
order to succeed at life, the rational man needs to develop the ability to perceive “the greatest
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needs” as beautiful and form a loving attitude toward such pieces of fate. Similarly, for the
intuitive man to flourish, he must honestly recognize “the greatest needs” as real even through
the “make-believe” veil that he has strewn over them. This early instance of Nietzsche working
through the nature of truth and falsity reaches its more finessed conclusion with the notion of
amor fati in the GS. This essay also prefigures the refinement of Nietzsche’s ideas of the
genuine philosopher and the will to power in the middle work of BGE.
After drawing primarily from Nietzsche’s early notes, Clark uses Beyond Good and Evil
as her main point of reference in order to build her argument that the will to power is a selfconscious myth, and she continues to defend her conception of the ontological doctrine by
focusing on a misinterpretation of the idea that philosophers “create the world” in their own
image. She begins with an analysis of BGE 9 and contends that Nietzsche is comparing himself
to the Stoics in the sense that as the Stoics interpreted nature “according to the Stoa,” similarly
Nietzsche himself (has confessed that he) interprets nature “according to Nietzsche.”158
However, in this section Nietzsche is not merely placing his interpretation of nature side-by-side
with the Stoic interpretation of nature and then just saying that philosophers pick and choose
however they wish to conceive of the natural world. No, not all interpretations of the world are
equally life-affirming. There are better and worse interpretations. He is claiming that the Stoics
“see nature the wrong way” because they imposed their morality on nature: claiming virtue as
that which is in accordance with nature.159 Does not Nietzsche impose his morality on nature in
the same way?

No, he does not.

If the will to power is thought of as a psychological

phenomenon in a dialogical relationship with our existential needs and if the will to power is
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properly thought of as applying only to human beings, then we do not impose any moral ideal (or
any morality) on nature.

Nietzsche describes nature and then explains our contentious

relationship to nature, while still being a part of nature in the first paragraph of BGE section 9.
He construes nature as it is from the human perspective, as “wasteful beyond measure,
indifferent beyond measure, without purposes and consideration, without mercy and justice,
fertile and desolate and uncertain at the same time.”160 Without human beings involved, nature
is not wasteful. It is indifferent, without purpose and without meaning, without our constellation
of values ranging from mercy and forgiveness to justice and punishment. It is only when human
beings arrive on the scene, that we—natural beings though we are—want to rip and tear
ourselves away from nature and transform ourselves into something unnatural. We want to be
good, to be beautiful, to be moral, to be one of God’s children, to be free, to be holy. Nietzsche
expresses this idea when he asks, “Living—is that not precisely wanting to be other than this
nature?

Is not living—estimating, preferring, being unjust, being limited, wanting to be

different?”161
Nietzsche is portraying nature as it actually is here in this early passage in BGE. But
such an interpretation renders the last short paragraph of section 9 to be somewhat perplexing,
for it is here that Nietzsche formally introduces the notion that the philosopher “creates the
world” in his own image. The section ends with the following:
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But this is an ancient, eternal story: what formerly happened with the Stoics still happens
today, too, as soon as any philosophy begins to believe in itself. It always creates the
world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise. Philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself,
the most spiritual will to power, to the “creation of the world,” to the causa prima.162
If this last passage is taken as the final conclusion to section 9 and as the final conclusion of
Nietzsche’s thoughts on who a philosopher is, then the activity of “creating the world,” which
appears to be the essence of what a philosopher does, lends credence to Clarke’s argument that
there is an ontological doctrine of the will to power and that that doctrine is a self-conscious
myth. But without more clarification, it remains a mysterious activity. How is it possible for
someone to create the world, even for a philosopher? I suggest that the introduction of this idea
is actually the beginning of a larger argument regarding who and what a philosopher is. The
themes that appear in any single work of Nietzsche are presented cyclically, and there is a kind
of movement of the argument that unfolds with each return to any one theme. For instance, the
question “What is the nature of a genuine philosopher?” is one of the themes that Nietzsche
begins to address in section 9 of BGE but that he unravels at further points in the body of the
work. The two points of further development of the nature of the philosopher occur later in BGE
in sections 211 and 292.

In section 211 Nietzsche makes a strange distinction between

“philosophical laborers” and “genuine philosophers” where the former merely press previous
positings of values into universal formulas that apply for all (Kant and Hegel being the examples
Nietzsche gives) but where the latter create values that are somehow unique to the self which
creates them. Nietzsche transfigures the idea of “creating the world” into the idea of “creating
values” in his description:
Genuine philosophers, however, are commanders and legislators: they say, “thus it shall
be!” They first determine the Whither and For What of man, and in so doing have at
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their disposal the preliminary labor of all philosophical laborers, all who have overcome
the past. With a creative hand they reach for the future, and all that is and has been
becomes a means for them, an instrument, a hammer. Their “knowing” is creating, their
creating is a legislation, their will to truth is—will to power.163
In this second movement of the development of the notion of a genuine philosopher, what has
become the mark of distinction for such a figure? The genuine philosopher now possesses a
range of features: an orientation toward the future; a compulsion to find the greatness of man; the
capacity to create values; an evaluative stance toward the virtues of his time; and a being whole
in manifoldness.164 While any philosopher, from the ancient Greeks to contemporary figures,
does some analysis of already existing values, it seems that the genuine philosopher “creates
values” with an “eye to the future” by placing himself in certain values that already exist: the
new product being ‘the appropriation of an old value transfigured into a new philosopher.’ The
presence of one’s active self within the “created” value gains a new emphasis and is brought to a
level of completion near the end of “What is Noble.” The genuine philosopher now exists and is
portrayed as the following:
a human being who constantly experiences, sees, hears, suspects, hopes, and dreams
extraordinary things; who is struck by his own thoughts as from outside, as from above
and below, as by his type of experiences and lightning bolts; who is perhaps himself a
storm pregnant with new lightnings; a fatal human being around whom there are constant
rumblings and growlings, crevices, and uncanny doings. A philosopher—alas, a being
that often runs away from itself, often is afraid of itself—but too inquisitive not to “come
to” again—always back to himself.165
In this final movement of the development of the genuine philosopher, Nietzsche adds action and
a newfound intimacy with one’s self. Thus the philosopher who has placed himself in his values
now puts those values into his “doings”, which brings them into a more realized state from mere
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intentions or desires. This figure has also developed an attitude of honesty and truthfulness
toward himself and is always willing to return to his own self—to understand who he is and what
possibilities lay before him as to who he may become in his future. So, the first movement’s
notion of world-creation has transformed into the second movement’s notion of value-creation
which in the third movement is transformed into self-creation.
Is this line of thinking concerning the nature of the genuine philosopher a digression?
No, it is not. Clark argued that Nietzsche himself was a philosopher who treated philosophy as
art and thus “created the world” in his own image, divorcing philosophy from the drive to
truth… or more precisely the drive to truthfulness. We now see that Nietzsche’s complete theme
of the nature of the genuine philosopher is complex, and that complex “becoming” can be
applied to Nietzsche himself. This interpretation does rest on the assumption that Nietzsche
considered himself to be a genuine philosopher, even if he does not explicitly state this outright.
We have reason to think that this is the case though. Nietzsche’s most reflective work on
himself—on who he is—is Ecce Homo. In this piece of writing, Nietzsche provides the meaning
of philosophy, stating, “Philosophy, as I have so far understood and lived it, means living
voluntarily among ice and high mountains—seeking out everything strange and questionable in
existence, everything so far placed under a ban by morality.”166 He does recognize himself as
“living” philosophy by examining that which appears most worthy of investigation, especially
that which may at first induce in one the state of aporia. Philosophy swings away from the pole
of art (with its value of creation) and toward the pole of science (with its value of rational
discovery) when Nietzsche once again reaffirms the heart of philosophy: “How much truth does
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a spirit endure, how much truth does it dare? More and more that became for me the real
measure of value.”167

Nietzsche does in fact capture what the activity of philosophy is:

questioning one’s own feelings and thoughts toward oneself, toward others and toward the world
and having the will to entertain without completely absorbing the feelings and thoughts of your
interlocutor (whether he is alive or born posthumously).
Even though this is the characteristic activity of the genuine philosopher, the possible
achieving of self-realization need not be strictly limited to the sphere of philosophy. Multiple
external perspectives can take up temporary residency within an individual, each perspective
becoming a “drive” or “instinct” that must adapt to the drives that oppose it inside that same
individual. Nietzsche contrasts the Christian desideratum of “peace of soul” with his naturalized
morality: “Our attitude to the “internal enemy” is no different: here too we have spiritualized
hostility; here too we have come to appreciate its value. The price of fruitfulness is to be rich in
internal opposition; one remains young only as long as the soul does not stretch itself and desire
peace.”168 Pure untamed hostility that may have been previously felt toward some perspective
would seek to crush it out of existence, yet the spiritualization (or sublimation) of that hostility
makes possible the creative tension between opposing drives. This theme of incorporating as
much truth as possible is given further expression in Nietzsche’s notes:
In contrast to the animals, man has cultivated an abundance of contrary drives and
impulses within himself: thanks to this synthesis, he is master of the earth.—Moralities
are the expression of locally limited orders of rank in his multifarious world of drives, so
man should not perish through their contradictions. Thus a drive as master, its opposite
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weakened, refined, as the impulse that provides the stimulus for the activity of the chief
drive.
The highest man would have the greatest multiplicity of drives, in the relatively greatest
strength that can be endured. Indeed, where the plant “man” shows himself strongest one
finds instincts that conflict powerfully (e.g., in Shakespeare), but are controlled.169
So, for example, take an ethical and political question that has increasingly become more urgent
over the last five hundred years: Should all citizens of a nation have access to universal
healthcare? Such is a question about the nature of distributive justice. The “un-spiritualized”
man will simply occupy his own perspective and mistakenly believe that his perspective is true,
whatever his position may be. The “highest man” who has undergone spiritualization will retain
and consider a multiplicity of perspectives. Such an individual will be a contest of the following
opposing perspectives: 1) Unlike our “natural” rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,
there is no such thing as a natural right to universal health care; 2) Every citizen should not have
access to universal healthcare because such an enterprise would unfairly deprive those people
with more wealth and property of their liberty; 3) Every citizen should not have access to
universal healthcare because some people do not deserve healthcare; 4) If Jesus Christ said that
the sick and the poor are blessed and that we should heal their illness, then they more than
anyone else should have access to universal healthcare; 5) Having a social rule that all have
access to universal healthcare will maximize happiness, and so there ought to be such a social
welfare program; 6) If all free, equal and independent persons would agree to a rule that
guaranteed universal healthcare, then all such persons should abide by such a rule that promotes
social cooperation; 7) Every human being should have access to universal healthcare in virtue of
the dignity that they possess by partaking in the rational autonomy of humanity; and 8) Each
individual should have access to a universal healthcare program because such a program would
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be created by the virtuous person and would promote human flourishing. The man who has
become complacent and found “truth” in just one of these perspectives fails to aim at unified
wholeness. The synthetic man who makes an experiment of himself with the incorporation of as
much “truth” as possible exemplifies the greatest strength attainable in a measured control over
diverse perspectives. Even the refinement of the weaker perspectives contributes to the overall
creativity of truth-incorporation.

A Question of Interpretation
Certain instances where Nietzsche expounds upon his notion of the will to power demand
a more scrupulous degree of interpretation and analysis. BGE 22 may seem to be an obstacle to
my account of the will to power in that Nietzsche exposes one mode of interpretation of nature as
being a democratic interpretation, and then he sets up his own will to power interpretation of
nature right alongside the democratic one. The democratic mode of interpretation is one in
which the presuppositions of ‘equality amongst all parts of nature’ and ‘equal obedience to law’
are already in place and are unreflectively projected onto the world or some facet of it. We see
that both are interpretations and neither matters of fact. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily
mean that both interpretations are equally good. Nietzsche presents the problem evocatively yet
with subtlety:
Forgive me as an old philologist who cannot desist from the malice of putting his finger
on bad modes of interpretation: but “nature’s conformity to law,” of which you physicists
talk so proudly, as though—why, it exists only owing to your interpretation and bad
“philology.” It is no matter of fact, no “text,” but rather only a naively humanitarian
emendation and perversion of meaning, with which you make abundant concessions to
the democratic instincts of the modern soul!...and somebody might come along who, with
opposite intentions and modes of interpretation, could read out of the same “nature,” and
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with regard to the same phenomena, rather the tyrannically inconsiderate and relentless
enforcement of claims of power—an interpreter who would picture the unexceptional and
unconditional aspects of all “will to power” so vividly that almost every word, even the
word “tyranny” itself, would eventually seem unsuitable, or a weakening and attenuating
metaphor—being too human—but he might, nevertheless, end by asserting the same
about this world as you do, namely, that it has a “necessary” and “calculable” course, not
because laws obtain in it, but because they are absolutely lacking, and every power draws
its ultimate consequences at every moment. Supposing that this also is only
interpretation—and you will be eager enough to make this objection?—well, so much the
better.170
It is not problematic for us, qua interpretive human beings, to gain understanding about the
reality of the human condition, as long as we realize that everything is interpretation. Just
because all of human experience of the world is perspectival does not mean that all perspectives
(or interpretations) are equal and valid. There are worse interpretations and there are better
interpretations. In BGE 22, Nietzsche calls the democratic mode of interpretation a “bad” mode
of interpretation. This at least implies that the will to power interpretation is a better mode of
interpreting nature, for it considers as many perspectives as possible and attempts to incorporate
as much truth as possible. At least, that appears to be part of the project of BGE: truth is
perspectival and there is more truth where there are more perspectives taken into account
regarding any question or inquiry. If we are in the genuinely philosophic mode when attending
to how we experience ourselves and how we experience the world, then we will be operating
both artistically and scientifically. More precisely, as genuine philosophers we operate in the
space in between art and science, a space whose existence we have uncovered.
In BGE 22 Nietzsche appears to be claiming that the democratic interpretation is bad
because it designates too specific a political regime as the essence of things.

However,

democratic regimes are fairly new in the history of humankind. People have existed for a far
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longer period of time under monarchies, dynasties, oligarchies, totalitarian regimes and even
under no formal government if we trace our evolution back far enough. While we are political
animals, a better interpretation is one that gets to our more basic psychological constitution,
which interestingly enough is the approach that Nietzsche takes in the very next section (23) of
BGE.171
Keeping in mind that “man is the great esteemer” and as such our estimations pervade all
of our “judgments,” to get hold of “the most objective truth” about the drives and needs of
humankind we have to fight against the values under which we are conditioned. Because the
heart works against the more truth-incorporating interpretations, an ongoing dialogue must occur
between a person and his heart—a dialogue that can be described as between a self and his
values.

This idea is very much present in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, for Zarathustra is

participating in a dialogue with his heart and not with his mind: the heart being that which loves,
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hates, fears, envies, and undergoes all the more nuanced emotions in between such extremes. A
free spirit has the ability to release his heart from old values, carefully investigate each value’s
worth, and allow his heart to be free, for Zarathustra loves “him who has a free spirit and a free
heart: thus his head is only the entrails of his heart, but his heart drives him to go under.”172 We
should view the process of “going under” [Untergang; untergehen] as the struggle for the free
spirit to become one with his free heart, or achieve a fully-realized self. This process may be
painful because of the tension that exists within it: old values pushing and pulling against the free
heart’s endeavor to create new values.
A final point about “the truth” of what Nietzsche says about the will to power in this
section: we ought to be interpreting the human condition with a certain measure of honesty—
being honest towards the object of inquiry and towards ourselves. We could correctly say that
Nietzsche is adopting the stance of an “honest realist” with his investigation into human
existence, as opposed to an ascription of “idealism” that might be pinned onto Nietzsche. The
last sentence of BGE 259 expresses the idea of truth as honesty: “If this should be an innovation
as a theory—as a reality it is the primordial fact of all history: people ought to be honest with
themselves at least that far.”173 As such, one mark of distinction for a free spirit is an ability to
endure and incorporate as much “truth” as possible.174
Clark’s conception of Nietzsche’s alleged second doctrine of the will to power, the
psychological doctrine, is that “the will to power is the most life-affirming drive in the sense that
the satisfaction of this drive, a sense of power, of the ability to enforce one’s will, is necessary
172
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for the affirmation of life, whereas a sense of powerlessness induces depression and a tendency
to passive nihilism.”175 I disagree with Clark that the psychological doctrine of the will to power
is the other context in which Nietzsche speaks of the will to power (in addition to the ontological
doctrine). This is because there is really only one mode of existence for the will to power: as the
achieving of self-realization. As I have shown, the ontological status of the doctrine of the will
to power is not that of a mere self-conscious myth expressing what Nietzsche values; rather, it is
the realization of such a self. However, the view that the will to power is the highest drive
among many, the drive that is most conducive to life-affirmation, does not capture the primacy
that the drive to power has over the rest of our needs and drives. The way to improve Clark’s
view would be to consider the will to power as the goal to which our drives aim—or which is
constituted by the satisfaction of our existential needs. The affirmation of one’s own life or the
affirmation of life as it is lived from one’s first-personal experience can exist as a norm of
development that can guide an individual toward the achieving of self-realization.176 Accounting
for the will to power as the striving to achieve self-realization grounds the reorientation from
conceiving of life-affirmation to self-realization, but without completely cancelling out the
former. In the end, one experiences the world either as pieces, fragments and limbs or as a fully
realized self…but such a traveler can be either fragmentary or unified; he can be either a shadow
of a human being or a real human being.
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Models of Achieving Self-Realization: Saint, Artist and Philosopher
Philosophy exists as an activity of self-creation in the gap between science and art, but it
serves as an activity that borrows elements from both. The genuine philosopher serves life,
individuated in his own process of becoming, by using an aesthetic mode of interpretation to
elucidate what is necessary. The aim of science is truth. The aim of art is beauty. The aim of
philosophy is to bring forth a higher form of existence. Does Nietzsche give any concrete
examples of those who are genuine philosophers? The providing of a model of the genuine
philosopher would significantly improve our understanding of the scaffold of art, science and
philosophy that we find in Nietzsche’s early notebooks. What lies ahead in this section is an
analysis of three such models as they are presented in Nietzsche’s early essay, “Schopenhauer as
Educator”: the saint, the artist and the philosopher.177 However, the relation between science, art
and philosophy does not directly map onto these models who achieve self-realization, for the
character types that serve as models of self-realization are “goals” of philosophy which are
different than the essence of philosophy itself. These goals are going to be individuated pieces
of nature, ones that become their own ends. As Nietzsche says in two notes written shortly after
the completion of this essay, “In three forms of existence only does man remain as an individual:
177
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as philosopher, saint and artist,” and that “If everybody’s purpose is in somebody else nobody
has a purpose of existence in himself; and this ‘existence for one another’ is the most comic
comedy.”178 These thoughts corroborate the theme in “Schopenhauer as Educator” that the
project of self-realization is individualistic in nature but that the selves that are being realized
will bear a peculiar relation to humanity as a whole. Thus our exploration of these models will
begin with an introductory look at how the genuine philosopher, the artist and the saint are
models who come to exemplify the will to power in BGE, and then we will segue into a thorough
analysis of those models in Nietzsche’s third untimely meditation.
More specific pictures of the will to power occur in BGE 51, BGE 213 and BGE 211 in
that they refer to a particular character type as acting out of a higher form of the will to power—
respectively, the saint, the artist and the genuine philosopher. The saint is hinted to be some kind
of “superior force” who possesses an uncanny “strength of the will,” yet Nietzsche here
highlights the “will to power” of those who worship the saint, not the will to power of the saint
himself. He intimates that the artist must create of necessity, with a feeling of freedom, of
subtlety, of “full power,” of creative placing, of disposing and of forming that reaches its peak,
yet here in BGE there is still some ambiguity as to how exactly such a character type exemplifies
the will to power. In BGE Nietzsche somewhat explicates the nature of the genuine philosopher,
but there are still not concrete examples of figures who have achieved such a level of human
existence. In order to clarify what kind of a human being might serve as a model a selfrealization, it would be beneficial for us to think more about whether Nietzsche offers (in earlier
works) any idea of character-types who serve as models of realized selves. Nietzsche believes
that those who best exemplify the will to power (and thus achieve a high measure of self178
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realization) are the goal of culture. In “Schopenhauer as Educator” the purpose of culture is the
creation of the genius, and the three models for the highest types of genius for any culture are the
artist, the saint and the philosopher.179
The character-types of the philosopher, the artist and the saint serve as models for the
kinds of individuals (and the kinds of activities that such individuals perform) that best illustrate
how the highest form of the will to power can be exemplified. The line of thinking begins with
the fact that as human beings we are entrenched in nature: we are nothing but mere animals who
flounder about in confusion and horror at our animality. As such we see life as a kind of
punishment for being animals, the sense of being punished originating in the enormous amount
of suffering that we experience and the seemingly pervasive senselessness of our suffering.180
Nietzsche supposes that because man is the highest representative of nature (the latest and ripest
fruit) that nature has “pressed toward,” that nature “intimates” that man is necessary to redeem
himself “from the curse of the life of the animal.”181 Isn’t the attribution of such an apparently
outright teleological purpose of nature merely to slip back into the kind of metaphysical
interpretation of the will to power that we exposed to be an error? Perhaps it is not necessarily
the case that nature as such actually “presses and urges” toward “that final and supreme
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becoming-human.” Regarding the metaphysical understanding of human existence, Nietzsche
claims that the supposition that the bodies of animals contain the guilt-laden souls of men has
arisen in more than one part of the earth.182 It is not that nature in itself has a purposiveness that
pushes toward some goal. Because as human beings we possess the existential need for a frame
of orientation, it is the case that we must make sense out of that which appears senseless—e.g.,
suffering and meaninglessness itself. So according to Nietzsche, our understanding of ourselves,
as part of nature, is the source of the metaphysical significance that is projected onto nature.
Does this get Nietzsche off the metaphysical hook? Almost, but not entirely. As the highest
representative of nature (or as one who potentially can realize a true self), Nietzsche says that as
an individuated representative of nature who begins to make himself a true human being
(“nature’s goal”), one must realize that he has to unlearn having goals. In other words, the
“goal” of nature is for the ones who have become philosophers, artists and saints to enlighten
themselves and recognize that they themselves are the creators of goals. The metaphysical
disposition is a step in the process of self-enlightenment aiming at self-realization.
When nature has transfigured herself into the goals of the philosopher, the artist and the
saint, such figures are then capable of creating meaningfulness out of life and suffering—e.g.
metaphysical, religious, philosophical, etc. The capacity to synthesize both contemplation and
action is the mark of a true human being. Accordingly, they do not abide by the dictum, “Know
thyself,” but such active successful natures give themselves the commandment, “Will a self and
thou shall become a self.”183 As Nietzsche indicates of the contemplatives, such an individual
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has the “creative power” to keep creating his life.184 A merely active life is insufficient, for this
character type is like an actor who must follow the script and (in a loose sense) obey the cues of
some director. This insufficiency implies that true creativity, especially that power to create
oneself, depends upon “contemplative power.” This appears to be a rather enigmatic claim:
Creative power depends on contemplative power. Is it impossible to possess this kind of
creativity without being contemplative? Well, in order to make a true human being out of
oneself, yes, it is impossible. One must be both the director, the screenwriter and the actor of
one’s life, in which one has “the ability to look back upon one’s work” and the ability to
thoughtfully see and hear immeasurably more than those who simply do as mechanical animals.
The climactic conclusion of this line of thought presents itself as follows:
Here I have arrived at an answer to the question whether it is possible to pursue the great
ideal of the Schopenhauerean man by means of a practical activity. One thing above all
is certain: these new duties are not the duties of a solitary; on the contrary, they set one in
the midst of a mighty community held together, not by external forms and regulations,
but by a fundamental idea. It is the fundamental idea of culture, insofar as it sets for each
one of us but one task: to promote the production of the philosopher, the artist and the
saint within us and without us and thereby to work at the perfecting of nature.185
While it is difficult to ignore the profundity of this conclusion, at least one question presents
itself as to how Nietzsche has arrived at this destination. Why is this merely the ideal of “the
Schopenhauerean man”?

Isn’t the perfecting of nature supposed to be the ideal of all

humankind? If we return to the fourth section of “Schopenhauer as Educator,” we see that the
argument ending with ‘the perfecting of nature’ as the ideal began with the question of who is to
set up “the image of man” that is to serve as an exemplar for humanity. Nietzsche answers by
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providing three images, which together form a tripartite progression toward the goal of all
culture: the man of Rousseau, the man of Goethe and the man of Schopenhauer.
The image of the man of Rousseau represents pure action and the desire to return to
nature. According to Rousseau, humankind is, in some strong sense, good by nature but our
natural goodness is distorted by the societal constructs of property, wealth and inequality. In his
Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, he states that it is certain “that compassion [pitié] is a
natural sentiment, which, by moderating in each individual the love of oneself, contributes to the
mutual preservation of the whole species.”186 For Rousseau the two basic instincts of humankind
are amour de soi [self-love] and pitié [compassion], but these two drives are corrupted
continually throughout human history as we move farther and farther away from whatever
natural state of existence we might have formerly occupied. This problem manifests in the
political sphere, where one of the primary problems is the identification of the individual will
with the general will.187 The general will can only be justified if it is the embodiment of all
individual wills that constitute it; yet, how is it possible for such a “general will” to actually
exist, considering that there will always be a minority “will” that does not identify itself with the
“general will” (that of the majority or of the government). Given this very brief synopsis of
Rousseau’s moral and political thought, why does Nietzsche characterize the first image of
modernity as the man of Rousseau? Of this first image, Nietzsche acknowledges how the image
of Rousseau educates by emphasizing his influence for political revolt against injustice. In a
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sense Rousseau echoes Nietzsche’s own worries about the individual being consumed and
suffocated by the majority (“the herd”). Nietzsche states, “From the first there has proceeded a
force which has promoted violent revolutions and continues to do so; for in every socialist
earthquake and upheaval it has always been the man of Rousseau who, like Typhon under Etna,
is the cause of commotion.”188 Nietzsche understands Rousseau to be a source of inspiration for
those who are being oppressed by “arrogant upper classes” or those with “merciless wealth.”
These revolutionaries, their will being omitted from the general will, would find themselves
dissatisfied in the “unnatural” state, and they would wish to return back to “light, sun, forest and
mountain.” Nietzsche would be somewhat amenable to this attitude of such revolutionaries, yet
he cannot fully advocate such a merely impulsive “return to nature” because they have failed to
thoughtfully reflect as to what this “nature” actually is.
If one were to find inspiration only in this first image of a perfected will to power,
however, then one would be ultimately doomed to failure. Firstly, it is not possible to return to a
natural state that was prior to our present socially-conditioned state of existence. Secondly, in
such a pursuit one would be operating under the dubious assumption that the natural state of
humankind is one of goodness, untarnished by the corrupt aspects of society. There simply is not
sufficient evidence to know that humankind is naturally good. Such a claim is colored with a
moral prejudice, for we pronounce it from a socialized and moralized standpoint.

Most

importantly, the deficiency with the first image is that represents action but without honest
contemplation of one’s own “nature.” It is not so much human nature that ought to be the object
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of contemplation; an individual ought to contemplate who he as an individual is if he is to realize
the higher self within him.189
The image of the man of Rousseau symbolizes a worthy yet incomplete attempt at the
realization of one’s higher self. Keep in mind that self-realization is not an all-or-nothing
accomplishment. There can be various gradations of the level to which an individual has
realized a self. The man of Rousseau symbolizes a high level of self-realization in that such a
person has satisfied the need for devotion by fighting the injustice of a corrupt aristocracy. This
figure addresses the needs for rootedness and effectiveness through the mobilization of
oppressed segments of a population—spontaneously creating the spark that lights the fire of a
revolution. However, the man of Rousseau has “mis-contemplated” his own nature, for he
assigns what is “bad” in humanity as having its origin in the artificial constructs of society,
property and wealth, and he assigns what is “good” in humanity as originating in human nature
itself. This faith in opposites inverts the metaphysical/religious faith in opposites where what is
“good” is of some supernatural world and what is “bad” is of this world: the inverted error of an
error. We might think that the man of Rousseau is taking a step in the right direction, yet he is
still operating under the error of putting his faith in any opposites at all. What results from this
error for the man of Rousseau is a feeling of shame for his attempts to transcend animality. This
sense of shame directed towards political corruption spurs one into action, but it is an action that
does not grow out of a real sense of contemplation.
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Rousseau’s contemplative moment exposes itself through an inability to satisfy the existential
need for unity. He cannot unify his animality with his wished for transcendent state from such
animality, and he cannot unify contemplation and action into a synthetic whole because his
“contemplative” attitude suffers from falling into the error of having a faith in opposites. In a
sense, the man of Rousseau does experience a healthy form of self-contempt, but he is like an
arrow flying through the air that has no target—for he has not given himself his target. So we
see that the man of Rousseau achieves a “half-measure” of self-realization, bringing to fruition
the moment of action but action without its counterpart of beautiful contemplation.
The image of the man of Goethe represents contemplation divorced from action—the
opposite of the man of Rousseau. Nietzsche characterizes Goethe as one who lives through the
image of Faust, the central character in his literary magnum opus. Because Faust chooses to sell
his soul to Mephistopheles for his assistance in attaining genuine satisfaction with life, there is an
important sense in which Faust has renounced his higher self and is no longer capable of genuine
agency. He cannot undertake genuine action because there is no real “he” there to act. Only a
shadow of a self remains, one that is externally moved and guided, i.e. by Mephistopheles. So
there is a two-fold sense in which there is only contemplation without action: Faust, a learned
man in science, art and religion, suffers from his overly developed ability to contemplate and his
inability for genuine action, unaided by supernatural forces; and Goethe, a learned man in
philosophy, science and the arts, suffers from genuine inaction because he has only “acted”
through his characters, mere images who themselves are merely semblances of genuine action,
which can only emanate from a higher self who fulfills self-imposed duties. Nietzsche expounds
this image in the following way:

128

The man of Goethe is…the contemplative man in the grand style, who can avoid
languishing away on earth only by bringing together for his nourishment everything great
and memorable that has ever existed or still exists and thus lives, even though his life
may be a living from one desire to the next; he is not the man of action: on the contrary,
if he does ever become a member of any part of the existing order established by the men
of action one can be sure that no good will come of it…and, above all, that no ‘order’ will
be overthrown.190
The “bringing together” of central problems of the human condition from the landscape of
human history is a praiseworthy project, but funneling “everything great and memorable that has
ever existed or still exists and thus lives” into a mere character that can only exist “in the world
of the theatre” generates the insufficiency of this second image for realizing one’s higher self.
As Nietzsche indicates, acting under the inspiration of the first image of Rousseau lies too close
to the danger of becoming a Catilinist, and acting under the inspiration of the second image of
Goethe lies too close to the danger of becoming a philistine.

I interpret “Catilinist”, for

Nietzsche, as one who acts with passion (and perhaps for a just cause) but does so with a sense of
recklessness and without an intellectual conscience to guide his actions. I interpret “philistine”
as one who lives under a veil of complacency and stagnation, who engages in a kind of
counterfeit form of contemplation, who suffers from an illusory form of self-sufficiency and
completeness because he fails to realize genuinely creative contemplation into action. It is not
necessarily that case that Nietzsche is characterizing Goethe himself as a philistine, but as a
symbolic voice registering the less-than-successful and apathetic nature of such a type, for he
states, “What is a philistine? An empty gut,/full of fear and hope./May God have mercy!”191
Thus the image of the man of Goethe also achieves only a “half-measure” of selfrealization. His strength is his rich contemplation of all that is beautiful and great in humankind,
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but his weakness is his inability to satisfy his need for effectiveness. The man of Goethe stops
short in the moment of being a “world-traveler” and cannot transfigure himself into a “worldliberator.” The man of Goethe does satisfy his need for devotion, for he is “a devotee to the
gospel of nature with his whole loving heart.”192 Through proper contemplation, this figure
develops a good understanding of the tragic nature of humankind. Nietzsche holds the character
of Faust to be an excellent representation of the hunger for life, the discontent and longing
associated with such hunger, and the character’s traffic with the demons of his heart. Whatever
existential needs the man of Goethe satisfies, they remain incomplete and prohibit a more full
degree of self-realization because this figure does not transform his moment of contemplation
into a moment of action.193
The image of the man of Schopenhauer symbolizes the synthesis of action and
contemplation. At first blush, this is curious because Schopenhauer was not active in the
practical or political sense throughout his entire life. This leads us to believe that Nietzsche must
be thinking of a peculiar kind of action that is associated with the Schopenhauerean ideal. In
what way does the Schopenhauerean image of man educate us? What does this third image
capture that the Rousseauean image and the Goethean image fail to teach? It is the form and not
the content of Schopenhauer’s stance toward his truths that Nietzsche praises in the third image
given to us in modernity. Truthfulness is the primary virtue that is associated with the image of
the Schopenhauerean man, but it is a being truthful to oneself even in the face of the suffering
that such honesty may cause. Adopting a truthful attitude entails the possible forsaking of loved
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ones, of institutions and even of justice, recognizing that being truthful means one is always
limited by one’s perspective. However, taking on the suffering of being truthful can lead to a
transfiguration of oneself if it is brought to full realization in words and deeds [logoi and erga].
Nietzsche even goes on to say that this “overturning and conversion of [the Schopenhauerean
man’s] being” is “the real meaning of life to lead up to.”194 Nietzsche goes on to further endorse
the virtue of truthfulness as the mark of distinction for the Schopenhauerean man when he says
that
…being truthful means: to believe in an existence that can in no way be denied and which
is itself true and without falsehood. That is why the truthful man feels that the meaning
of his activity is metaphysical, explicable through the laws of another and higher life, and
in the profoundest sense affirmative…always offering himself as the first sacrifice to
perceived truth and permeated with the awareness of what sufferings must spring from
his truthfulness.195
This conception of being truthful seems very Platonic in that such a one believes in an
undeniable existence which is “itself” true; be that as it may, the truthful man does not know that
the meaning of his activity is metaphysical and profoundly affirmative. The truthful man [der
Wahrhaftige] feels [empfinden] that the meaning of his activity is metaphysical because of the
profound affirmation of that which must be conceived as valuable in and of itself. We might say
that the image of Schopenhauer teaches us to cultivate an honest attitude toward the self-imposed
struggle to transcend our bare condition of animality—to bear a truthful stance toward the
seemingly insurmountable task of transfiguration. Near the end of Nietzsche’s account of the
image of the Schopenhauerian man, he makes several allusions to Plato’s allegory of the cave,
albeit in an altered form. In Plato’s allegory the prisoner who escapes the cave of mere shadows
is enlightened by the sun, which symbolizes the Good: the principle which makes it possible to
194
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see the pure forms of things clearly. The problem with Plato’s allegory, Nietzsche thinks, is that
the Good is the only criterion for measuring the value of things and this overlooks the role that
the self must play in his own perfection. In Nietzsche’s version of the allegory, the “heroic
human being” who ascends from the cave of mere shadows is enlightened, not by the sun, but by
his own higher self that lies above him.
The philosopher (Schopenhauer), the artist (Goethe) and the saint (Rousseau) should be
viewed as three character-types that meld into one image: the image of the genius.

As

philosopher, one has the capacity to evaluate and destroy old values. As the artist, one has the
capacity to create new values, thereby beginning the process of self-enlightenment. As the saint,
one recognizes oneself as the particularity (a particular specimen of nature) that stands in a
relation to the universality (the wholeness of nature). As such he loses his ego as it exists
“unperfected” and becomes the bridge between here and there. Nevertheless, the artist and the
saint are in a sense half-perfected models that are stepping stones to the more fully-perfect model
of the philosophical genius. Nietzsche says that believing in culture (and being able to realize
this belief through action) is nothing else than believing in the perfecting of oneself as a part of
humanity:
‘I see above me something higher and more human than I am; let everyone help me to
attain it, as I will help everyone who knows and suffers as I do: so that at last the man
may appear who feels himself perfect and boundless in knowledge and love, perception
and power, and who in his completeness is at one with nature, the judge and evaluator of
things.’196
The striving toward one’s higher self is shared with “the mighty community” of others who also
have the potential for perfection and thus it does not have to be a solitary mode of existence. The
cultivation of one’s own higher self bears an interdependence with that of other possible higher
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selves.

The philosopher is transfiguring himself from a mere becoming into one who is

knowledge and love. The artist in oneself transfigures himself from a mere becoming into one
who is a boundless perception and power. And the saint in oneself transfigures himself from a
mere becoming into one who is one with nature. Adopting the attitude towards oneself whereby
one “feels” oneself to be one’s higher self and allows oneself to emotionally adopt a “happiness
of contemplation and action” makes it possible to realize one’s higher self.

Thus, the

philosopher, the artist and the saint can serve as exemplars who are the goals of nature; yet, they
are goals who forget themselves as such because they have embodied the activity of giving birth
to new goals.

Schopenhauer as Exemplar of the Will to Power
Does the model of the Schopenhauerean image of man serve as a model of a figure who
exemplifies the will to power? If the Schopenhauerean man exemplifies the will to power, then
he must undergo the process of achieving a high degree of self-realization. If he is to realize a
self, then he must satisfy the cluster of existential needs that constitute the achieving of selfrealization. And if a “true human being” is to be created, then those needs must be satisfied for
the sake of the beautiful, which serves as the norm of satisfaction for the needs. Remember that
the comprehensive set of existential needs that we possess are the following (in random order):
the need for a frame of orientation; the need for devotion; the need for unity; the need for
rootedness; the need for effectiveness; the need for excitation; and the need for self-love. Upon
showing that the image of Schopenhauer satisfies each of these needs, it will be evident that
Schopenhauer not only serves as Nietzsche’s educator but also as a self who exemplifies the will
to power.
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We begin with the existential need whose satisfaction in the appropriate way is the least
difficult to undergo, yet by no means is task that is easy to perform—namely, the need for a
frame of orientation. Schopenhauer satisfies his need for a frame of orientation through his
development of his understanding of the two-fold existence of the world as will and
presentation.197 Schopenhauer’s map of the world lies in its having two modes of existence: the
world exists as a presentation to a subject, and the world exists as the will. The will manifests
itself in the world with different levels of reality, and humanity as individuated subjective
cognizance possesses the most immediate degree of accessibility to the will. In the second
volume of WWP, Schopenhauer describes this interiority:
Consequently, a path is open to us from inside to that proper self and inner essence of
things to which we cannot penetrate from outside. It is, as it were, a subterranean
passage, a secret alliance that, as through treachery, transports us at once into the fortress
that could not be taken from outside….In fact our willing is the only opportunity we have
of at the same time understanding an externally manifesting occurrence in terms of its
inner being, hence the only thing known to us immediately and not, as with everything
else, given merely in presentation.198
The fundamental difference between Schopenhauer’s will and Kant’s thing-in-itself is that for
Kant we can never have knowledge of the thing-in-itself whereas for Schopenhauer each
individual has immediate access to the existence of the (noumenal) will through her own first-
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person experience, even though the will does not emerge entirely naked.199 So, apprehension of
the world begins with an individual’s will and with her body, which is the objectification (and
individuation) of the will. The manner in which Schopenhauer satisfies his need for a frame of
orientation illustrates a kind of elegance and beauty, for he comprehensively interweaves four
dimensions of human experience into an organic whole. He begins with an epistemology of how
we experience the world through presentations conditioned by the principle of sufficient ground.
Each thing as presentation exists within the conditions of time, space and causality—each
presentation falling under the principium individuationis, or the veil of Maya. Schopenhauer
moves from epistemology to metaphysics and reveals the essence of the world to be will. We
experience ourselves in a two-fold way: as the exterior body which is presented to us under the
Principle of Sufficient Ground, and as the interior will which presents itself to us as our essence.
Schopenhauer analogizes the human body with all corporeal bodies in nature, and he claims that
even though we are conscious only of other things as presentations, if we were to strip away the
“presentation” of any object, then what would remain would be will.

According to

Schopenhauer, to think that human beings exist differently than everything else in the world
would be to fall into theoretical egoism.

For the theoretical egoist, objects only exist as

presentations, but this would mean that the presentations that we experience would have no
objective existence in the world.

Schopenhauer admits that there is no proof against this

position, but to adopt it as a serious conviction, one would place oneself in a madhouse.200 He
suggests that it is not a proof that is needed against solipsism but “a cure.” He undergoes this
199
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curative exposition of the world through an aesthetic and an ethical lens.

So to restate,

everything in the world differs only in the degree of objectification of the will, but everything is
part of the same essence of the world—namely, the will.

Schopenhauer moves from the

metaphysics of nature to aesthetics, where he broadens his understanding of the higher levels of
objectification of will in objects of art. The essence of the world is will, and the will does
nothing other than will its own existence through a blind and unending striving. So, to be will is
to be desire, and to be desire is to exist in a perpetually painful state of wanting. Thus, viewing
the world as will and presentation explains “the twin evils” of suffering and death. However,
through pure will-less subjective cognition of art, an individual can experience a temporary
reprieve from the pain of willing. Such moments of will-less existence occur in a kind of pure
contemplation of Platonic Ideas, which true art presents to us in a seemingly timeless fashion.
Thus, art becomes one means of transcending existence as will, if only momentarily.
Schopenhauer moves from aesthetics to ethics when he re-focuses his attention on how the will
manifests itself through human action. He does not provide any sort of systematic ethical theory,
but he does claim that compassion is the singular and fundamental “virtue” of the ethical sphere.
Since each human being exists as a manifestation of one and the same will, when one causes
another to suffer, one causes himself to suffer and shares the victimization. Similarly, when one
suffers by the hand of a perpetrator, the victim shares the guilt of the offense. Attaining the
recognition that all human beings, and all of nature, are part of the same whole produces the
effect of a kind of “oneness” with objectifications of the will. Ultimately, it is only the full
denial of the will in death that allows a permanent and complete unification with the will.
Schopenhauer says that in death one becomes nothing and everything—nothing as individuated
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presentation and everything as will to life.201 He concludes the ethical dimension of the world
with the acknowledgement of a paradox. What is paradoxical is that the will, objectified as a
human being, ultimately wills its own nothingness.

Schopenhauer clarifies by saying that

redemption from the world consists in one’s willing itself into nothingness as presentation, but
that same “step” is also a step into a becoming of everything, i.e. the will.
The need for stimulation is satisfied by Schopenhauer through his active engagement
with Immanuel Kant, Plato, the Upanishads and the Vedas. Kant was Schopenhauer’s hero in
that he captured the bifurcated nature of the world as appearance and as thing-in-itself. One of
the fundamental philosophical questions for Kant was, “How is human experience possible?” In
attempting to address this question, Kant recognized the limitations and conditions that are
necessary for the possibility of human experience. Schopenhauer shared this insight into the
experiential distance between subject and object and the interdependent relation between each
subject and the objects that she experiences. Schopenhauer was stimulated by this insight and
developed a more organic and less systematic philosophy which sought to explain the two-fold
nature of existence. Schopenhauer’s epistemology and metaphysics have strong roots in Kant’s
epistemology and metaphysics, yet Schopenhauer’s thoughts on these two dimensions of the
philosophical attitude did significantly deviate from his hero. The unknowability of the thing-initself becomes the immediate certainty and knowledge of the will, which is the interiority of an
individual’s experience of herself. Appearances that also exist as things-in-themselves become
presentations that also exist as objectifications of the will. In addition to Kant’s model of human
experience, Schopenhauer appropriates Plato’s conception of Ideas (also known as Forms). His
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use of Plato’s “bifurcation” of the world into Ideas and sensible particulars is present throughout
his works, but Plato qua stimulator plays a large role in Schopenhauer’s conception of art.
Again, Plato’s model of the nature of art is not strictly mimicked by Schopenhauer but is
appropriated in an interesting way. For Schopenhauer, art makes possible the subjective willless experience of the Ideas, a kind of transcendent experience that breaks though the veil of
Maya and outside of time, space and causality, even if only for a transitory few moments. The
experience of the sublime and the experience of beauty are only different in the degree to which
resistance from presentations disrupts the apprehension of the will, the former being a more tense
and rough experience of oneness and the latter being a more full and smooth experience of
oneness with the world. The third set of sources of stimulation for Schopenhauer was Buddhism
and the Hindu sacred texts of the Vedas and the Upanishads.

Two Hindu notions that

Schopenhauer appropriated were the dreamlike quality of existence as presentation and the
sought-for oneness of the individual with the world as will.

The world experienced as

presentation is similar to that of a dream, one from which we hope to awaken when we
ultimately achieve a complete denial of the will.

Even before an individual’s death, the

recognition that others are part of the same will that you yourself are can be a guiding thought
one the way toward full denial of the will. The Buddhist notion of Nirvana is virtually the same
as Schopenhauer’s idea of the denial of the will. In Nirvana the will is silenced and there is only
a perfect cognition that birth, old age, sickness and death do not exist—we are shown “that
complete stillness of the sea of spirit.”202 Schopenhauer believed that he had an understanding of
the nature of reality, one that had roots in the oldest of world religions. By tracing certain core
tenets of Hinduism and Buddhism through the history of ideas up to his own philosophical
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endeavor, he satisfied his need for stimulation and such satisfaction resulted in the fruits of his
philosophical labors.
His actual writings shed light on how he satisfied his existential need for effectiveness in
the world. Schopenhauer satisfied his existential need for effectiveness in and through his
philosophical writings. He wrote his works to an as yet unknown audience, yet he wrote always
as if his understanding of humanity’s relation to the will would result, not merely in his reader’s
adoption of his conclusions, but in his reader’s mode of existence being purposively affected.
The answer to the question, “How should I live?” ought not to be simply contemplated. The
“effect” of that question is to be action. Such a hoped for result of one’s writings is difficult to
envision, for it is not immediate and it may never even come to exist within “the cause’s”
lifetime. Nevertheless, the satisfaction of Schopenhauer’s existential need did in fact realize
itself, particularly by Nietzsche whose own effectiveness has had exponential growth, like the
subtle shifting of a tectonic plate under the ocean has the effect of tidal waves on lands afar.
How did Schopenhauer satisfy his need for devotion? He was an atheist and did not
believe in any god. He never engaged with political issues of his day and did not strongly
identify with any national state. We cannot be certain what the object of his devotion actually
was, yet even if we cannot know the content to which he devoted himself there is strong
evidence that he did partake in the activity of devotion. In the beginning of his magnum opus, he
expresses an attitude of conviction:
What is to be communicated through [this book] is a single thought. Nonetheless, despite
all efforts, I could find no shorter way to communicate it than this entire book.—I take
the thought to be that which has been sought at great length under the name philosophy,
and whose discovery has been, precisely for that reason, held by the historically
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cultivated to be as impossible as that of the philosophers’ stone, even if Pliny has already
told them: Quam multa fieri non posse, priusquam sint facta, judicantur?203
This “single thought” is that to which Schopenhauer has devoted himself, and this “single
thought” is that which gives meaning and purpose to Schopenhauer’s activity of doing
philosophy. When one reads this introductory remark in The World as Will and Presentation,
one expects Schopenhauer to provide an answer at some point in the following pages.
Unfortunately, an explicit answer never surfaces.

Even in the last section of WWP,

Schopenhauer reiterates the claim that his work constitutes “the entire development of that one
thought whose communication was my purpose.”204 At first this unanswered question presents
itself as a source of frustration, for we would like to know to what Schopenhauer has devoted his
very existence (as an individuated presentation). Some have suggested that the single thought is:
“The world is will’s self-cognizance,” yet it is not clear that this is specifically what the single
thought is.205 The expression of the single thought culminates with the ethical significance of
human action in Book IV of WWP, and there we discover a kind of interdependence between
self-cognizance and action.

In his discussion of virtue, Schopenhauer claims that genuine

goodness of disposition can only arise “from an immediate and intuitive cognizance,” but that
such a disposition can also only find “its true adequate expression…in deeds, in action, in the
course of a person’s life.”206

Looking at the quote from Pliny at the beginning of

Schopenhauer’s first preface, the idea being expressed is that the possibility of something often
cannot and does not enter into one’s understanding of ‘what is possible’ until an action is “done”
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[factum = deed, act, exploit, achievement]. It is reasonable to think Schopenhauer’s underlying
single thought, the single thought of his magnum opus and the single thought to which he has
devoted himself, unfolds through a synthesis of self-cognizance and action. This may only get
us part of the way toward knowing what the single thought actually is and thus what his object of
devotion actually is, yet perhaps this illustrates that the particular object of devotion is less
significant than the activity of devotion itself.
Schopenhauer satisfies his existential need for rootedness in a rather artful manner. At
first glance (or even second glance), there does not seem to be any sort of community that
Schopenhauer ever rooted himself within. While he did have some friends, Schopenhauer did
not experience the kind of sense of belonging that we might generally think of, for his father died
when he was young, he had a disastrous relationship with his mother and he had two children
that died in early infancy. Thus, he never created a family of his own. So in what way did
Schopenhauer “feel at home in the world”? Thinking of the world only as presentation leaves
everything in it, including Schopenhauer himself, individuated by the Principle of Sufficient
Ground. However, by also conceiving of the world as the will for life in which everything is an
objectification of one and the same will, he has effectively rooted himself in the metaphysically
superlative community of all possible communities. According to Schopenhauer, his existence
as will is what gives him the feeling of rootedness in some whole that is larger than his
individuated self. He gives a good characterization of what the will is in the Second Book of
WWP:
A phenomenon means a presentation and nothing beyond that: every presentation, of
whatever sort it may be, every object, is a phenomenon. But thing in itself is solely will.
As such, it is altogether not a presentation but toto genere distinct from it; it is that of
which all presentations, all objects, are the phenomenon, the visibility, the
141

objectivization. It is that which is innermost, the core of every individual thing and
likewise of the whole: it makes its appearance in every blindly effectual natural force; it
also makes its appearance in the reflectively considered actions of human beings. The
great difference between the two concerns only the degree to which it makes its
appearance, not the essence of that which is making its appearance.207
So all objects are objectifications/manifestations of the will for life, and human beings possess
the highest level of reflectivity for entities whose essence is will. So no matter how much
suffering Schopenhauer experiences at any point in his life, he is always “connected in being” to
every other individuated object in the world. He thereby annihilates any possibility of isolation
throughout his entire life, and even in death he loses all individuation and thereby becomes one
with the will. Let us put aside the question whether the will to live is something real or apparent
for the moment and consider the way in which Schopenhauer satisfied his need for rootedness.
He conceptualized an ontologically monistic world where all objects and subjects only differ in
the degree to which the will makes its appearance. So for Schopenhauer there is a kind of
metaphysical rootedness that makes other forms of rootedness like friendship, family and
political community seem to pale in comparison.
A more difficult existential need to satisfy is that of self-love, especially for
Schopenhauer. According to him, egoism and malice are the two anti-moral incentives of human
actions, and contrarily compassion is the only incentive of moral worth. Schopenhauer considers
egoism to be the desire of one’s own “weal and woe” and that such a desire is boundless.208 He
oddly assumes that egoistic and morally worthy actions are mutually exclusive: either one must
act in one’s own interest or one must act in the interest of another/others. His hero Kant
postulated that there are duties to ourselves, but Schopenhauer more stringently conceives of
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actions of moral worth as only possibly being done for the interests of others. Arguing against
the duty of self-love, Schopenhauer holds that self-love is a kind of self-evident given and that
morality here “finds its work already done and comes too late.”

He makes reference to

Christianity and complements it for getting at least one thing right: “The impossibility of
violating the duty of self-love is already presupposed by the supreme commandment of Christian
morals, ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,’ according to which the love that each cherishes
for himself is assumed beforehand as the maximum and the condition of all other love.”209 His
conception of the self-orientation of human beings is that everyone already does love himself for
each individual is fundamentally a manifestation of the will to live. The error here is that he
inappropriately identifies the will to existence, which can more plausibly be attributed to human
nature as such, with self-love; however, developing and maintaining an attitude of love towards
oneself is much more an achievement rather than an attitude that can be possessed automatically
and without effort. This highly dubious conception of the impossibility of a duty of self-love is
continued in his discussion of the ethical dimension of WWP where he addresses the possibility
of compassion for oneself. Schopenhauer equates crying with compassion for oneself, but he
claims that the phenomenon of crying takes “a double detour” from the mere presentation of
one’s own suffering to the possibility of another experiencing that same suffering back to a
feeling of pity towards oneself. In other words, he claims that crying is caused by another’s
suffering. Through imagination we can envision another person’s endurance of some piece of
suffering that oneself experiences—that there is a necessarily other-oriented “projection” that we
experience when we suffer. He expresses this unconscious psychological process as follows:
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That is, one passes from the pain that is felt, even when it is corporeal, to its mere
presentation, and then finds his own state so deserving of compassion that he is firmly
and sincerely convinced that, were another person enduring it, he will come to his aid full
of compassion and love; only it is oneself that is now the object of one’s own sincere
compassion.210
This explanation of the phenomenon of crying may be more insightful than we realize at first
glance. One piece of evidence that he provides to support his claim is the fact that children who
suffer a pain usually cry only when someone “commiserates” with them and not over the pain
but only over its presentation. For example, think of a child who falls flat on her face when she
thinks no one is around but who is being watched from a distance. The child certainly feels pain
from smacking her face on the ground, but often does not cry. When adults are present and the
child falls flat on her face and feels the ground brush against her flesh, it is only upon the child’s
recognition of the adults’ recognition of her smacking her face that she cries. This does not only
take place with the physical suffering of infants. We may wonder how far this supposed
necessity of otherness in the phenomenon of crying extends into other kinds of suffering
experienced by human beings.
Does this picture of compassion for oneself make it possible that Schopenhauer did
successfully satisfy his need for self-love? I think it does, but it is possible that Schopenhauer
did not become conscious of the implications of his argument. There does seem to be at least
one form of self-love that represents the satisfaction of an existential need. Through our faculty
of imagination, we are able to put ourselves in the shoes of others. Here one focuses on one’s
own experience of suffering and the possibility that another could experience this first-personal
suffering. It may be too strong to say that this is a necessary condition of all instances of crying.
To counter such a claim, we might look for examples of crying where one’s suffering is not
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“replicated in reflection” or “vividly transported” to others. However, finding such an example
proves to be rather vexing. Regarding the need for self-love, I think it fair to conclude that
Schopenhauer did leave a space (albeit small) for himself to develop a relation of self-love, even
though he requires his compassion for himself to be mediated by otherness.
Finally, how does Schopenhauer satisfy his existential need for unity? In what way does
he attain the particular kind of inner unity in which there is a harmony arising out of discordant
drives and perspectives? We can uncover this unity amidst diversity through the paradoxical
conclusion of Schopenhauer’s comprehension of the world as will and presentation.
Schopenhauer’s starting point for philosophical investigation was how the human being
experiences herself as presentation: both as that to which the world presents itself, and as the one
who presents herself to the world—existing both as the theatre and the actor within the theatre.
There is a dialectical movement from the individual’s existence as presentation to the
individual’s existence primarily as will, and then there is another dialectical step to the
individual’s experience of objects of art, which serve as temporary palliatives to existing as the
suffering will, and climactically a final movement toward the individual’s existence as will,
whose existence is fundamentally that of desire and suffering. Schopenhauer’s conclusion is that
ultimate redemption from an existence burdened by desire and suffering is the complete denial of
the will. Paradox thus enters the stage: How and why does the will both will itself to live and at
the same time will itself to be denied—to nothingness? This is the primary expression of the
tension between inner perspectives within Schopenhauer, one of which he is quite conscious.
Another way of articulating this paradox is this: Why does the world as will ever begin its “other
existence” as presentation in the first place?

Schopenhauer might argue that world as

presentation has its origin in the world as will’s desire for self-knowledge, yet this will not
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suffice. Before the world exists as presentation, there are no desires, for the world as will
without objectifications has no desires, no beliefs, no hopes, no mentality or consciousness at all.
Schopenhauer says that it is impossible to remove this one objection to his account:
It is that, once our considerations have finally arrived at the point where, in complete
saintliness, what we have before our eyes is denial and abandonment of all willing, and
precisely thereby redemption from a world whose entire existence has shown itself to be
suffering, precisely this appears to us now as a passage into empty nothingness.211
The tension becomes clearer when we recall the true nature of the world as expressed earlier in
his work:
The will that, considered purely in itself, is incognizant and only a blind ceaseless
pressing, such as we see also appearing in inorganic and vegetable nature and its laws as
well as in the vegetative part of our own life, obtains with the arrival of the world of
presentation, developed for its service, cognizance of its willing and of that which it is
willing, namely, that it is nothing other than this world, this life, precisely as it stands
before it. For this reason we called the phenomenal world its mirror, its objectivization.
And since that which the will always wills is life, just because the latter is nothing more
than a display of that willing with respect to presentation, it is all the same and only a
pleonasm if, instead of simply saying “will,” we say “will for life.”212
The tension between the will’s willing life and the will’s denial of life does not have a crystal
clear resolution. A sure-fire solution to this tension is not necessarily what is needed because in
order to satisfy the existential need for unity, one needs a unity of opposition between
perspectives. A certain kind of harmony does arise from Schopenhauer’s discordant inner
perspectives. There are two ways in which this occurs. The first is that from an investigation of
his magnum opus we find a reasonable amount of evidence that Schopenhauer himself actually
satisfied his need for the complex unity that Nietzsche describes. The satisfaction of this need in
tandem with the (non-systematic) satisfaction of the other existential needs made it possible for
Schopenhauer to achieve self-realization.
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disorganized collection of fragments and limbs and dreadful accidents.213 The second way in
which this harmony out of discord occurs is in Schopenhauer’s consecrating himself to culture.
According to Nietzsche, there are two steps in this process:
Thus only he who has attached his heart to some great man receives thereby the first
consecration to culture,…that one has a feeling of sympathy for the genius who again
and again drags himself up out of our dryness and apathy and the same feeling in
anticipation for all those who are still struggling and evolving,…so that the men we live
among resemble a field over which is scattered the most precious fragments of sculpture
where everything calls to us: come, assist, complete, bring together what belongs
together, we have an immeasurable longing to become whole.214
And
I now have to describe the effects of the second consecration [to culture]…For now we
have to make the transition from the inward event to an assessment of the outward event;
the eye has to be directed outwards so as to rediscover in the great world of action that
desire for culture it recognized in the experiences of the first stage just
described…culture demands of him…finally and above all an act, that is to say a struggle
on behalf of culture and hostility towards those influences, habits, laws, institutions in
which he fails to recognize his goal: which is the production of the genius.215
It is not so much that Schopenhauer attached his heart to Plato or to Kant or to the Buddha, but
that he attached his heart to the genius that dragged himself up out of his own barrenness and
apathy. The tension between the various inner perspectives of Schopenhauer’s conception of
reality produced a harmony, but a harmony having a concrete effect in the world.
Schopenhauer’s inward event of genius-production was externalized into an outward event. The
product of that outward event was Nietzsche. Through the satisfaction of his existential needs,
from the need for unity through the need for a frame orientation, Schopenhauer achieved selfrealization and thus exemplified more than just the will to live. He exemplified the will to
power.
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Chapter Five
Nietzsche’s Account of Friendship as a Mean Condition
Does Nietzsche present an account of friendship? I believe that we can find an account
of friendship within Nietzsche’s thought, albeit one that presents the status of friendship as a
kind of mean condition [mesotês] between various types of vices. I characterize the phenomenon
of friendship as a mean condition for three reasons. Firstly, friendship understood as a mean
condition best articulates its “what-it-is” by reference to what it is not—i.e. certain vices. I use
the notion of vices rather broadly to indicate those dispositions that exemplify loss of self,
fragmentation of self, psychological sickness, deformity of “soul”, life-negation, alienation from
self and/or escape from self.

These vicious conditions usually are somewhat more easily

apprehended than the more elusive virtue of friendship of which we ultimately wish to gain a
better understanding. Secondly, friendship should be understood as a mean condition because
characterizing it in this way illuminates its built-in relativity. Friendships take many forms and
many shapes, from one culture to the next and even within the same culture between sets of
individuals. Even authentic friendships, which are the kind we are interested in, appear to have
some level of variability. Despite this variability, Nietzsche does have an account in which he
presents what the essence of friendship is—an essence that is universally instantiated in genuine
friendships. In other words, the characteristic essence of genuine friendship allows for some
variation of expression, albeit still with the confines of the human structure of such relationships.
Thirdly, the virtue of friendship will have a plurality of corresponding vices where each set
surrounded the mean condition of friendship on different continua. Just as other virtues, such as
courage, have more than one set of vices with more than one continuum, friendship will also
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display this structure. The fact that there is a plurality of continua of vices for friendship (or
other virtues) is not a problem for this virtue ethical account of friendship, for Aristotle says that
“it is possible to go wrong in many ways…, but there is only one way to get something right
(which is why the one is easy and the other is difficult, it being easy to miss the target and
difficult to hit it); so for these reasons excess and deficiency belong to vice and the mean
condition belongs to virtue.”216 Given such a plurality, we can see that there is more than one
way to fall out of the harmonious and balanced mean. Such a view recognizes that the emotions
and actions of the human psyche are not limited to just one continuum with only two opposing
poles. From an inquiry into the tension between the vices that oppose friendship (and that
oppose each other), we will discover what this essence of friendship is.

Sameness and Difference
In the attempt to engage in friendship, there is a tension between the drive for sameness
and the drive for difference. Accomplishing the virtuous mean of friendship requires one to
avoid manifesting either of these drives in their vicious extremes. One who entertains the
possibility of another person becoming a friend, or who has already established some degree of
friendship with another person, often operates from the drive to find as many similarities as
possible with the identity of the friend. One has the hope that the other will see the world the
same way that he does. There is the wish that the other will feel the same way about social and
political issues. A friend hopes that he shares a similar aesthetic taste with the other: “Are we
216
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moved to tears by the same kinds of films? Do we both feel inspired by the same music?” The
drive at hand can easily shift from a desire for mere similarity to a desire for sameness, i.e.
“sameness of being.” It is often thought that such a desire only occurs in erotic relationships, but
the desire for the “merging of souls” can be present in friendship as well. The difficulty with the
satisfaction of such a drive is that in reality this sameness does not exist, despite love’s attempts
to annihilate the feeling of being other in a relationship.217 In recognizing the nonexistence of
sameness between self and other, one moves closer toward the mean condition of friendship. In
order for the friendship to thrive, the specific wish for sameness needs to be overcome, and each
member of the relationship must respect the individuality of the other. This respecting of the
other’s individuality is a kind of keeping distance from the other, which might be regarded as a
form of respect for his autonomy and self-expression. Such autonomy and self-expression might
be contaminated if impressed upon too often or to too high a degree. This idea of respect as
keeping distance finds expression in Nietzsche when he compares the contamination of the
other’s individuality with the smearing of a good engraving:
If we live together with another person too closely, what happens is similar to when we
repeatedly handle a good engraving with our bare hands: one day all we have left is a
piece of dirty paper. The soul of a human being too can finally become tattered by being
handled continually; and that is how it finally appears to us - we never see the beauty of
its original design again. - One always loses by too familiar association with friends and
women; and sometimes what one loses is the pearl of one’s life.218
Just as it is possible for an individual to improve and preserve the good condition of the friend
through a sharing of lives, it is also possible for one to wear thin “the beauty of its original
design” by intruding on the other’s self-chosen projects—projects that may require a measure of
strict solitude. A good example of this kind of tattering is the premature forcing of oneself into
217
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the other’s most intimate secrets.

The other must give a person permission to enter her

innermost world of thoughts and feelings, yet the drive to sameness can cause one to easily and
hastily overlook the need for such freely given consent.
Another form of resistance to genuine friendship is the presence of the opposing drive for
difference. There will likely be a moment in the formation of a friendship where someone
realizes that he does not want his friend to be the same person as he is. The drive for complete
similarity between friends is opposed by the drive for difference. Although it may appear to be
counterintuitive, Nietzsche claims that this drive may do even more good than the opposing drive
for sameness: “…it is as though [those who are gentle, reflective and possess a relaxed
friendliness] were gazing out of the windows of their castle, which is their fortress and for that
reason also their prison—to gaze into what is strange and free, into what is different, does them
so much good!”219 Such is the manner in which one can relate to another but do so through the
recognition of difference rather than a recognition of some similarity. Seeing “what is different”
in the friend preserves one’s own individuality and helps to solidify one’s identity in
juxtaposition to the identity of the other. Nevertheless, in the construction of a friendship an
individual still experiences the inner demand to identify with the other in terms of what they find
agreeable. Because the struggle to bring forth one’s self into the world has such potency, the
tendency to individuate oneself from the other always resurfaces. Nietzsche acknowledges this
phenomenon stating, “It is not in how one soul approaches another but in how it distances itself
from it that I recognize their affinity and relatedness.”220 We might say that one deficiency of
friendship is complete difference between self and other, and we can say that one excess of
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friendship is complete sameness. It is not terribly important which is the excess and which the
deficiency because each can be viewed as either “excessive” in one way and “deficient” in
another. Each vice will be “out of proportion” and prohibit the creation of a friendship as a kind
of work of art, whereby the subtraction of anything or the addition of anything would destroy its
beauty.

What is important is that friendship aims at some mean condition between total

sameness and total difference, a condition in which the participants look to what is beautiful.
Nietzsche’s conception of how friendship exists somewhere between sameness and
difference is similar to Socrates’ solution to the problem of friends being neither “like to like”
nor “opposite to opposite.” Near the end of his discussion of the nature of friendship with Lysis
and Menexenus, Socrates introduces the notion of kinship. For one to be akin [oikeion] to
another is “to feel at home with,” for oikeion is related to oikia, which means “house,”
“household,” or “home.” This feeling at home of two friends is a kind of relationship that is
neither one of complete sameness nor one of complete difference, yet partaking somehow of
both. Socrates explicates:
“And therefore,” I said, “if someone desires another, boys, or loves him passionately, he
would never desire, nor love passionately, nor love [as a friend] unless he happened to be
akin in some way to his passionately beloved—either in his soul, or else in some
character of his soul, or some of its ways, or some aspect of it.”221
On this understanding, friendship depends on one friend being akin to in some way, or feeling at
home with in some way, the other, not entirely but feeling at home with some character or aspect
of the other’s soul, or some of its ways. The desire that a friend experiences for his loved one
does not have to be a desire for the whole being of the other. The loved one could have one
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particular passion or virtue that he possesses that draws the friend in, even while having an
aversion or being indifferent to other aspects of the other’s soul.
But might not one object that genuine friendship requires there to be a connection with
the other person as a whole? This requirement is too strong, for a couple of reasons. For one,
the kind of wholeness that Nietzsche is interested in is a unity within manifoldness, in which a
single soul embodies a potentially wide range of perspectives, moralities, values, etc. Friendship
need not require one to have a connection with all parts of the other’s inner diversity-based unity.
Secondly, a connection with the whole person seems to involve a near complete knowledge of
the other or a near full identification of one’s feelings and attitudes with the affective states of
the other. Such knowledge of the other in his wholeness may not be psychologically possible,
even in the most intimate of friendships. To strive to achieve this type of connection might also
cause one to neglect the values of mystery and unfathomability of the other in friendship. So, the
desire for a connection with the whole person is best associated with a kind of excessive
condition that fails to hit the target of genuine friendship.
We can see, then, how this picture of friendship as kinship-to-some-aspect-of-soul bears
a strong resemblance to Nietzsche’s understanding of friendship, for both Plato and Nietzsche
comprehend the tension between sameness and difference surrounding friendship and seek a kind
of mean condition between extremes in which it can exist. In replacing sameness with a more
precise notion of ‘being akin,’ Nietzsche expresses this ideal of kinship in terms of his
connection with certain thinkers who have posthumously augmented his joy of living on this
earth, “If I were set the task, I could endeavor to make myself at home in the world with
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[Montaigne].”222

Part of the reason that Nietzsche feels this kinship with Montaigne is that he

is honest as a writer and a thinker. However, honesty has an opponent: dissimulation, which
leads us to another important aspect of the mean condition of friendship. From the samenessdifference tension, then, we must turn to the related honesty-dissimulation tension that surrounds
friendship, which seeks to occupy a mean condition between honesty and dissimulation.

Honesty and Dissimulation
The problem of how much of one’s self should be disclosed to another looms large in
Nietzsche’s writings. On the one hand, Nietzsche praises honesty [Redlichkeit] as “the youngest
virtue” and as a virtue still in the process of becoming. Honesty is an active condition where one
is truthful towards the needs and drives that move one’s actions and that substantiate one’s
beliefs. On the other hand, Nietzsche praises dissimulation as a discriminatory ability that the
genuine friend should possess. With such praise, Nietzsche suggests that a certain degree of
dishonesty should be present in friendship. How can we unravel this apparent contradiction?
First, how does Nietzsche characterize honesty, not as a virtue, but as a vice of excess? Honesty
is not only honesty with oneself but also an active condition especially directed toward one’s
friends. Nietzsche begins to follow Ralph Waldo Emerson’s account of friendship, for Emerson
also holds honesty to be one of the two elements that go into the composition of friendship:
I am arrived at last in the presence of a [friend] so real and equal, that I may drop even
those undermost garments of dissimulation, courtesy, and second thought, which men
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never put off, and may deal with him with the simplicity and wholeness with which one
chemical atom meets another.223
Such a virtue finds a place in Nietzsche’s “good four” along with courage, magnanimity and
politeness.224 In a letter to Mathilde Maier, Nietzsche expresses the value of a friend whose
honesty is double-directed, at self and other: “I can endure only human relationships which are
absolutely genuine. I avoid half-friendships and especially partisan associations; I want no
adherents. May every man (and woman) be his own adherent only.”225 I find this conception of
genuine friendship quite compelling. Nietzsche promotes the idea that only human relationships
that are absolutely genuine are actually the most human of relationships. This attitude displays
integrity and courage—to accept nothing less than whole friendships and to forego those “halffriends” who would be mere followers rather than engage in the relationship through choice.
Concerning both the attitude toward wisdom and the attitude toward one’s friend, a mere
follower is one who only reveres and idolizes the wise and similarly who only reveres and
idolizes the friend. On the other hand, one who adheres to himself lives his aspiration to wisdom
as a philosopher of life and puts his reverence toward the friend into his living deeds.226 It is this
double meaning of friendship, ‘being a friend to wisdom’ and ‘being a friend to another’, that
Nietzsche expresses in his letter to Maier. The thought also echoes the priority of the project of
self-realization in that each individual should only follow himself.
However, the drive for honesty finds strong resistance from the drive for dissimulation.
If one cares for the feelings of a friend, then a certain level of dissimulation is necessary in order

223

Emerson, Ralph Waldo. Essays: First and Second Series. New York: First Vintage Books,
1990, “Essay VI: Friendship,” p. 117.
224
D, Sec. 556.
225
SL, Letter #81.
226
SL, Letter #81.
155

to respect the tenderness of his affections. Nietzsche suggests that we often have to practice “a
benevolent dissimulation” especially toward those with whom there is a possibility of friendship,
for we may have to pretend we do not see through the motives of their actions.227

This

suggestion implies that the motives behind our actions are often not what they appear to be. This
does not necessarily mean that our motives are always harmful or malicious, although sometimes
they may be. What I think Nietzsche is getting at here is that our “motives” are really our
existential needs that are constantly present in the split between our consciousness and our
instincts. Our needs are forever pressing towards the realization of a self. This underlying
process may appear to be a threat to what is conventionally required for genuine friendship:
loving the other for her own sake. However, the goal of self-realization does not undermine such
human relationships because the struggle to realize a self does not necessarily threaten the love
that is felt toward the friend. The acceptance of the particularity of the friend and the eventual
loving attitude that is developed toward the other opens up otherwise closed avenues for selfdiscovery and self-creation. There seems to be a higher stage of freedom associated with higher
levels of self-realization, which also would appear to involve a higher degree of selfconsciousness.

Nietzsche is not the only thinker to recognize that human relationships

exemplifying mutual commitment can increase the autonomy of both. In the development of
freedom from abstract to more concrete forms, Hegel found such a commitment in the institution
of marriage. Whereas Hegel takes marriage to be one moment in the movement toward absolute
Freedom in human society—a moment that makes a higher level of liberation of both parties
possible “because in it they attain their substantive self-consciousness,”—Nietzsche sees that
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friendship is not simply a condition, but the unique social condition of excellence that makes a
higher degree of liberation possible—a liberation to a fully realized self.228
Zarathustra’s recommendation that some degree of illusion is needed alongside honesty is
consistent with friendship’s status as a mean condition. He poses the question whether some
degree of dreamlike illusion is needed in order for one to spark the friend’s longing for the
overman inside himself: “You do not want to put on anything for your friend? Should it be an
honor for your friend that you give yourself to him as you are?”229 Zarathustra suggests that an
individual who makes no secret of himself puts his friend into a rage and that there is some
reason for one to fear nakedness. He also advises that one cannot groom oneself too beautifully
for one’s friend and that a friend must not want to see everything. So we have an image of a
friend, but one who partakes in forms of dissimulation: secrecy, illusion and clothing oneself in
beauty.
But why is such dishonesty needed when honesty also is needed in friendship? There
must be something valuable about the mysteriousness of the friend, a kind of mystery that helps
both self and other to be mutually supportive in the realization of selves. When Zarathustra says,
“O my friend, man is something that must be overcome,” he means that what must be overcome
is that being which is not yet a fully realized self. Just a step later, Zarathustra says that if what
you love in the friend is “the glance of eternity,” then some level of mystery must remain to
preserve that higher ideal. Why is it important to possess some degree of unfathomability as a
228
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friend? Why should the friend conceal his compassion under a hard shell? How does the
concealment of that compassion make it full of “delicacy and sweetness”? Compassion must be
somewhat hidden because of the human lust for possession. The drive to possess, especially the
possession of others, is an extension of both the existential needs for effectiveness and for active
stimulation; however, we might consider it to be potentially harmful to a possible or actual
relationship.

Particularly with relationships based on erotic love and with friendships, the

phenomenon of boredom provides some evidence that a lover or a friend should not entirely
reveal himself (all the manifestations of his compassion) too soon. Think of how often and how
easily two spouses, having formerly been true lovers, exhaust the full range of what they are
capable of and what constitutes their inner life. Two friends can just as easily grow fatigued of
each other, if one allows himself to be completely possessed by the other. If a relationship is to
not fall prey to boredom, the inner life of the other should be a kind of endless well of bits and
pieces of the other’s revelations of compassion. One party in a friendship should discretely
disclose himself so that there is always something novel to discover. Also, think of how much
fascination a friend or lover can embody when draped with a certain quality of mystery. Only
one who has the ability to discriminate when to feign and when to disguise parts of himself will
properly occupy this mean condition between honesty and dissimulation. Regarding the nature
of possession in erotic love, Nietzsche says, “Our pleasure in ourselves tries to maintain itself by
again and again changing something new into ourselves; that is what possession means. To
become tired of some possession means tiring of ourselves.”230 The lust to possess someone is
the desire to expand one’s self outward to encapsulate the other, but there is a danger in the
satisfaction of this desire. Suppose one actually succeeds and comes to possess a lover. The
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complete possession of the other causes one’s drive for self-expansion to be stifled.

As

Nietzsche says, once one tires of the other, he will tire of himself. This process that occurs in
erotic relationships also can occur in friendship. The same lust for possession exists with the
friend as it does with the lover. Zarathustra’s cautions the friend to make a secret of himself, to
beautifully groom himself and to conceal his compassion in order to prevent complete possession
of the other.

To further explicate Zarathustra’s idea that man is something that must be

overcome, we ought to consider this lust for possession as that part of man which must be
overcome. It must be overcome for two reasons: in order to experience friendship and in order to
realize selves.

Betrayal of Confidence and Neglect of Praise
Concerning the next set of opposing elements to genuine friendship in Nietzsche’s
account, one extreme is the vice of betrayal of confidence, and its counterpart vice is something
like a failure to praise the strengths of the friendship (and the friend).231 The corresponding
mean condition is friendship but that aspect of friendship that is concerned with trustworthiness.
Each of these vices stems from humankind’s nature as “the great esteemer,” particularly the
activities of blaming and praising, in which one vice consists of saying too much to the wrong
people and the other vice consists of saying too little to the friend (How much to say? To whom
to say it?). The betrayal of confidence is excessive in the sense that one discloses to others
outside the friendship what is intended to be kept in secrecy inside the friendship. Such a
231
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betrayal is a failure to revere the trust that has been place in oneself by the friend, and is rooted
in the human tendency to blame the base actions and weak qualities of others, especially those
intimate ones that are kept secret for everyone except the friend. On a separate continuum, the
vice of failing to praise the strengths of the friendship (and the friend) is deficient in the sense
that one neglects the excellence aspects of the friendship and the strengths of the other, even if
those strengths surpass one’s own. One may recognize them, but recognition is not enough.
Vocalization of that recognition is an important way to let the friend know that that there is a
recognition and an appreciation of her merits. So, on one continuum we have an excess of blame
and a deficiency of blame (where one fails to manifest the strength of keeping the other’s
confidence), and on another we have an excess of praise and a deficiency of praise (where one
fails to exemplify proper pride regarding the friend (and friendship)). Experiencing enough
comfort inside a relationship to freely disclose oneself to the friend seems to be the mark of the
genuineness of a friendship. It is easy to reveal what a friend has said to oneself in confidence;
however, it takes a significant amount of strength of character to be “a confidant” to the other—
to treat what is given in secrecy as a gift from the other. Of a friend’s secret, Nietzsche says,
“There will be few who, when they are in want of matter for conversation, do not reveal the more
secret affairs of their friends.”232 The human desire to engage in gossip comes to mind, for the
activity of gossiping is usually associated with a feeling of moral superiority and is an
opportunity for gossipers to voice condemnations and judgments upon others. However, the
gossiper usually only experiences the feeling of moral superiority and does not possess any
actual superiority of will or character. Such a person often speaks out of flagrant ressentiment
for the target of ridicule. On the flipside, a genuine friend has the ability to take in the secrets
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given by the other and can be trusted to treat such secrets as gifts and as little windows into the
fortressed soul of the other.233 So when Nietzsche advises his reader that one should not talk
about one’s friends, otherwise one will talk away the feeling of friendship, he recognizes the ease
with which one is able to violate a friend’s trust by placing a new trust in a new acquaintance.234
However, because the new “trust” is a violation of a previous secrecy, its dishonesty cancels both
the old trust and itself out.
Nietzsche’s thought that genuine friendship can be exemplified by oneself in an agonistic
but cooperative dialectic with the other is significant, especially in the sense of a friend standing
as one’s enemy. The full quote on “Self-observation” from HAH just referenced states:
Man is very well defended against himself, against being reconnoitered and besieged by
himself, he is usually able to perceive of himself only his outer walls. The actual fortress
is inaccessible, even invisible to him, unless his friends and enemies play the traitor and
conduct him in by a secret path.235
In order to “play the traitor,” a friend must have the willingness to be his friend’s spiritual
enemy. There are many ways in which a friend can assist in solidifying the other’s self through
intellectual contestation. Some modern salient examples of such enemy-enemy relationships are
the Republican-Democrat, the Christian-Atheist, the Vengeful-Merciful, the ObjectivistRelativist (regarding morality), the Capitalist-Socialist and the Absolutist-Perspectivist
(regarding Truth). While these are just a few among many ways that two individuals can
intellectually and emotionally oppose one another, they are some of the most enduring and
salient oppositions. One manner in which a friend can help one to realize a self “by a secret
path” is to occupy the position of spiritual enemy—to lure him into a philosophical dialogue by
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willfully being his interlocutor. It is possible that two friends already occupy opposing positions,
yet a friend’s intentional and willing placement of himself as the other’s enemy seems to be a
way in which an individual’s self can be brought into clearer focus—to observe the self.

Permanence and Change
For Nietzsche, friendship also requires accomplishing a mean between the opposing
forces of permanence and change. In friendship there is the drive for the relationship to have a
kind of permanence throughout the lives of each friend.

Once engaged in a committed

relationship with another, the intuition quickly develops that the relationship must be life-long,
for any sort of break in the relationship might be considered a failure or be viewed as an inability
to participate in genuine friendship. Nietzsche warns against the feeling of this kind of bad
conscience. He recognizes that some individuals achieve a great measure of self-transformation
but that some people are not capable of such a process: “If we greatly transform ourselves, those
friends of ours who have not been transformed become ghosts of our past: their voice comes
across to us like the voice of a shade—as though we were hearing ourself, only younger, more
severe, less mature.”236 What I take Nietzsche to mean here is that an individual ought not to
feel obligated to maintain a friendship if he has achieved a full degree of self-realization but the
other has not “matured.” If the other is still a friend to a former self that no longer exists, then
one ought not to sacrifice his own process of self-realization. In other words, do not be a friend
to a ghost of your past. Sometimes fate forces two friends to be separated from each other for a
period of time, yet the two friends refuse to recognize that the other has become a different
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person than who he once was. Nietzsche acknowledges this inner defiance of the world of
becoming:
When old friends meet again after a long separation it often happens that they feign an
interest in things mentioned to which they have in fact grown quite indifferent: and
sometimes both of them notice this but dare not lift the veil—from a sad apprehension of
what they might see. Thus conversations arise like those in the realm of the dead.237
However, it does not necessarily have to be because one friend has failed to realize a self while
the other has created a self that a friendship should only have a temporary existence; nor must it
be the case that they have grown indifferent to their new interests. In a more broad sense,
friendship must find its place between its drive for permanence and the reality that each
individual changes over time. This sought-for mean condition is reminiscent of the adoption of
the attitude of amor fati, but in this case it is a love of one’s own fate that is expanded to include
a love of the fate of the friend. Nietzsche illumines this condition in a section entitled “Star
friendship.” As we will see, the meaning of a star friendship proves elusive unless carefully
digested:
We were friends and have become estranged. But this was right, and we do not want to
conceal and obscure it from ourselves as if we had reason to feel ashamed. We are two
ships each of which has its goal and course; our paths may cross and we may celebrate a
feast together, as we did—and then the good ships rested so quietly in one harbor and one
sunshine that it may have looked as if they had reached their goal and as if they had one
goal. But then the almighty force of our tasks drove us apart again into different seas and
sunny zones, and perhaps we shall never see each other again; perhaps we shall meet
again but fail to recognize each other: our exposure to different seas and suns has
changed us. That we have to become estranged is the law above us; by the same token
we should also become more venerable for each other—and the memory of our former
friendship more sacred. There is probably a tremendous but invisible stellar orbit in
which our very different ways and goals may be included as small parts of this path; let
us rise up to this thought. But our life is too short and our power of vision too small for
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us to be more than friends in the sense of this sublime possibility.—Let us then believe in
our star friendship even if we should be compelled to be earth enemies.238
A lot is going on in this passage. It begins with the possibility of becoming strange [fremd] or
alien to each other, a possibility from which friends often seek to immunize themselves. From
this desire, a more-than-human standard is generated and then when the friends find themselves
in their all-too-human existence of change and becoming, it is likely that they will feel ashamed
or guilty. To clarify, the desire to be overcome is the desire to look for selfhood in a permanent
union with another individual. In seeking the kind of immutable quality sought under such a
wish, one assumes that there is an already-existing soul substratum underneath the individual.
To make this unwarranted assumption is to negate life as it truly exists, in the Heraclitean
thought, as a river that is ever-changing and which, as the same river, cannot be stepped into
twice. But according to Nietzsche here, these feelings of guilt and shame should be overcome.
These emotions foreshadow what Nietzsche will later refer to as a “bad conscience” in the
Genealogy of Morals. It seems that Nietzsche is already wrestling with the question of whether
and how it is possible for one to be the same person over time, to stand security for one’s own
future, as the sovereign individual does.239

While Nietzsche does think it possible for an

individual to realize such a power over oneself and over fate, he insinuates that most human
beings do not posses such an ability and that such an expectation should be significantly
tempered by natural and social pressures that alter our character and temperament. Nietzsche
proposes that each ship has its own goal [Ziel] and implies that there is not one single goal for all
ships. It would make sense to think of each individual’s goal to be his realized self (a kind of
universal form ascribed to the selfhood which is sought), which is unique and different from
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individual to individual (and thus each goal is different insofar as its particular content is
concerned). Moments where friends are sharing their lives, especially in the activities of resting
together and feasting together, may make it seem as though they share the same goal, but the
danger here is losing the self—the realization of which is the ultimate goal. Nietzsche says that
it is the almighty force of the friends’ tasks [Aufgabe] that then must drive them apart. There
does seem to be a kind of necessity or fatal aspect of what each individual’s “tasks” or “roles”
are. If we apply the notion of amor fati to this notion of “duties,” we might say that each person
has a duty to be and accept the life in the world into which fate has thrust him. Each ship is thus
cast out and must submit to difference and change. As Heraclitus says, not only can we not step
into the same river twice, but because we are temporal beings who are part of a world of
becoming, each ship is always a somewhat different ship than it was in its past or that it will be
in its future. So when Nietzsche makes the seemingly strange statement, “That we have to
become estranged is the law above us,” he has a two-fold meaning: Because we are necessarily
temporal beings of becoming, we are forced to always be (somewhat) alienated (1) from our own
past and (2) from possible shared pasts that have intertwined with loved ones. That is “the law
[Gesetz] above us.” However, Nietzsche advises his reader that he ought to adopt the attitude of
amor fati even toward a past that appears fleeting and sometimes almost seems as if it didn’t
really happen. A friendship in which the friends’ fates are at some point forced to travel on
different seas and under different suns still ought to inhabit a “venerable” [ehrwürdig] and
“sacred” [heiliger] attitude toward their past friendship. The finite quality of those friendships
that are genuine should not diminish their excellent quality.
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Individuality and Shared Lives
The last part of the “Star friendship” section leads into the final tension within which
friendship must seek out a mean condition—the tension between individuality and the sharing of
lives. On the one hand, there exists the human drive to exemplify one’s individuality, to
individuate oneself from everyone else.240 On the other hand, there is also a drive to share one’s
activities and one’s life with others, especially in friendship. (This drive has its origin in the
existential need for rootedness.) In his portrayal of his friendship with Etienne de la Boétie,
Montaigne holds that the unison of souls is a fundamental feature of genuine friendship:
In the friendship I speak of, our souls mingle and blend with each other so completely
that they efface the seam that joined them, and cannot find it again….Everything actually
being in common with them—wills, thoughts, judgments, goods, wives, children, honor,
and life—and their relationship being that of one soul in two bodies, according to
Aristotle’s very apt definition, they can neither lend nor give anything to each other.241
It is tempting to attribute such an idealistic quality to genuine friendship. Both Montaigne and
Aristotle characterized the friend as “another self” or as the blending of two souls into one.
Nietzsche warns us that such a mingling of selves/souls may not be a psychological possibility,
however, and that such a desire could be harmful to one’s self. The problem thus raises its head:
How can one possibly retain one’s individuality while at the same time blurring the lines of that
individuality by sharing one’s activities, self and life with others? Is it paradoxical to say that
240
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both drives can be tended to simultaneously? Through the use of metaphorical imagery in his
conclusion of “Star friendship,” Nietzsche illuminates how to resolve this paradox. Nietzsche
supposes the existence of an ideal: “a tremendous but invisible stellar orbit” in which each
friend’s “very different ways and goals” might possibly all become parts of the one single stellar
path. With a hopeful attitude, Nietzsche beckons his reader to lift himself up to such a thought.
Insofar as we are able to acknowledge the limitations of our humanity, this very ideal—this
“sublime possibility”—may be the limit of how two friends can each preserve their individuality
and yet exist together in a star friendship. To further complicate matters though, Nietzsche
warns that some authenticity between self and other may have to be sacrificed in order to
preserve individuality in friendship. According to him, one feature of a good friendship is that
“one party knows how to facilitate the association by adding to it a delicate tinge of intimacy
while at the same time prudently withholding actual and genuine intimacy and the confounding
of I and Thou.”242 Thus it seems that the opposite practice, the possibility of having to be honest,
not so much in the brutal sense but perhaps with a certain mixture of gentleness and brutality, is
what is sometimes required to preserve one’s individuality. For example, one may find oneself
being swept up and being carried along by the strong political beliefs of one’s friend—suppose
that the friend believes that Republican Governor of Texas, Rick Perry, should be the next
President of the United States—and because of this tightening of grip by the other’s political
beliefs, which are perhaps antithetical to one’s own position, one feels one’s individuality
slipping away. This is where authenticity and honesty would appear to be required in order to
confess to the other that his beliefs are not shared.

Another example: suppose that one

unexpectedly discovers that one’s friend is a huge fan of Dave Matthews Band and that the
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friend is about to ask one to go see D. M. B. live in concert.

Suppose further that this

unfortunate discovery horrifies one (and rightly so) because the friend’s Dave-Matthews-Bandness is going to potentially infect oneself. What should be done here to keep one’s integrity as
an individual who is a separate self from others? Should one be brutally-yet-gently honest in the
expression of difference in aesthetic taste? What are we to make of this? The mean condition of
friendship results from a dialogic process whereby shared activity enhances each other’s
individuality and, vice versa, each person’s individuality enhances his own capacity to share his
life. Such sharing of lives and activities ought to not necessarily be a complete sacrifice of one’s
individuality though, nor should it be sacrificial of the rootedness that can be obtained in shared
experiences. Friendship here is an active condition in which each person is in a kind of
equilibrium between opposing extremes. One possible solution to ‘how much’ and ‘in what
way’ we can find the target between individuality and the sharing of lives is through friendship’s
nourishing quality. In a parent-child relationship, the egoism/altruism dichotomy is sublimated.
The parent nourishes the child emotionally, intellectually and physically for the child’s own
sake; however, the child’s hoped-for flourishing is in a sense constitutive of the parent’s
flourishing. The significant difference between the nourishment that takes place in the parentchild relationship and the friend-friend relationship is the lack of equality in the former and the
presence of equality in the latter. The recognition of the otherness sought for its own sake but
still recognized as an otherness that is a constitutive element in one’s own process of becoming a
self is what makes such sublimation possible. Along with Nietzsche, we assume that each
motive is interest-laden—i.e. interested in realizing a self. If it is true that there are no such
things as disinterested motives and that all altruistic actions are sublimated egoistic ones, then
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attempting to be more intimate than humanly possible will result in failure and self-loathing,
potentially destroying the friendship. In his re-centering of human motivation, Nietzsche claims:
Good actions are sublimated evil ones; evil actions are coarsened, brutalized good ones.
It is the individual’s sole desire for self-enjoyment (together with the fear of losing it)
which gratifies itself in every instance, let a man act as he can, that is to say as he must:
whether his deeds be those of vanity, revenge, pleasure, utility, malice, cunning, or those
of sacrifice, sympathy, knowledge.243
The underlying motive-force that both pushes an individual and pulls him forward is the drive to
enjoy the self as a fully realized self. Just as an individual’s deed can be one of vanity, malice or
cunning in the interest of accomplishing such a realized self, that same individual’s deed of
sacrifice or sympathy is also motivated by this framework of self-becoming. Specifically in
friendship, actions of sacrifice and/or sympathy can be authentically performed for the other, but
only insofar as the other’s good exists as part of the self’s good. So, upon the completion of a
sacrificial deed, the self-enjoyment that a friend experiences is the nourishing relation that
promotes healthy growth of the other qua individual and qua part of a self’s ultimate flourishing.
This way of conceiving selfhood is counterintuitive to the commonsense way of thinking, and
therefore, such relationships may sometimes require the slight feigning of intimacy. Keep in
mind that such feigning should be interpreted as a kind of practical wisdom that one possesses
toward being intimate in the right way, at the right time, to the right extent, etc.

Envy and Schadenfreude
Another opposition of attitudes circling the virtue of friendship is that between envy and
schadenfreude. I refer to them as affective states, and not vices, because in each experience one
243

HAH, Sec. 107.
169

seems to be in the grip of an emotion or feeling, rather than as the occupying an active condition;
however, this distinction may not be terribly significant. At a minimum, they are affective states
that condition actions that emanate from them. Nietzsche spends a significant amount of time
examining the feelings of envy [der Neid] and schadenfreude (sometimes referred to as “malice”
[die Böswilligkeit]), and each emotion appears to represent some sort of sickness of soul,
especially one that prohibits participation in friendship.

What exactly are envy and

schadenfreude? In terms of pleasure and pain, envy is the experience of being pained by the
fortune of others, and schadenfreude is the experience of pleasure (or joy/delight) at the
misfortune of others. In terms of power, envy is the feeling of inferiority caused by the fortune
of others, and schadenfreude is the feeling of superiority caused by the misfortune of others.
Envy is an affective experience toward which human beings have a strong tendency, yet despite
its frequent occurrence it displays a weak and fragmented character. In envy there is a distance
between an individual’s desire and that which is coveted that cannot be traversed. There is a
sense in which such an emotion just happens to one and as such is out of one’s control;
nevertheless, to say that the experience of envy “just happens” would not be entirely correct.
What and who one envies will be conditioned by what he takes to be valuable, but through
introspection some rational control of such an experience is possible. The fact that we do blame
people for being envious of other’s fortune supports such a claim. However, Nietzsche does
think that there is some way in which an individual can transform his feelings away from envious
orientations, even if it is not done on a fully conscious level. In describing such an instance of
nobility, Nietzsche says, “Man involuntarily conducts himself nobly when he has become
accustomed to desiring nothing of men and always bestowing gifts upon them.”244 This process
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of accustoming oneself to want nothing of others but to accustom oneself to instead bestow gifts
upon then is one mark of nobility. The discord between envy and friendship is more specifically
addressed when Nietzsche remarks that “[a] lack of friends may be put down to envy or
presumption. Many owe their friends only to the fortunate circumstances that they have no
occasion for envy.”245 This comment both recognizes envy as an obstacle to friendship and as an
obstacle whose presence or absence partially depends on circumstances that are out of our
control. Sometimes it just happens to be the case that a friend doesn’t have much of which to be
envious—an instance of fortune (for the friendship). Other times it is the case that a friend has
much good fortune of which to be envious—an instance of misfortune for the friendship.
Regarding the individual who has experienced good fortune (especially the friend), Nietzsche
says that he should perhaps mask his happiness in order to preserve the friendship:
We must display our unhappiness and from time to time be heard to sigh, be seen to be
impatient: for if we let others see how happy and secure in ourselves we are in spite of
suffering and deprivation, how malicious and envious we would make them!—We have
to take care not to corrupt our fellow men; moreover, they would in the instance referred
to impose upon us a heavy impost, and our public suffering is in any event also our
private advantage.246
In order to prevent both envy and malice in a friend, Nietzsche advises that one should disguise
one’s happiness and security in oneself with a veil of “public suffering,” for one’s good fortune
and self-satisfaction has a strong tendency to cause a feeling of inferiority in the other. That
feeling of descent in the other can potentially give rise to pain felt toward one’s good fortune or
pleasure at one’s misfortune. Because such emotive attitudes are not fully within our control,
such cautionary measures need be taken by one who wishes to preserve (potential or actual)
genuine friendships.
245
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In addition to these practical methods for preventing the friend from experiencing such
friendship-destroying emotions, however, the friend himself is able to control these emotions to a
certain degree. Because of the duality (and multiplicity) of the self, there is an inner dialogue
that takes place, and it is this dialogue that allows us to adopt higher order affective and rational
responses to those feelings that simply take hold of us.
The existence of this intermediate condition of the dialectical process between emotion
and emotion, or between intellectual conscience and emotion, is a kind of ethical autonomy akin
to deliberative choice [prohairesis], but a process of choice which is conditioned by
temperament, attitude and the more fine-grained emotions. We ought to conceive of that ethical
autonomy that is achievable by us as something less free than the traditional notion of “free will”
but as something more “autonomous” than mere causal determinism. Along with Nietzsche, we
should recognize that absolutely free will is a fiction but also that strict causal determinism is a
misuse of cause and effect.247 Such a stance is pertinent to how we think of an individual’s
relationship to his emotions and feelings. Since we do have some measure of control over
envy—though not complete freedom—how do we fend it off? Should we fend it off if we can?
Is envy always a destructive drive? In keeping with his tendency to complicate strict good/bad
dichotomies, Nietzsche notes that when envy is generated by a condition of contest, then it can
be the spark that ignites the furthering of self-improvement and self-realization. For example,
when another’s good fortune serves as a challenge to go beyond her success, then the pain that
one feels at her good fortune can possibly be transformed into a drive to self-improvement. So
when there is a prevailing outlook on the praise or blameworthiness of some facet of society—
e.g. the all-too-easily-abused nature of some piece of technology like television or the Internet–
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then the common opinion which is apparently the best position on the issue may be challenged,
forcing one to look more critically at how and whether that piece of technology improves or
hinders the possibility of human flourishing. Alternatively, the kind of envy that Nietzsche
negatively criticizes is one that causes strife that is purely destructive of the other and the self—a
mere expression of cruelty. This more common form of envy, in which one is pained at the
fortune of another and which can be expressed in a wish for her demise, is that which stands
opposed to friendship.
Schadenfreude also presents itself as an obstacle to genuine friendship, and it has a dual
origin: in the demand for equality between one individual and the next, and the demand for
equality between virtue and happiness. If an individual experiences the general feeling of
“unwellness,” then seeing the harm that befalls another will make that person his equal: it
appeases his envy.248 Similarly, if an individual feels perfectly well, then he “gathers up his
neighbor’s misfortune in his consciousness as a capital upon which to draw when he himself
faces misfortune.”249

According to Nietzsche, schadenfreude is what “restores” equality

between self and other. Taking pleasure in another’s misfortune expresses the drive to equalize
the suffering of another with one’s own suffering. Since some amount of suffering is inevitable
for each person, an individual will retain the present suffering of another “as capital” for his own
potential future suffering. In characterizing schadenfreude as the appeasement of envy—joy in
another’s misfortune as compensation for pain at their good fortune—there is a sense in which
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envy and schadenfreude are two sides of the same coin.250 Because the demand for equality can
never be perfectly satisfied in the world and because equality itself is something of an apparition,
the striving for such and the associated schadenfreude results in a fragmented and sick soul.
This demand for equality, or feeling of righteous indignation in the face of inequality, seems to
represent a weakness of character that is somewhat different from the deeper weaknesses of
character that exemplify envy and schadenfreude. So in the broader political sphere, justice
demands the equal and fair treatment of citizens. It also demands that acts of injustice are
punished where the punishment is proportional to the wrong committed. While these demands
of justice may be conditions that make friendships within a community possible, there is a sense
in which such demands fall away within the boundaries of genuine friendship. To exemplify
righteous indignation toward a friend who has not paid back a debt of some kind, especially a
debt that can be overlooked, would express a certain weakness of character. To exemplify
righteous indignation toward unequal treatment between two friends would also represent a weak
character, for the true friend would recognize that it is a more beautiful thing to do good for
friends than to demand that the same amount of good be received from the other. Thus within
friendship there is a sense in which justice should not be sought. This is different than situations
where a pure justice simply cannot be found. Such kinds of contexts where a demand of justice
might represent weakness of character might be the possession of a chronic medical disorder or
the death of a loved one due to some catastrophe. In cases like these, the inability to overcome
the demand for equality would be such a weakness. On the other hand, there could be contexts
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where the demand for equality (qua justice) where some kind of fair practices or fair laws can be
instantiated could represent strength of character.
There is also the kind of schadenfreude that expresses a drive for equality between vice
and unhappiness. The herd operates under the wish that those who are vicious be the victims of
misfortune and unhappiness. This demand for equality between vice and unhappiness, and the
corresponding demand for equality between virtue and happiness (typically in the afterlife), is
also a point of origin for schadenfreude.
This brings us to the question: What exactly is the mean condition between envy and
schadenfreude? At first we supposed that it is friendship, but we must be a bit more precise.
The mean condition between the two “sick” emotions is not righteous indignation. Righteous
indignation can be defined as the feeling of pain toward the undeserved misfortune of others or
the feeling of pain toward the undeserved fortune of others. As such it expresses the desire to
reward the virtuous with happiness and the desire to punish the vicious with unhappiness.
However, such equality can never be perfectly realized in the world, meaning that righteous
indignation is also a pathological attitude. So what kind of attitude, or mean condition, should
we strive for—especially regarding friendship? We should not think of the mean condition as
one of pain felt toward the undeserved misfortune of others (unless one is reasonably capable of
exemplifying justice and can do so without harboring a vengeful attitude on a global scale).
Instead we ought to characterize the mean condition as one of pleasure/joy felt towards the
fortune of others, and in a sense we should do so regardless of whether the other’s good fortune
is deserved or undeserved. While there is some sense in which a person can be said to deserve
whatever fortune or misfortune comes about in his life, there is an even larger sphere of human
175

existence in which one’s fortune or misfortune is outside of one’s control. In other words, we
must tear ourselves away from the strict demand for desert and replace it with an attitude of
amor fati, especially as a precondition for friendship. This is what Nietzsche means when he
says of friendship, “Fellow rejoicing, not fellow suffering, makes the friend.”251 One must
develop and posses the capacity to rejoice with a friend over his good fortune. So, the mean
condition underlying friendship is pleasure in another’s fortune, which is opposed to pain in
others’ fortune (envy) and pleasure in others’ misfortune (schadenfreude), and it is a mean
condition that is not enslaved to the oppressive demand of equality. Nietzsche summarizes this
opposition by contrasting two character types that he calls the retarded man and the anticipatory
man:
The unpleasant character who is full of mistrust, consumed with envy whenever
competitors or neighbours achieve a success, and violently opposes all opinions not his
own, demonstrates that he belongs to an earlier stage of culture and is thus a relic: for the
way in which he traffics with men was the apt and right one for conditions obtaining
during an age of club-law; he is a retarded man.
And conversely,
Another character who readily rejoices with his fellow men, wins friends everywhere,
welcomes everything new and developing, takes pleasure in the honours and successes of
others and makes no claim to be in the sole possession of the truth but is full of a
diffident mistrust—he is an anticipatory man striving toward a higher human culture.252
Through this investigation into the vices that oppose each other and that oppose
friendship, we now have the capacity to paint a picture of the complex and elusive nature of
friendship. So what is friendship? The virtue of friendship is a mean condition that exists
between sameness and difference, honesty and dissimulation, envy and schadenfreude,
permanence and change and individuality and the sharing of lives. The fragile place that
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friendship occupies between these sets of vices, which might be described as inhuman absolutes,
gives us a clue to why it is considered to be a form of excellence. Through this interpretation of
Nietzsche’s account of friendship, we can now decipher why friendship is the virtue that can best
support the exemplification of the will to power.

Potential Objections to Nietzsche’s Account of Friendship
Is it possible to say more than what has been said about the essence of genuine
friendship? Through an inquiry into the vices, or extremes of excess and deficiency, we have
gained a better understanding of how the virtue of friendship exists as a mean condition; yet, is it
possible that the very word “friendship” (and its corresponding concept ‘friendship’) violates
friendship’s qualities of uniqueness and irreplaceability?

At various points in Nietzsche’s

corpus, he identifies the problem of consciousness as one in which conscious concepts and the
language by which we express those concepts only capture “what is common” and “what is
communicable.” In other words, all our actions, including and especially those in friendship, are
“altogether incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely individual… [b]ut as soon as we
translate them into consciousness they no longer seem to be.”253 If language fails to convey the
true essence of each particular friendship, then the Nietzschean account of friendship would itself
fail to capture the essence of friendship in all its particularity. Does Nietzsche have a reply to
this?
I believe that he does, and a rather interesting one at that. Nietzsche would concede that
through language we cannot fully secure how an individual experiences the feeling of friendship
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from the inside. Nevertheless, he would admit that we can identify those dispositions that fail to
hit the target of friendship’s bulls-eye. The extreme dispositions that are in tension with each
other and that are in a metaphorical sense “opposite” to friendship are conditions that are
pervasive in the human condition. We might not be able to provide an exact description of what
a particular experience of friendship is like from the inside, for each instance of friendship is
personal, unique and infinitely individual.

However, because of friendship’s constitutive

importance in self-realization and in human flourishing, it seems necessary to be able to provide
the best account that we can of such a phenomenon. And doing so by way of a description of the
opposing vices appears to respect its importance while acknowledging its resistance to
description.
A related objection to Nietzsche’s account might be that it does not really address the
elusive character of friendship as experienced from the first person perspective itself. In his
essay on friendship, Montaigne illumines the paradox between the certainty of friendship and its
unknown “what-it-is-ness.” In order to clarify what Nietzsche’s position is regarding the elusive
nature of friendship, it is worth further attention. On the one hand, Montaigne expresses the idea
that when he has been in the grip of such a relationship, that he has been certain of the reality of
friendship:
It is not in the power of all the arguments in the world to dislodge me from the certainty I
have of the intentions and judgments of my friend. Not one of his actions could be
presented to me, whatever appearance it might have, that I could not immediately find the
motive for it. Our souls pulled together in such unison, the regarded each other with such
ardent affection, and with a like affection revealed themselves to each other to the very
depths of our hearts, that not only did I know his soul as well as mine, but I should
certainly have trusted myself to him more readily than to myself.254
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In a “real” friendship, Montaigne claims that one feels certain as to what the friend’s intentions,
judgments and motives are—the entire inner contents of his soul. If one has this kind of
certainty about the contents of the friend’s soul, then it would seem that one also feels certain of
the reality of the friendship. One feels that the “unison of souls” is not a mere appearance but
that the relationship has a kind of authenticity that is indubitable. Montaigne elucidates this
seeming knowledge of the other quite well, and his attitude of certainty appears to be more than
just an intuition. But is such certain knowledge of the “what-it-is” of a particular friendship
possible? Earlier in his essay, Montaigne voices his worry about the inexplicable nature of
friendship:
If you press me to tell why I loved him, I feel that this cannot be expressed, except by
answering: Because it was he, because it was I. Beyond all my understanding, beyond
what I can say about this in particular, there was I know not what inexplicable and fateful
force that was the mediator of this union. We sought each other before we met because
of the reports we heard of each other, which had more effect on our affection than such
reports would reasonably have; I think it was by some ordinance from heaven.255
Montaigne poses the curious question that any individual who has thought himself engaged in
friendship poses to himself: Why do I love my friend? What are the reasons why I love him?
The only answer that he can give is “because it was he” and “because it was I.” At first glance,
this answer may seem uninformative, but I believe that such an answer accentuates the
inexplicable quality of friendship. One may object to this and argue that it is indeed possible to
verbalize the characteristics that a friend possesses and that these are “the reasons” for my love.
If then asked, “Would you be a friend to just anyone who possessed such characteristics?” then
one might reply: Well, it’s not just my friend’s set of characteristics, but it’s how he uniquely
and particularly expresses such a set. Perhaps one could be pressed further and asked, “What is
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it about how your friend exemplifies his humor or how he exemplifies his generosity that causes
you to love him?” At some point in the line of questioning, it is probable that such a person will
take Montaigne’s position. If one is pressed to describe the essence of one’s friendship, I wager
that he will ultimately come up empty-handed for an answer, or at least be forced to resort to:
“Because it was him. Because it was I.” Because of its unknown, and possibly unknowable,
essence, Montaigne proposes the idea that “fate” must have had a role to play in his friendship
with Etienne or that their union came into existence “by some ordinance from heaven.” Both the
appeal to fate and the appeal to the divine are attempts to explain the inexplicable quality of a
genuine friendship. In spite of this desire, it may just be the case that the essence of friendship
cannot be rationally articulated because it is not a rational phenomenon. So what do we make of
this strange tension between certainty and unknowability?

It appears that one engaged in

genuine friendship is certain that it exists and has an apparently indisputable knowledge of his
own motives, judgments and intentions: the stuff that is constitutive of one’s own identity.
However, the same friend in the same friendship at the same time is incapable of rationally
articulating “the why” of the friendship: the cause/reason for its existence is unknown.
Is this paradoxical tension between certainty and inexplicability a problem for
Nietzsche’s account of friendship? He does not appear to be explicitly aware of it in his
writings, but perhaps that is because the paradox is only apparent and not real. Nietzsche would
reply that friendship is explicable through a proper understanding of the vices and attitudes of
excess and deficiency that oppose friendship and threaten to destroy it. What may forever
remain inexplicable is the rational articulation of ‘the why’ of a particular friendship, but that is
okay because friendship, and the love substantiating it, is not a completely or even a mostly
rational phenomenon. Nietzsche could also agree that what is certain is ‘the that’ of a friendship:
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it is possible for one to know that one loves the friend but not know why or from whence one’s
love originates.
A third objection that one might raise against this account of friendship is that it
necessarily involves a kind of injustice. If friendship of the kind described essentially involves
an injustice, then there is something intrinsically unethical about friendship. Inequality is the
particular kind of injustice associated with friendship, for the friend is partial to the loved one
and acts accordingly. Is this not a form of injustice against all those who are not one’s friends?
Nietzsche would have two replies to this worry. First, there may be no way to resolve the
ongoing conflict between friendship and justice. The kind of individual who possesses the talent
for friendship will likely also have the practical wisdom to know that there is no perfect
instantiation of justice in the world: punishments and rewards are never perfectly equal to their
corresponding actions. Such a figure capable of friendship might also recognize that there can be
no perfect equality even between friends, and as discussed above will be able to rejoice at the
other’s good fortune, even when it surpasses her own. Secondly, because justice has been
traditionally conceived as the hallmark “virtue” of traditional morality, Nietzsche would say that
it too is something that must be overcome—especially when the drive for revenge exists under
the guise of justice. Thus, his concluding thought on such a worry would be: “Whatever is done
from love always occurs beyond good and evil.”256
Another objection to Nietzsche’s account of the virtue of friendship as a mean condition
is the charge of egoism. The project of self-realization (i.e. exemplifying the will to power) and
the virtue of friendship are supposed to be mutually supportive; however, there is a sense in
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which the on-going process of becoming a real self has a certain primacy to it. If that is so, then
it could be objected that friendship is merely being used as an instrument for the larger goal of
self-becoming, and the friend is not loved for her own sake but only insofar as he reflects or
serves my own self-directed project. This is a small-scale version of the broader charge that is
often raised against the connection between the virtues and human flourishing. So does the
striving for one’s own human flourishing undermine the other-orientation of (most of) the
virtues? Does the overarching project of striving to exemplify the will to power undermine the
genuineness of friendship? The objection at hand rests on a misunderstanding of the target of
action done from virtue and the relationship between virtue, beauty and flourishing. Since we
are claiming that friendship is a particularly complex form of excellence that contributes to
human flourishing, let’s consider exactly how its practice relates to human flourishing. For an
action to be virtuous, an individual must act for the sake of the virtue, but this phrase has two
meanings, both of which apply: for the sake of the virtue itself and for the sake of the target of
the virtue. So in the case of friendship, when one acts virtuously, one acts for the sake of
friendship and for the sake of the target of that virtue, namely the friend. One could also say that
the target of such a virtue is the friendship itself and not just the friend, for each friend by him or
herself is a mere part of a larger whole. In this sense, activities that are shared and performed
both for the sake of the friend but also for the sake of the friendship, in which the telos is “the
we,” and neither merely “the other” or “the self.” Although given what we have already said
about the extremes of sameness/difference and individuality/sharedness, the Nietzschean version
of “the we” is one that recognizes and treats both members of that union as separate individuals,
keeping each person’s individuality intact. Now, through the spiritual nourishment that takes
place in friendship, which leads to contemplation and action, each friend’s trajectory toward a
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more fully realized self is enhanced. One may or may not recognize how the virtue of friendship
supports self-realization, but perhaps we are mostly concerned with the cases where one is
conscious of this fact. As we have pointed out, an action done for the sake of the friend, or for
the sake of the friendship, is performed as a mean condition that is a healthy balance between a
plurality of continua of vices that are destructive to selfhood. How does friendship become an
active condition that is also done “for the sake of the beautiful”? Beauty is both created and
discovered in friendship in its unfolding amidst the complex web of vices that exist and into
which there is a tendency to get trapped. However, neither beauty nor flourishing is a conscious
target of action when acting for the sake of friendship. To compare, think of the virtue of
sympathy. The target of sympathy is the putting oneself into the shoes of another—to show
another that you understand what they feel, especially a feeling of despair or hopelessness. The
hitting of that target is not consciously done for the sake of the beautiful nor for the sake of one’s
own flourishing. Nevertheless, the hitting of that target constitutes an action that is done for the
sake of the beautiful, and such a performance is also a constitutive element in a life of
flourishing. A similar relation to flourishing exists for other virtues as well, each of which is a
form of excellence.

The courageous individual does not exemplify courage for his own

flourishing. He does so because he recognizes the need to overcome some danger that threatens
something valuable, yet his courage does play a constitutive role in his flourishing.

The

courteous individual does not exemplify courtesy for his own flourishing. He does so in order to
respect the human dignity in others, yet his courtesy does play a constitutive role in his
flourishing. The honest individual exemplifies his virtue in his having the strength to face up to
the realities that are of the utmost importance, especially those aspects of the world that have
deep ramifications for how one may or may not choose to live. Such honesty toward a friend has
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as its target the accurate representation of one’s inner spiritual content, not one’s own
flourishing. Nevertheless, honesty is one constitutive element in an individual’s flourishing. So,
there is a sense in which genuine friendship can be engaged in and this engagement is for the
project of self-realization, but actions done for the sake of friendship (or any other virtue) has its
own target that is independent from yet constitutive of the ultimate goal of flourishing.
Flourishing, in my case, should be taken to be equivalent to exemplifying the will to power, or
achieving a high degree of self-realization.

Crossing the Footbridge between Friendship and Self-Realization
The virtue of friendship and the will to power mutually support each other’s
exemplification, in which there is a kind of bi-directionality to the relation. Concerning the
manner in which friendship supports the exemplification of the will to power, if this virtue does
play the role of midwife to the will to power in a particular individual, then it must also enhance
the process of achieving self-realization. If this is the case, then friendship is able to assist in the
satisfaction of the existential needs and do so for the sake of the beautiful. As I will show, the
engagement in genuine friendship does play this role in regard to all seven existential needs: the
need for a frame of orientation; the need for devotion; the need for rootedness; the need for
unity; the need for effectiveness; the need for excitation/stimulation; and the need for a relation
of self-love. Bear in mind that the existential needs are grounded in humanity’s contradictory
nature where humankind’s instincts have diminished to a minimum and humankind’s
consciousness, reason and imagination have expanded to a maximum—i.e. where man has fallen
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out of nature.257 So we are less and less creatures run by instinct and increasingly conscious
beings. However, despite the development of consciousness in the human species, we seem to
be less and less conscious of our “selves.” But we must be clear what we mean by “conscious of
our ‘selves’.” For Nietzsche, consciousness is inextricably tied to our social or herd nature, but I
take this to represent two possible modes of consciousness. Consciousness could be called forth
by one’s need to communicate either with the herd, in which one will “know” less and less
because our words only allow to communicate the most superficial and worst parts of that which
wants to be communicated; or consciousness can be employed in one’s need to communicate
(socially) within the community of one’s peers or friends. A related distinction that Nietzsche
makes is that between knowledge (or consciousness) as reducing the strange to the familiar and
knowledge (or consciousness) as understanding or comprehension.

The former sense of

consciousness is broader in that all knowing is merely a taking what is strange and making it
familiar, yet the latter sense of consciousness is not necessarily present when the former is
operating. Of those philosophers who have claimed to have found “knowledge,” Nietzsche says:
Even the most cautious among [the men of knowledge] suppose that what is familiar is at
least more easily knowable than what is strange, and that, for example, sound method
demands that we start from the “inner world,” from the “facts of consciousness,” because
this world is more familiar to us. Errors of errors!258
It is not necessarily the case that something’s being “not-strange” and familiar means that it is
therefore known, or has become something of which one is now conscious. Familiarity does not
necessarily imply knowability, or a thing’s capacity to be an object of consciousness.
Nietzsche’s comments here should be interpreted as regarding knowledge or consciousness of
the self. Two Nietzschean character-types quickly come to mind, the blond beast of prey and the
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man of ressentiment who is ensnared within his own slave morality. The blond beast represents
a figure that embodies pure action but one whose “goodness” is “free from all social constraints”
and who lacks the mirror of consciousness generated by the development of the phenomena of
responsibility, guilt and bad conscience. As such the blond beast has a kind of pre-cultural
existence and cannot experience the inward turn of slave morality. Conversely, the emergence of
the bad conscience seems to be a condition for the possibility of one’s intellectual conscience—
“a conscience behind your ‘conscience’”—but such a contemplative self-grasping can only be
transfigured into self-realization by sublimating the active attitude of the master or overcoming
the reactive attitude of the slave. Thus, the model of a synthesis of contemplation and action that
we found in Nietzsche’s third untimely meditation remains at-work in the Genealogy’s
movements of “morality.” Despite consciousness’ late emergence in the human species, we are
more conscious of ourselves in that we feel as though we are familiar with ourselves, but we are
less and less conscious of our ‘selves’ in that we do not fully comprehend what it means to be a
real self.
Remember though that mere self-consciousness is insufficient for the realization of a self.
In order to accomplish a full degree of self-realization, it would then require that an individual
attain a kind of wisdom about himself. We might give it a new name: self-wisdom. Despite
what Nietzsche says about the antithesis between wisdom and action, wisdom, especially about
the self, seems to be inherently directed toward the promotion of living well as opposed to
knowledge, which can often be inimical to life as it manifests itself in an individual.259 That
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being said, we now must explicate how friendship specifically supports the satisfaction of each
of the existential needs.
We begin with the existential need for unity, particularly the kind of inner unity between
the varying drives and perspectives that reside within an individual. Unlike the rest of the
animals in nature who get along with their perceptions, feelings and instincts, human beings have
the additional phenomenon of consciousness. Specifically, we have the capacity to be conscious
of our thoughts, feelings and instincts. Self-consciousness is strange because it engenders an
inner division between a subject who can be conscious and an object of whom one can be
conscious, yet the subject and the object appear to be one and the same entity. Alternatively, we
might say that they are parts of the same whole, yet the mere inner split of “the whole” puts its
whole-ness into question. When we look at human experience, we discover that the self’s
closeness with itself makes self-observation rather difficult. The fact that an individual can ask
himself “Who am I?” and the fact that such a question remains open-ended and continuously
presents an invitation to be pondered cause us to wonder whether self-consciousness (and selfwisdom) is not something already given but a step in the achieving of self-realization. Aristotle
explicates this observation about the hiddenness of oneself from oneself in the Magna Moralia:
Since then it is in fact a very difficult thing, as even some of the wise have said, to know
oneself, and a very pleasant one (for knowing oneself is pleasant), we will not therefore
be able of ourselves to gaze at ourselves. –And that we cannot of ourselves do this to
ourselves is clear from the way we blame other people and do not notice ourselves doing
the same thing. This happens because of kindly disposition or passion; these things
darken correct judgment in many of us.260

seeks to use knowledge for the purpose of realizing a self through action, then it is not
antithetical to life.
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The fact that we blame other people for certain actions and do not at the same time notice
ourselves doing the same things is a strong piece of evidence for the Nietzschean idea that we are
unknown to ourselves. While we should agree with the first part of Aristotle’s claim here, we
have good reason to disagree with the idea that knowing oneself is pleasant, at least a good
portion of the time for most people, for the uncovering of one’s own vices, weaknesses,
inadequacies and deficiencies is probably not a pleasant experience. Because of our incapacity
to gaze at ourselves, an individual requires some other to mirror that which cannot be gazed
upon. The friend is that other who can serve as this rough and imperfect mirror that can best
reveal oneself to oneself. How does the friend assist in one’s satisfaction of his existential
need for unity? Recall our brief remarks earlier about the friend qua enemy and our initial
puzzlement over this idea. What does it mean to for one’s friend to also be one’s best enemy?
Why does Nietzsche consider the capacity to wage war as an essential part of having a friend?
The openness to different perspectives is the quality that Nietzsche is emphasizing here that is
required for friendship to be genuine. Nietzsche says, “If one wants to have a friend one must
also want to wage war for him: and to wage war, one must be capable of being an enemy,” and
“In a friend one should still honor the enemy,” but he cautions us with the question, “Can you go
close to your friend without going over to him?”261 This warning reminds us that friendship
exists somewhere between a complete identification with the other and a total differing from her.
It is in how one distances oneself from his friend that one discovers the connection between
them, especially the distance that surfaces in philosophical disagreement betwixt perspectives.
So the kind of war that one should want to wage for one’s friend is a spiritual war: to wage war
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for one’s thoughts and to be a warrior for knowledge.262 When the friend serves as one’s best
enemy by taking an opposing perspective in intellectual battle, she thereby opens up the
possibility of the kind of philosophical dialectic that can help one fortify his own perspective.
This appears to be the primary way that friendship can assist in satisfying the existential need for
unity, especially the kind of unity amidst diversity of opposing perspectives. This wholeness
amongst manifold of perspectives also satisfies the norm of beauty. To conceive of oneself as a
“pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject” is to occupy a shameful condition whereby
one violates the perspectival nature of reason, humanity and life. Such arrogance represents an
extreme and imaginary form of absolute objectivity that betrays the conditioned nature of a
perspective. However, beauty can be achieved through the capacity to harmonize and to master
a plurality of perspectives, in which a sense of balance (a mean condition) can be obtained, not to
hold each perspective on an equal footing, but to consider each perspective’s merits and demerits
in order to decipher which are the better interpretive stances and which are the worse. Nietzsche
captures this active condition in the third essay of his GM:
…to see differently in this way for once, to want to see differently, is no small discipline
and preparation of the intellect for its future “objectivity”—the latter understood not as
“contemplation without interest” (which is a nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability to
control one’s Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that one knows how to employ a
variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge.263
An individual who has achieved such mastery thus has the ability “to dispose” of those
perspectives that may be useful as foils for a period of time but that ultimately turn out to be
defective, but he also has the ability “to control” the plurality of Pro’s and Con’s not simply in
the service of knowledge but also in the service of life.
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In a similar way, friendship can facilitate how an individual satisfies his need for a frame
of orientation. In a genuine friendship a friend has a somewhat intimate understanding of one’s
current frame of orientation, usually one that has come into being from his socio-cultural
upbringing. Because of such an intimate understanding of what the other’s frame of orientation
is, he has the ability to call into question, and make the other call into question, the status of his
frame of orientation. The three primary kinds of status that ought to be revalued are whether a
frame of orientation is life-affirming or life-negating, whether a framework is spiritually healthy
or sick and whether a framework is occupied for the sake of the beautiful or exemplifies
deformity or ugliness. One manner in which to make such an evaluation is for the friend to assist
one in holding up his current frame of orientation side-by-side by other frames of orientation that
originate in other cultures and possibly in other ages. So, for example, in a genuine friendship
the other can “trigger” a Catholic’s intellectual conscience and force him to do two things: (1)
critically reflect on the tenets of the Catholic doctrine and their historical developments and (2)
contrast Catholicism with the plurality of other frames of orientation, such as Judaism,
Buddhism, Hinduism, atheism or ancient Greek paganism. It is not impossible that a person
could develop the ability to control her own Pro’s and Con’s of various perspectives.
Nevertheless, an individual only possesses one set of eyes, and even if those eyes are highly
perceptive, they may fail to see the reality of certain features of the world. A friend who has hit
the mean condition between dissimulation and honesty will be a balanced counterweight to an
individual, one that understands when and how to be honest at the right times (e.g., assisting one
to recognize the reality of something when the instinct of fear is causing one to be blind to it) and
when and how to be deceptive at the right times (e.g., playing devil’s advocate for a particular
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position that one does not really hold). In genuine friendship, such a dialogue is performed for
the sake of the friend.
The friend has the capacity to play a similar role in assisting the other in satisfying his
need for devotion. Within the parameters of genuine friendship, an individual will give the other
permission to ask the formidable question: “Who or what do you worship?” This question can
be the stimulus causing one to reflect on what or who exactly his object of devotion is and on
whether he should in fact devote himself to such an entity. A good example of a deformed and
misshapen mode of need-satisfaction (for devotion) is the pursuit and worship of a corporate
entity that sees its army of workers as mere means of labor-power as opposed to human beings.
Wal-Mart comes to mind as such a corporate entity. It is probable that there are countless WalMart employees that devote themselves to Wal-Mart as if it were a kind of god of capitalism. In
order to be dislodged from such a strong form of devotion, it would take the kind of honest
contestation of an individual’s mode of need-satisfaction that only a genuine friend can provide.
Friendship plays a helpful role in the satisfaction of the existential need for rootedness—a
role that other relationships fail to play—because of the feeling of kinship essentially
experienced between two friends. Such kinship makes possible a feeling of being at home in the
world that is absent in many other kinds of human relationships. Because in modernity our
capitalistic mode of production treats people less and less as ends in themselves, and more and
more as replaceable employees, the employer-employee relationship will almost always result in
experiences of alienation within the sphere of business. The presence of choice is also much less
existent when it comes to what occupation one currently has and what occupation one might
possibly find. The social and economic conditions that radically limit what an individual can
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“choose” for himself become extremely pronounced here. A similar kind of absence of choice
exists in familial relationships in that grandparents, parents and siblings are part of the
dimensions of an individual’s existence which is beyond his control. One might argue that there
is a certain “blood rootedness” in family ties that can satisfy an individual’s need for rootedness.
When it comes to the relation between family members, it is possible that the other can be a
force in the process of achieving self-realization, but when this does occur, it will be in virtue of
the family member being a genuine friend and not due to the fact that the two are blood kin.
While the existence of a friendship may not be wholly chosen, for two friends may encounter
each other totally due to chance, the moment of choice must continually renew itself for the
friendship to endure for as long as it can. It is that ongoing revaluation—deliberative choice—
present in genuine friendship that allows an individual to transcend nature (e.g. family) and
which can pave the way to the satisfaction of other existential needs, especially the need for
effectiveness - to which we now turn.
If we remember correctly, the existential need for effectiveness stems from our
powerlessness and our experience of ourselves as powerless in the world. There are several
ways that friendship helps the satisfaction of this need and hence assists the process of selfrealization. The first is the very friendship itself. The friend can serve as a piece of evidence for
an individual that he does have a concrete effect on at least one part of the world: i.e. the friend.
Through this kind of reminder, an individual can recognize that he has an active effect on who
the friend is and on who she is becoming. This reminder can be voiced directly by the friend, or
her presence as a being who has been affected can be simply recognized through perception.
The second manner in which the friend can assist the process of self-realization is by bringing
new avenues for effecting into an individual’s consciousness. A third manner in which efficacy
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can be revealed is through the possibility of joint-action performed by friends. The performance
of some activities cannot exist without another person who is just as much invested in the
activity. Such is the case with games. Without at least one opponent, the game cannot be
played. Gaming is a good example of how joint-action displays effectiveness because one must
retain one’s individuality qua player in order to compete well, as is the case with poker, chess,
Risk or whatever. Also, the doing of an activity with a friend, where it is both done for the sake
of the activity and for the sake of the friend, concretizes it reality.

Through the friend’s

recognition and participation in a shared activity, one’s performance, including his desires,
intentions and hopes, enhances the realization of both friends’ selves. This introduction of new
possibilities by the friend is a crucial form of spiritual nourishment that is the essence of genuine
friendship, which brings us to how friendship enhances the existential need for
stimulation/excitation.
Zarathustra’s thoughts in the section “On the Friend” furnish what I take to be the
essence of genuine friendship. Interestingly enough, this turns out to be an embodiment of what
have been considered to be traditionally feminine qualities. In the previous section of this
chapter, the ‘what-it-is’ of friendship remained somewhat elusive, in that we were able to pin
down what excessive and deficient vices were that surround friendship (the ‘what-it’s-not’) but
were not quite able to verbalize its core. In Zarathustra, however, Nietzsche is more explicit in
his claim that the core of friendship is the activity of nourishment, a kind of nourishing for the
sake of the other that is modeled by the mother-child relationship. The mother-child serves as
model for the kind of friendship that Nietzsche praises because it demonstrates how one can love
the other person for his own sake and also have that love and that particular other be a
constitutive element in one’s own flourishing. Nietzsche again draws a parallel with Aristotle on
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this mother-child model for genuine friendship.

In Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics,

Aristotle says, “For people consider a friend to be someone who wishes for and does good
things, or things that seem good, for the sake of the other person, or who wants the friend to be
and to live, for the friend’s own sake, which is the very thing mothers feel toward their children,
and which friends who are in conflict feel.”264 Just as a mother wishes for and does good things
for her child, a friend wishes for and does good things both for the friend’s own sake (for him to
be and to live) and for one’s own flourishing. In Book VIII Aristotle also stresses the active and
other-oriented aspects of friendship by reference to the mother-child model:
But friendship seems to be present in loving more than in being loved. A sign of this is that
mothers delight in loving, for some of them give up their own children to be brought up, and feel
love just in knowing them, not seeking to be loved in return if both are not possible; it seems to
be sufficient for them if they see their children doing well, and they love them even if the
children, in their ignorance, give back nothing of what is due to a mother.265
Even though the mother-child model here described does not contain the reciprocation involved
with friendship, it does illustrate the kind of nourishing activity that ought to be present in
friendship. Nietzsche also emphasizes the activities of loving and nourishing as definitive of
what the virtue of friendship is. In order for one to be a friend, and not simply have friends, one
must spiritually nourish the other, where spiritual nourishment involves producing both affective
and cognitive growth. Zarathustra asks his reader, “Are you pure air and solitude and bread and
medicine for your friend? Some cannot loosen their own chains and can nevertheless redeem
their friends.”266 To be ein Erlöser—a liberator—of one’s friend is to be capable of liberating or
redeeming the friend from some kind of fettered state of being. The fettered state of being from
which one wishes to be liberated is that of being merely fragments and limbs and dreadful
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accidents, and the condition toward which one wishes to be redeemed is that of realized
selfhood. What is crucial to notice here is that someone may be better suited to help his friend
achieve self-realization than he is to achieve it himself. This process of liberating the friend is
portrayed as an activity of nourishment, specifically one that brings the other toward a state of
spiritual health.

One must be “pure air” and “bread” and “medicine” and “solitude” to

successfully be a friend to the other, each of those images symbolizing means toward greater
health. In saying that a friend must be solitude as a means of greater health for his friend,
Nietzsche confirms that the kind of solitude he is advocating is a solitude shared by two friends,
as opposed to a complete isolation from everyone. Nietzsche praises this type of solitude
elsewhere when he warns of the future disappearance of the contemplative life because of the
breathless haste of work and industriousness saying, “Soon we may well reach the point where
people can no longer give in to the desire for a vita contemplativa (that is, taking a walk with
ideas and friends) without self-contempt and a bad conscience.”267

Similarly, Nietzsche

implicitly distinguishes between the solitude of friends and the unclean quality of associating
with society. Near the end of the section “What is Noble” in BGE he states
And to remain master of one’s four virtues: of courage, insight, sympathy, and solitude.
For solitude is a virtue for us, as a sublime bent and urge for cleanliness which guesses
how all contact between man and man—“in society”—involves inevitable uncleanliness.
All community makes men—somehow, somewhere, sometime “common.”268
According to Nietzsche, association “in society” involves inevitable uncleanliness, but on the
contrary association with the friend with whom one can sympathize, on the contrary, is a form of
human association that is “clean.” Such an unspoken implication seems warranted given the
inclusion of sympathy as one of the virtues of the noble soul.
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So, the friend’s role as

philosophical interlocutor aides his friend’s process of incorporating as much truth (or as many
perspectives) as possible in order to enrich and deepen his spiritual health, which thereby
beautifully satisfies his need for active stimuli. For Nietzsche, the norm of beauty is satisfied
through an individual’s becoming a poet or an artist or being the stimulus to this process for a
friend. However, the work of art or the poem that is created does not have any distance between
it and its creator. What I think Nietzsche has in mind in stimulating or being stimulated for the
sake of the beautiful is for one to become a poet of one’s life, or for one to simultaneously be
both artist and work of art. More precisely, active stimulation serves as the impetus to begin (or
to continue) to recognize and become a creator and not merely be a creature.
Finally, how does the virtue of friendship support the existential need for a relation of
self-love? For, on the contrary, it has been argued by some that one is closest to oneself and that
the relation that one first has with oneself will be a model for the relations that one bears to
others.269 So, for example, if one is a friend to oneself, then one will be capable of being a friend
to another and one will treat the other as another self. Conversely, if one feels contempt toward
oneself (let us say for being weak-willed or vicious in some way), then one will externalize this
self-orientation outward toward others. According to this line of thought, being a friend with
oneself, or developing and possessing a relation of self-love, will support and enhance how one’s
exemplifies the virtue of friendship with another.

However, we were interested in how

friendship supports the satisfaction of the need for self-love, not vice versa.

The key to

understanding the relation between friendship and the possible satisfaction of the existential need
for self-love lies in the mutual reciprocity of both activities. Nietzsche expresses the idea that
learning to love some particular others may strengthen an individual’s ability to love himself. In
269
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other words, engaging in genuine friendship with another, where one spiritually nourishes the
other for her own sake, can also serve as a model for how one might become a friend to oneself.
This possibility gains credence especially when we question the Aristotelian assumption
that a person is closest to himself. While this may have been more true in the ancient Greek
polis, our social and political conditions in modernity have made the chances for finding and
creating a sense of self very difficult. While it has had its benefits, the rise of capitalism has
created an economic atmosphere where competition and profit take priority over the treatment of
workers as human beings. While religious freedom and religious toleration have also have their
benefits, those benefits have been overshadowed by the life-negating and self-negating effects of
such institutions. And despite the advantages of liberal democracy, such a form of government
has embedded the values of equality and individual liberty so far into the core of our being that
they cannot be seen as anything other than absolute by nearly all. Thus, the tendency for an
individual to have the experience of himself as alien, or as something other than what he is, has
become widespread.
Zarathustra’s teachings on the friend may lend the best understanding between friendship
and the realization of a self. In the First Part of Zarathustra’s journey, he makes a transition from
the more populated towns such as The Motley Cow, which are filled with neighbors, to the more
isolated and secluded forests, where only Zarathustra and his friends/disciples are present. The
three themes that permeate the first part of his journey are the will to power’s possible
production of the overman (or in my language: the realization of a self), the strange manner in
which the friend can buttress such self realization and the way that neighbor-love fails by serving
as an escape from self rather than a movement toward its creation.
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In the First Part of

Zarathustra’s speeches, these three themes collide in the following sections: “On the Friend,”
“On the Thousand and One Goals,” and “On Love of the Neighbor.” In order to understand the
contrast between neighbor-love and friendship, and how the former fails and the latter succeeds
in being supportive of self-realization, we must analyze these three sections and view them as a
kind of whole that represents the general movement of Nietzsche’s account of friendship and
selfhood.

Distinguishing Erotic Love, Neighbor-Love and Friendship
The remainder of the section “On the Friend” complicates Zarathustra’s (and
Nietzsche’s) feminine account of friendship, for in it Zarathustra suggests that there is an
essentially feminine quality to genuine friendship, yet he raises the possibility that woman, as she
now exists, is not yet capable of experiencing such friendship. Zarathustra asks us two questions
which set up conditions for the possibility of friendship, “Are you a slave? Then you cannot be a
friend. Are you a tyrant? Then you cannot have friends.”270 At first glance, what this appears to
mean is that one cannot be a friend if one is less-than-human, or a mere tool of one’s owner, and
that one cannot have friends if one is unjust and oppressive, treating others as mere tools.
However, the very next line forces us to give much more precise meaning to the slavishness and
tyranny that prohibit friendship. Zarathustra says, “All-too-long have a slave and a tyrant been
concealed in woman.

Therefore woman is not yet capable of friendship: she knows only

love.”271 What could Zarathustra possibly mean in declaring that it is woman who has all-toolong concealed both a slave and a tyrant inside her? The way to unravel this peculiar claim is to
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figure out Nietzsche’s interpretation of how woman has historically and socio-culturally been
both a slave and a tyrant. Regarding Nietzsche’s claim that woman is a slave, woman is slavish
in so far as she has been considered the second sex while man has been considered to be the
superior sex.

Because woman is perceived as the inferior sex, especially by man, social

conditions have made her into a mere instrument of man. The slavishness that is concealed in
this perception of woman renders her fundamentally unequal and lesser than a whole human
being, which would make impossible the kind of equality that is traditionally understood to be
necessary for friendship. While such inequality based on sex is clearly a misperception of the
reality of woman’s ability to engage in genuine human relationships, such an interpretation of
woman’s subordinate role has not yet been fully overcome. Regarding Nietzsche’s claim that
woman is a tyrant, woman is tyrannical in the sense that she has been the primary caregiver,
nurturer and educator of the child throughout history. Her primacy as ruler of the child can
perhaps be seen as oppressive and dominating not in that woman has prohibited man to
participate in the upbringing of the child but that because of woman’s traditionally given role as
primary caregiver and of man’s lack of participation in the family, she was allowed to develop a
kind of tyrannical role over child-rearing.

This result may have been and may still be

unrecognized by man. Because he has historically forgone the position of primary care-giver, he
has likely weakened his ability to reclaim this position. We might say that woman has ruled the
realm of childrearing—with an iron fist! The concealment of this kind of tyrannical stance
would engender another kind of inequality where woman is fundamentally superior to man due
to his inability to nurture and care and superior to the child due to the child’s complete
dependence on woman. I take this to be a brief analysis of Nietzsche’s beliefs on how “woman”
figures into his account of friendship. Regardless of whether Nietzsche’s gender role analysis is
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completely accurate, we can hopefully gain a better understanding of Nietzsche feminine
dimension of friendship through it. So at this point, we might say that it is in the above senses
that woman up till now has concealed both slave and tyrant within her and that this has put her in
a rather paradoxical position where there is a two-fold sense of inequality that prevents her from
engaging in genuine friendship.
If this description of woman is correct, then would woman be incapable of engaging in
friendship with other women who conceal both slave and tyrant? Though Nietzsche suggests
otherwise, it would seem that two women who are tyrannical and slavish in the same way would
have a kinship to each other that enabled friendship. Those individuals who can understand each
other’s conditions of oppression or servitude would share the same pain together and likely
would desire to nourish each other back to spiritual health.
Zarathustra concludes, however, that the only kind of love that woman knows is erotic
love, which necessarily involves an inequality between lover and beloved. This appears to be the
kind of love with which Zarathustra is contrasting friendship.

Woman’s incapacities for

friendship—and conversely her ability to only experience erotic love—now include “injustice
and blindness against everything that she does not love.” But why blame such injustice and
blindness against everyone other than the object of her love? When in the grip of eros, doesn’t
the lover necessarily place the beloved on a pedestal high above everyone else? Is Zarathustra
here negatively criticizing “the assault” and “the lightning” and “the night along light” that are
associated with the love of a woman? Zarathustra’s tirade of criticisms against woman here
constitute a kind of argument claiming that up until this point in the history of humankind,
woman has valued erotic love over friendship, and as she centers herself with this love, she is
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still operating from the drive to be possessed (or possibly also the drive to possess). Operating
within the bounds of mere possession makes it impossible to achieve the higher ideal of
friendship, in which self and other are not fettered by “sick selfishness.”272 If we were to
attribute a conclusion to Zarathustra’s teaching on friendship, it would be: Because society has
made woman into a fundamentally unequal being—sometimes a slave and sometimes a tyrant
and always only capable of an unequal love—she is not yet capable of friendship. If this were
the final conclusion, then it would seem still possible for man to partake in that which woman
cannot do. But Zarathustra continues, declaring, “But tell me, you men, who among you is
capable of friendship? Alas, behold your poverty, you men, and the meanness of your souls!”273
It turns out that neither woman nor man is yet capable of friendship, for man’s soul is empty and
has no riches in it to give. One may even claim that Zarathustra is intimating that man is even
less capable of friendship than woman is because he is even more fettered by the chains of erotic
love and possesses an inner nothingness due to his desire—even more so than woman does.274
So, in that way man is slavish, but in his oppressive stance toward woman he also appears to be
tyrannical. We are left to wonder just how possible it is for either man or woman to be capable
of friendship since both appear to conceal slave and tyrant, but in different ways.
In her analysis of Nietzsche’s notion of woman as friend, Denise Schaeffer analyzes his
notion of friendship as a higher ideal in sections 14 and 61 of the GS claiming, “Friendship is
presented as higher than the self-destructive proximity of love’s lust for possession, and as
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higher than the absolute distance required for complete self-sufficiency.”275 Given Nietzsche’s
critique of erotic love, and both man and woman’s up-to-present bondage to it, and his claim that
solitude stemming from one’s bad love of oneself turns such solitude into a prison, it is correct to
say that friendship is “higher than” both extremes of proximity and distance, especially if we
think of its relation as a mean condition between them.
The thought that man’s soul is poverty-stricken and mean does indicate that a particular
kind of self-orientation is needed in order to be able to engage in genuine friendship. Zarathustra
opposes neighbor-love to friendship, and he argues that neighbor-love involves a kind of
selflessness that makes friendship difficult if not impossible to achieve. So he states that “your
love of the neighbor is your bad love of yourselves,” which signifies that neighbor-love (also
known as universal love) is an escape from self.276 Zarathustra recognizes that the JudeoChristian imperative of “the you” has reigned supreme for centuries and has been pronounced
holy; nevertheless, he adopts a hopeful attitude that “the I” will replace “the you” in some future
time.

The section “On the Love of the Neighbor” details just how neighbor-love is not

conducive to self-realization and how friendship is the best midwife for the birth of a self.
Because of the absolute and unconditional quality of neighbor-love, it does not demand the
growth and perfection of the self that is constitutive of a will to power. Neighbor-love does not
demand that one satisfy one’s existential needs by the norm of beauty, for in neighbor-love there
is a continual disintegration of self. So when Zarathustra recommends love of “the farthest,” he
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is advocating a love of that highest self which is farthest away and still unrealized. Zarathustra
again seduces his reader by challenging him:
Higher than love of the neighbor is love of the farthest and the future; higher yet than
love of human beings I esteem the love of things and ghosts. This ghost that runs after
you, my brother, is more beautiful than you; why do you not give him your flesh and
your bones? But you are afraid and run to your neighbor.277
There is a rough synonymy between “ghost” ≈ “spirit” ≈ “self” ≈ “the farthest” ≈ “the future”,
and understanding these entities as meaning approximately the same entity renders a more
intelligible reading of this section. Upon the conscious recognition of the spiritual labor that is
involved in self-realization and upon becoming conscious of one’s instincts and needs, it is the
fear of the work necessary for self-realization and the ease with which one can hide from “the
farthest” that impels one to neighbor-love. One might ask about the strange temporal alignment
of “ghost” and “the farthest,” for Zarathustra says that this ghost runs after you. But isn’t it my
current self that runs after this ghost? The most reasonable explanation for this non-linear
temporal aspect of self-realization is that such a process is circular in nature. It requires cycles of
Untergang and Überwindung in which it may sometimes seem that the ghost to whom you are
striving to give your flesh and bones is behind you, for you have come out of a period of going
under and approaching a new overcoming.

Another possibility is that this is merely

metaphorical language depicting an image of circularity that ought not to be taken too literally.
Regardless, the passage supports the idea that a more fully realized self acquires a kind of beauty
that opposes the ugliness and deformity of a fragmented self.
In his critique of neighbor-love, Zarathustra cites the inability to endure oneself and the
inability to love oneself as impetuses to escape from self. In other words, the failure to endure
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and love oneself is a failure to satisfy the existential need for self-love. Zarathustra’s teachings
concerning neighbor-love culminate with the relationship between friendship and the overman:
I teach you not the neighbor, but the friend. The friend should be the festival of the earth
to you and an anticipation of the overman. I teach you the friend and his overflowing
heart. But one must learn to be a sponge if one wants to be loved by hearts that overflow.
I teach you the friend in whom the world stands completed, a bowl of goodness—the
creating friend who always has a completed world to give away. And as the world rolled
apart for him, it rolls together again in circles for him, as the becoming of the good
through
evil,
as
the
becoming
of
purpose
out
of
accident.
-------Let the future and the farthest be for you the cause of your today: in your friend you
shall
love
the
overman
as
your
cause.
-------My brothers, love the neighbor I do not recommend to you: I recommend to you
love of the farthest.278
When Zarathustra says that the friend should be an anticipation of the overman, he means that
the friend (if genuine) should be and can be a midwife to the realization of a whole self (an
overman) that lies within. However, in addition to being a friend one must also be able to absorb
(like a sponge) that which the friend has to offer. Notice that what is being offered in a genuine
friendship is “a completed world.” Such is a gift that one friend gives to another, and being so it
is similar to the gift that wisdom gives to the philosopher qua a friend to wisdom, particularly
when we remember that world-creation is an incomplete and preliminary stage in self-creation.
This idea is confirmed in Zarathustra’s clue that one’s “cause” [Ursache] is both the future and
the farthest and the overman, and that through friendship it becomes possible to create purpose
out of accident, and to realize a self out of a collection of needs and instincts.
On a final note, it may not be the case that Nietzsche is claiming that neighbor-love has
no value whatsoever. It may just be that neighbor-love holds a secondary kind of value to
friendship because it cannot assist in the project of self-realization the way that friendship can.
The higher status of friendship then does depend on whether selfhood is actually something
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valuable. Throughout, I have been operating under the assumption that selfhood, the realization
of a self, is something that we ought to value. However, given the Nietzschean imperative of
revaluation of all values, it would seem that even selfhood can come under some scrutiny.
Whether selfhood and its attainment is something that is objectively valuable may be a question
that has no clear answer—certainly not for a Nietzschean who is skeptical about claims regarding
the ‘objectivity’ of values. However, just because it is difficult to determine what kind of value
selfhood has does not mean that we cannot make an attempt at an answer. Getting ensnared in
the falsely dichotomy between objective value and subjective value is not instructive in
determining why and how we should value selfhood, for the realization of a self is neither
absolutely and objectively valuable nor does its value merely depend on a subject’s whim and
fancy. The former option is not the case because nothing is absolutely intrinsically valuable.
Nothing has value outside of some perspective which grants it its value; however, the danger
here is that the gravity of selfhood seems to disappear. The latter option is not the case because
selfhood’s value does not depend solely on whether some individual does in fact happen to
desire it. Imagine someone deciding that he no longer cares about becoming a real self and
selfhood’s value just vanishing into thin air, just like that. Thus, if selfhood is neither objectively
valuable nor subjectively valuable, then where do we stand concerning the question: Why should
I care about achieving self-realization? Perhaps we cannot say that a person “should” or “should
not” unqualifiedly be motivated to realize a self. It is possible, and more often the case than not,
that people are not capable of becoming selves or have no desire to engage in such a process. I
believe that we can say that an individual who does become a self expresses a character that is
more excellent human being, and insofar as a person exists within the appropriate conditions and
has the needed reflective resources, he will be motivated to realize a self. As such, the value of
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selfhood remains integrally connected to the human condition that we occupy, and selfhood’s
value is only as real as its exemplification by certain human beings.

Conclusion
In this dissertation, I have presented a new interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche’s
doctrine of the will to power. What it means to exemplify a will to power is to realize a self, a
process which does not necessarily have a terminus within a single human life. I have argued
that the foundation for this view lies in an understanding of human nature as a contradiction
between instincts and consciousness. I have explicated the nature of the existential needs that
arise from human existence as such. As an advocate of this aspect of Nietzsche’s view, I have
also argued that beauty is the fundamental norm that can guide how the existential needs are to
be satisfied, if a person is to achieve the kind of excellence, or virtue, that Nietzsche praises. By
paying attention to Nietzsche’s early “untimely” thoughts on selfhood, I have shown that he does
provide an interesting progression of models for an individual who has attained a high degree of
self-realization: the saint, the artist and the philosopher. Insofar as the philosopher is the model
of the synthesis of contemplation and action, I have claimed that Arthur Schopenhauer serves as
the penultimate model of one who exemplifies the will to power. Not only did he satisfy the
existential needs as they existed within him, but he satisfied them for the sake of the beautiful,
operating under the fundamental norm of beauty. I have contended that the particular virtue of
friendship is that that virtue which can best support the achieving of self-realization, given its
status as simultaneously other-oriented and self-oriented and given its status as a mean condition
between different continua of vices. Taking cues from Nietzsche, I have argued that genuine
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friendship is a form of excellence that not only supports but also is supported by an
exemplification of a will to power.
With an eye toward the future, it is my hope that this Nietzschean account of human
flourishing can provide a framework to better understand how a virtue ethical approach to
normativity can be applied to contemporary moral problems. I acknowledge that my discussion
of beauty is a starting point for further examination of what it means to act “for the sake of the
beautiful.” I believe that paying close attention to Nietzsche’s early writing can also be fruitful
in better understanding his providing a positive account of what it means to be an excellent
human being, particularly regarding expressions of excellence through friendship, honesty,
courage and generosity. Finally, I believe that my interpretation of human flourishing, with its
primary constitutive elements of selfhood and the will to power, can better handle the elements
of luck, chance and fortune that lie outside of our control, yet serve as conditions for the
possibility of human flourishing.
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